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The current thesis examined the processes involved in the generation of 
empathy in infancy. This thesis endorses the combination of developmental and 
cognitive neuroscience techniques for a more comprehensive understanding of 
empathy. In support of this view, the current work has adopted a multi-method 
approach in which neuroimaging, psychophysiological and behavioral techniques have 
been used to examine the cognitive and affective aspects of empathy in infancy. 
Through a series of experimental studies, this thesis has addressed intertwined yet 
different aspects of the experience of empathy.  
Paper 1 investigated individual differences in 8-month-old infants’ neural 
responses to peers’ emotional non-verbal vocalizations by using event-related potential 
(ERP) method and parental reports of infants’ temperament. Results showed that infants 
responded differently to peers’ laughing and crying vocalizations, as indexed by 
modulations in the N100, P200 and late positive component (LPC). Of special interest, 
individual differences in negative emotionality were related to amplitude variations in 
the P200 and LPC components. Paper 2 expands on the previous results by examining 
frontal asymmetry patterns linked to infants’ affective and behavioral responses to a 
peer crying and a peer laughing. Eight-month-old infants underwent two assessment 
sessions on separate days, in which electroencephalography (EEG) and behavioral 
measures were respectively recorded in each day. EEG analysis showed that distinct 
neural patterns were related to the observation of a peer laughing and a peer crying, 
with greater right frontal activation being associated with the observation of a peer 
crying. Furthermore, correlational analysis suggested a positive relation between left 
frontal cortical activation and infants’ attempts to approach a peer crying or infants’ 
attempts to engage with a peer laughing.  
	 iv	
Following on from it, Paper 3 and 4 investigated potential neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying affective and cognitive aspects of empathy. Paper 3 examined 
the role of motor mimicry and affective evaluation processes in infants’ facial matching 
responses to others’ emotional facial expressions by measuring spontaneous facial 
reactions (SFRs). In particular, 4- and 7-month old infants were presented with facial 
expressions of happiness, anger, and fear. Electromyography (EMG) was used to 
measure activation in muscles relevant for forming these expressions: zygomaticus 
major (smiling), corrugator (frowning), and frontalis (forehead raising). Results 
indicated no selective activation of the facial muscles for the expressions in 4-month-
old infants. For 7-month-old infants, evidence for selective facial reactions was found 
especially for happy faces and fearful faces, while angry faces did not show a clear 
differential response.  
Paper 4 goes on to explore the ontogeneis of cognitive aspects of empathy by 
examining the neural correlates underlying false belief (FB) processing in 15-month-
old infants. Using a passive non-verbal FB task, 15-month-old infants were presented 
with sequences of images depicting a character acting congruently (FBc) or 
incongruently (FBi) to her false belief about an object’s location, while EEG was 
continuously recorded. ERPs analysis revealed differences between conditions at 
frontal locations, as indexed by modulations in the N400 component. Specifically, a 
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The ability to share and understand others’ feelings is crucial to interact 
successfully in our social environment. Broadly defined as empathy, this complex 
affective state underlies some of the most meaningful human interactions from mother-
child bonding to more complex prosocial behaviors towards others (Batson, 2009; 
Decety & Svetlova, 2012). In addition, empirical evidence from clinical research 
emphasizes the importance of such a complex emotion in the development of healthy 
social interactions (Blair, 2001, 2005). Indeed, deficits in empathy have been linked to 
the genesis of certain neurodevelopmental disorders such as psychopathy, autism 
spectrum disorder or disruptive behavior disorder (Blair, 2005; Decety & Meyer, 2008). 
Also, some researchers suggest that empathy contributes to the development of moral 
behaviors (e.g. Eisenberg, 2000; Eisenberg & Eggum, 2009; Hoffman, 2000). Given 
the potential negative implications that can result from an atypical development of 
empathy, it is crucial to elucidate the developmental mechanisms underlying empathic 
responses throughout infancy. 
Although a substantial body of research has been conducted on empathy 
development in young children, only a modest number of studies have examined 
empathy during the first year of life. So far, what we know about empathy prior to the 
first birthday, it is that infants seem to be born with an innate ability to resonate with 
others’ emotions (e.g., Hoffman, 1975; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). For instance, few hours 
after birth infants display vocal and facial expressions of distress in response to another 
newborn cry (e.g., Simner, 1971; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Geangu, Benga, Stahl, & 
Striano, 2010). Similarly, by 10-12 weeks of age infants also show emotional resonance 
to adults’ facial and vocal displays of happiness, sadness and anger (e.g., Haviland & 
Lelwilca, 1987; Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1995; Kahana-Kalman, & Walker-
Andrews, 2001). These early signs of affect sharing are thought to be followed by more 
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sophisticated other-oriented responses towards others in distress, which can already be 
observed during the second half of the first year in the form of modest signs of affective 
concern or simple attempts to approach the distressed victim (Hay, Nash, & Pedersen, 
1981; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011). These precocious other-
oriented empathic responses continue to increase gradually throughout childhood (e.g., 
Liew et al., 2011; Nichols, Svetlova, & Brownell, 2010; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 
2010; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, & Chapman, 1992) and are believed to 
constitute the precursor for later prosocial behaviors (Batson, 1991; Decety & Lamm, 
2006; Hoffman, 1982; Knafo & Israel, 2012; Singer, 2006).  
Although it is widely assumed that affect sharing is a likely precursor of empathy, 
this notion has never been directly tested in infants. We still do not have a clear 
understanding of the different mechanisms underlying infants’ ability to share others’ 
emotions and how they relate to the production of later empathic and prosocial 
responses. In adults, evidence suggests that several processes contribute to the 
experience of empathy, such as automatic motor mimicry, emotional appraisal, and 
cognitive perspective taking (e.g., Decety, 2010a; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & 
Meyer, 2008). The extent to which these mechanisms are engaged in early empathy 
development is still not well understood. Behavioral research is limited in its ability to 
address this complex question given the many challenges involved in the study of 
empathy, or any other psychological construct, with preverbal infants. Notably, it is 
difficult to trigger and assess infants’ empathic responses given the fact that they lack 
the ability to provide verbal responses and follow verbal instructions. Nonetheless, 
these inherent limitations can be partially overcome by using neuroimaging and 
psychophysiological techniques, which have the potential to help us to identify and 
understand the component processes that trigger empathy without the need to rely on 
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introspective data. Taken together, the current thesis proposes a neuroscientific 
approach to examine the mechanisms of early empathy development due to its 
promising potential for the evaluation of developing populations.  
The current work will selectively review empirical evidence from social 
neuroscience research on empathy. In particular, this thesis will use current 
neuroscientific models of empathy as a framework to describe this phenomenon as well 
as examine the main neural routes that lead to the experience of empathy. Next, this 
thesis will describe the two key components of empathy (i.e. affective and cognitive) 
along with their potential cognitive and neural mechanisms. For the affective 
component, special attention will be drawn towards current evidence from 
developmental and social neuroscience research on affect sharing and infant-oriented 
empathic responses. Additionally, this thesis will review neuroimaging research on 
infants’ ability to process emotional cues from faces and voices, which is considered to 
be essential for affect sharing. For the cognitive component, theory of mind and 
emotion regulation processes will be discussed in relation to empathy and its 
development across time. Finally, some inter- and intra-personal factors that contribute 
to the modulation of empathy during its development will be reviewed.  
Current Neurocognitive Developmental Models on Social Cognition 
Before getting into specific details on empathy and its development, I would 
like to frame the study of empathy behaviours into wider contemporary developmental 
cognitive neuroscience models of social cognition which have been essential for the 
development of my doctoral studies. Social cognition is a complex cognitive 
phenomenon that covers a wide range of social processes such as perception of 
emotions, join attention, mentalizing, or empathy (Grossman & Johnson, 2007; Nelson, 
Jarcho, & Guyer, 2016). Thus, it is reasonable to think that the neural mechanisms 
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underlying social behaviours do not rely on a unique brain network, but rather the 
combination of multiple neural circuits involved in dissociable yet related functional 
brain processes (Adolphs, 2002; Frith, 2007). Although the human brain is already 
tuned to social stimuli quite early in life (Grossman & Johnson, 2007), neuroimaging 
evidence suggests that these different neural networks are not fully functional at birth, 
and follow different developmental trajectories up to early adulthood (Kilford, Garrett, 
& Blackmore, 2016; Nelson et al., 2016).  
For the last 10 years, multiple adolescent neurocognitive developmental models 
have started to map changes in social behaviours onto maturational changes across 
different brain areas. These models have mainly focused on the bi-directional 
interactions between cognitive-control and affective-motivational systems and their 
associated brain networks (Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Ernst, 2014; Nelson et al., 
2016; Steinberg, 2008). Cognitive control refers to a set of skills that allow the 
modulation of one’s thoughts, feelings, or actions in the pursuit of short- and long- term 
goals. This set of processes, including inhibitory control, working memory, and 
selective attention, is mediated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and displays a protracted 
pattern of maturation that extends up to early adulthood (Casey et al., 2008; Giedd et 
al., 1999; Gotgay et al., 2004; Shaw et al., 2008). The protracted nature of this system 
is closely tied to increases in myelination and pruning in the PFC during adolescence 
(Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997; Mills et al., 2016; Yakovlev & Lecours, 1976), 
processes that are sensitive to be shaped by experience (Leppanen & Nelson, 2009; 
Werker & Hensch, 2015). On the contrary, the affective system, which relies on 
subcortical areas such as the amygdala and the ventral striatum, follows an inverted U-
shape developmental trajectory, with a peak in subcortical bran activation during 
GENERAL	INTRODUCTION	 6	
adolescence followed by a subsequent decline in early adulthood (Casey, Jones, & 
Somerville, 2011; Somerville & Casey, 2010; Scherf, Smith, & Delgado, 2013).  
For the purposes of this thesis, I would like to highlight three main 
neurocognitive models: the dual-system models (Casey et al., 2008; Steinberg, 2008; 
Luna & Wright, 2015), the triadic model (Ernst, Pine, & Hardin, 2006), and the social 
information processing model (Nelson, Leibenluft, McClure, & Pine, 2005). The main 
premise of the dual-system model is that brain areas critical to cognitive control develop 
later and more slowly than brain areas mediating affective and motivational behaviours. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to find several variations of this model regarding the 
developmental course of these systems. For example, while some authors propose that 
the affective system follows an inverted-U shape trajectory, with its maximum peak 
activity during adolescence (Luna & Wright, 2015; Steinberg, 2008), others defend that 
the activation of the affective-motivational system increases until mid-adolescence time 
when it reaches a plateau (Casey et al., 2008). Another point of contention refers to the 
cognitive system, with some dual-systems models defending a linear development 
through late adolescence and early adulthood, whereas others suggest that their 
development reaches a plateau in mid-adolescence. Figure 1 illustrates the 
resemblances and disparities between the distinct versions of the dual-system model. 
Expanding on these dual models, Ernst et al.’ (2006) proposed a triadic model that adds 
a third neural system underlying responses to punishment (avoidance system) anchored 
in the amygdala. According to this model, the reward-related system matures earlier 
than the harm-avoidant system or the cognitive control system, which follows a more 




Figure 1. Schematic presentation of the three main dual-system models. 
Adapted from “The dual systems model: Review, reappraisal, and reaffirmation”, by E. 
P. Shulman, A. R. Smith, K. Silva, G. Icenogle, N. Duell, J. Chein, and L. Steinberg , 
2016, Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience, 17, p.105 
 
Although the models mentioned above have been essential to increase our 
understanding of neurocognitive development, they posit some limitations linked to 
their lack of precision in their predictions, neural labels, inferences and applications 
(see Pfeifer & Allen, 2012, 2016  for review). As Pfeifer and Allen note, these models 
fail to provide precise predictions which in turn may explain the high number of studies 
supporting these models. Moreover, these models are not specific when labelling 
critical brain regions. They often use regional-based labels (e.g. prefrontal cortex) 
rather than network-based labels to describe underlying networks, which are imprecise 
as well as uninformative. This constrain closely links to their lack of precision in the 
specificity of neural inferences. The inferences of these models are based on one-to-
many and many-to-one relationships, which can be misleading. Last, but not least, these 
models tend to explain a wide range of negative developmental outcomes. 
A more refined approach is the social information processing model of 
adolescent development developed by Nelson and colleagues (2005, 2016). This model 
expands and updates the existing models by including more precise definitions and 
predictions of the social brain systems. This model identifies three functional systems: 


















socioemo!onal  system cogni!ve control system
Matura!onal Imbalance ModelB.
(Casey et al., 2008)
Driven Dual Systems ModelC.
(Luna & Wright, 2015)
Fig. 1. Alternative theoretical models of the development of the socioemotional (reward processing) and cognitive control systems from about age 10 to age 25.
adolescence may  not actually be a peak period of vulnerability to
risk-taking (e.g., Defoe et al., 2014; Willoughby et al., 2013; but see
Ernst, 2014 for a response to Willoughby et al.). We  briefly address
these critiques here.
We do not disagree with a fourth critique of the dual sys-
tems model—that it is insufficiently nuanced (Pfeifer and Allen,
2012)—because this is almost certainly correct. However, we
believe that even an admittedly simplified model can serve as a
useful heuristic and, more important, can help to motivate research
needed to flesh out the details of an initially simplistic account (for
a full discussion see Strang et al., 2013). Moreover, given the influ-
ence this perspective continues to have on legal policy and practice,
public health, and popular discourse about adolescence (Steinberg,
2014), it is important to ask whether this simplified account is
helpful or misguided.
It may  be useful at this juncture to clarify our terminology. To
begin, the term “adolescence” warrants discussion. Largely as a
matter of convenience, scholars generally agree that adolescence
begins when pubertal development becomes evident, around age
10 (somewhat later among males). The end of adolescence—the
attainment of adult status—is not easily pegged to any single biolog-
ical or social event, however. In research, adulthood is often defin d
as beginning at either age 18 or 21, the two ages most often tied
to legal majority in the developed world. However, given that 18-
to 21-year-olds in industrialized societies are rarely regarded out-
side the legal system as fully mature adults, and typically have not
attained many of the traditional markers of adult status (e.g., finan-
cial independence, completion of formal education, stable romantic
relationships, full-time employment, pare thood), we prefer to
refer to this age range as “late adolescence.” For purposes of this
paper, our focus is ainly on the second decade of life, from about
ages 10 to 21, which we  subdivide into early adolescence (10–13),
middle adolescence (14–17), and late adolescence (18–21).
Another source of confusion in discussions of the dual systems
perspective concerns levels of analysis, since the perspective refers
to overt behaviors (such as risk taking), the psychological states
hypothesized to motivate them (such as sensation seeking), and
the neural processes believed to undergird th se stat s (such a
reward sensitivity). In an earlier paper (Smith et al., 2013), we  sug-
gested that “reward sensitivity” and “cognitive control” be used to
refer to the neurobiological constructs that are measured in stud-
ies of brain structure or function (see Fig. 2). These neurobiological
phenomena have psychological manifestations (in our terminol-
ogy, “sensation seeking” and “self-regulation”) that are measured
by assessing psychological states or traits through the subjective
reports of individuals or their evaluators.
For heuristic purposes, we use “sensation seeking” as an over-
arching label for a number of interrelated constructs that refer
to the inclination to pursue “varied, novel, complex, and intense
sensations and experiences and the willingness to take physical,
social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experi-
ences” (Zuckerman, 1994, p. 26). Recruitment of brain regions and
systems implicated in reward-processing (e.g., ventral striatum,
orbitofrontal cortex) has been linked to measures of sensation seek-
ing in humans and other animals (Abler et al., 2006; Leyton et al.,
2002; Lind et al., 2005). In a similar vein, we use the label “self-
regulation” to refer to a group of interrelated but distinguishable
constructs that refer to the capacity to deliberately modulate one’s
thoughts, feelings, or actions in the pursuit of planned goals; among
these constructs are impulse control, response inhibition, emotion
regulation, and attentional control. Aspects of self-regulation have
been linked to the functioning of brain regions and systems that
subserve cognitive control (e.g., lateral prefrontal, lateral parietal,
and anterior cingulate cortices) (Luna et al., 2010; Mennigen et al.,
2014).
Variations in sensation seeking and self-regulation, in turn, are
a sociat d with variations in behaviors, including risk taking, which
can be measured through objective reports or observations. In our
model, risk taking is a subset of many aspects of decision making
that share some, but not all, characteristics in common. Further-
more, as Fig. 2 indicates, all decision making takes place within a
broader context that encourages and enables some acts but discour-
ages and prohibits others. As we  discuss, the fact that adolescents’
risk taking is influ nced by the broader context in which it occurs
makes it difficult to move seamlessly between laboratory studies
and the real world.
3. Are adolescents particularly prone to risk taking?
Allusions to adolescence as a time of rash behavior and poor
decision making predate the articulation f the dual systems model
by centuries. And yet, empirical evidence of a mid-adolescent peak
in risk taking (at least in humans) is not unequivocal. As pointed
out in a recent review of epidemiological data, the peak age














Fig. 2. Constructs implicated in the dual systems model of adolescent risk-taking
arranged by level of analysis.
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the perceptual, the affective and the cognitive-regulatory system. According to this 
model, social stimuli are processed in the three nodes in a sequential manner, going 
from perceptual to affective to cognitive. Nonetheless, the model also emphasizes that 
the systems do not work independently but as an interactive network via feedback 
loops. In general this model posits that the three systems rely on different brain areas 
that follow differential developmental courses. Perceptual systems are inherently tuned 
to salient social stimuli early after birth, yet their response becomes increasingly more 
specialised and refined through at least late adolescence and early adulthood (Leppanen 
& Nelson, 2009; Nelson et al., 2016). In contrast, developmental changes in the 
affective system are characterized by phase-specific shifts in social salience and 
behavioural engagement patterns. Although there is not enough evidence, it is believed 
that these swings may be mediated by functional changes within subcortical regions 
(e.g. the amygdala, ventral striatum, septum, nucleus accumbens) related to rapid and 
drastic hormonal alterations at puberty. Finally, the cognitive system displays a 
particularly protracted pattern of maturation, experiencing a decrease in functional 
activity during socials tasks across the transition from adolescence to adulthood.  
In summary, current developmental neurocognitive models of social cognition 
have begun to clarify the developmental course of social cognition and the associated 
brain areas across the lifespan. More importantly, these models provide a rich source 
of hypotheses that are testable using neuroimaging tools, while establish the basis for 
the study of more advanced levels of cognitive development, such as empathy. Yet, 
further research is needed to elucidate how the different systems interact and how 




Towards a Definition of Empathy 
Empathy is a complex psychological phenomenon that has been defined in many 
ways by different academics working in the field, yet only social neuroscientists have 
provided a relatively specific construct for the purpose of research (McCall & Singer, 
2013; Singer & Lamm, 2009). In plain words, when empathising with someone we 
vicariously experience what another person is feeling without confounding the feeling 
with one’s own direct experience. For example, let us imagine a situation in which we 
encounter a close friend whose parents have died in a car accident. Clearly, she is very 
distressed as indexed by her facial and vocal expressions as well as body posture. 
Empathising with our friend will result in the immediate experience of feelings of 
distress in ourselves, yet to a lesser extent, which probably will be followed by active 
attempts to comfort or help her in order to reduce her suffering. During this process, 
commonly known as empathy, we have been able to vicariously experience our friend’s 
distress, to understand how our friend must be feeling after the loss of her parents, to 
regulate our own emotions to avoid self-distress reactions, and to have the motivation 
to provide help. Nonetheless, we do not always empathise with others. For example, 
often we are confronted with the suffering of strangers when reading the newspaper or 
watching the TV news, yet those episodes do not always affect us, either because we 
do not connect with the victims, because we do not fully understand the situation or 
have certain negative beliefs about it, perhaps even because we do not have the time to 
pay attention to it or be bothered by it. Similarly, there are occasions where we may be 
exposed to our friends’ happiness and instead of sharing their joy with them we may 
feel a hint of jealousy or even sadness. Additionally, empathy is not always followed 
by the motivation to assist, help or comfort the other person. For instance, we may feel 
sad for someone who has lost the custody of their children because that person has been 
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found guilty of drug consumption, yet we may not have the motivation to help that 
person because we believe it is the best thing for the children. Together, these examples 
capture the complexity of empathy and illustrate that this phenomenon is not an all or 
none experience. On the contrary, its occurrence can be modulated by multiple factors 
such as characteristics of the empathic emotion, features of the empathizer, the relation 
between the empathizer and target, and the appraisal of the situation (e.g., de 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 2008).  
Although the concept of empathy has a complex nature, this should not be an 
excuse to work towards a more operational definition of empathy able to break this 
psychological construct into its different constitutive components. Though the perfect 
definition of empathy is still not available, current neuroscientific models have adopted 
a more successful approach aimed at mapping cognitive processes onto brain structures, 
illustrating precisely how these processes and underlying brain areas change over time, 
and how environmental factors modulate them. These models directly inform and 
motivate infant brain research and provide a rich source of hypothesis that can be 
assessed using neuroimaging tools (Crone & Ridderinkhof, 2011; Decety & Jackson, 
2004; Engen & Singer, 2013; Kilford, Garrett, & Blakemore, 2016). Regardless of 
differences in terminology, they agree on three principal components (See Figure 2): 
(1) an affective response triggered by the observation or imagination of another 
person’s emotion, which is isomorphic and modulated by the awareness that the other 
person is the source of one’s own affective state; (2) a cognitive ability to understand 
other person’s internal states; and (3) some regulatory mechanisms (Decety, 2007; 
Decety & Jackson, 2004; Decety & Meyer, 2008; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Engen 
& Singer, 2013). This definition has proven to be quite useful since it suggests that 
there are several groups of neurocognitive processes underlying the generation of an 
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empathic response. Furthermore, this description enables us to distinguish empathy 
from other related phenomena such as mimicry, emotional contagion, compassion, 
sympathy, empathic concern or mentalizing (de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Singer & 
Lamm, 2009; McCall & Singer, 2013).  
 
 Figure 2. Schematic representation of current neuroscientific models of 
empathy depicting potential components involved in empathy, their interactions and 









The Generation of Empathy: A Two Components Tale 
Current neuroscientific models of empathy have put forward the view that there 
are at least two different paths to generate empathic responses, which has lead to two 
main components of empathy being distinguished (Decety & Meyer, 2008; de 
Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 2008; Singer, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009; 
Zaki & Ochsner, 2013). Firstly, there is the perceptual-based route (affective 
component) based on bottom-up processes that account for the experience of affect 
sharing. At this low level the empathic response is triggered directly and automatically 
by perceptual information without the need of conscious or effortful processing of the 
other person’s emotional state (Decety & Lamm, 2006; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Singer, 
2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009). Secondly, there is the cognitive-based route (cognitive 
component) based on top-down processes responsible for generating second-order 
representation of others’ feelings while regulating one’s own emotional arousal to avoid 
personal distress. In this case, the empathic response is the result of high-order 
processes such as selective attention, perspective taking or self-regulation skills rather 
than mere perceptual input, which makes the person less dependent on external cues 
(Decety & Lamm, 2006; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Singer, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
According to the model proposed by Decety and colleagues (Decety, 2005; Decety & 
Lamm, 2006; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Decety & Michalska, 2010), these two routes are 
intertwined and work together to generate and modulate empathy in humans. Both 
routes regulate each other through a feedback loop supplemented by top-down (mostly 
regulation and control) and bottom-up (sensory information and body response) 
information processes, adding cognitive flexibility and shaping the initial affective 
sharing response into a more other-oriented response, which may finally motivate the 
production of prosocial acts. 
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The theoretical distinction between a perception-based route and a more 
cognitive-based route in the generation of empathic reactions is consistent with several 
fMRI studies on empathy for pain with adult participants (see for reviews: Fan, Duncan, 
de Greck, & Northoff, 2010; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2010). In brief, these studies 
have shown that the generation of empathy via direct perceptual input (picture-based 
paradigms) is associated with the activation of brain areas previously involved in 
action-perception decoupling such as the somatosensory cortex, the premotor cortex, 
the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and the inferior parietal cortex (IPC) (Engen & Singer, 
2012; Zaki & Ochsner, 2013) as well as areas involved in automatic generation of 
emotions, including the anterior insula (AI), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) for 
pain and disgust, and the amygdala for fear  (Engen & Singer, 2012; Singer, 2006; 
Singer & Lamm, 2009). On the other hand, the induction of empathy via the 
employment of perspective taking skills (cue-based paradigms) has been associated 
with the activation of regions underlying Theory of Mind representations, such as the 
ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), temporal poles (TP) and superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
(Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2000; Castelli, Happe, Frith, & Frith, 2000; 
Engen & Singer, 2012; Singer, 2006; Vogeley et al., 2001; Zaki & Ochsner, 2013).  
Additionally, this division between routes has been supported by empirical 
evidence from clinical studies with patients suffering from different types of empathy 
deficits such as autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) and psychopathy (Blair, 2008; 
Dziobeck et al., 2008; Rogers, Viding, Blair, Frith, & Happe, 2006). Findings from 
these studies suggest that while children with ASD have deficits in cognitive empathy 
(cognitive-based route), children with psychopathic tendencies show deficits in 
emotional empathy (perceptual-based route) (see Blair, 2005 for a review). For 
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instance, although individuals with psychopathic tendencies do not show theory of 
mind impairments (Blair et al., 1996; Dolan & Fullam, 2004; Richell et al., 2003), they 
show deficits in their ability to recognize emotions from facial expressions (Blair, 
Colledge, Murray, & Mitchell, 2001; Blair et al., 2004; Hastings, Tangney, & Stuewig, 
2007). In contrast, while individuals with ASD have deficits in cognitive perspective 
taking (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Castelli, Frith, Happe, & Frith, 2002; 
Happe et al., 1996; Hill & Frith, 2003), they do not show impairments on emotional 
facial recognition tasks (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001; Ozonoff, Pennington, & 
Rogers, 1990; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990). Therefore, there is evidence for a 
double dissociation, with the disruption of the affective component not necessarily 
affecting the functioning of cognitive component, and vice versa.  
There is also extensive behavioral evidence suggesting that these two routes 
follow different developmental pathways, with the affective component developing 
earlier than the cognitive one (e.g., Decety & Michalska, 2010; Decety & Svetlova, 
2012). Thus, while infants are able to respond emotionally to others’ emotions as early 
as few hours after birth (e.g., Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971), it is not until the 
age of 15-18 months when they show some rudimentary abilities for ToM computations 
(e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Song, Onishi, 
Baillargeon & Fisher, 2008; Träuble, Marinović, & Pauen, 2010). This early form of 
ToM continues to develop throughout adolescence into more complex forms (e.g., 
Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Blackmore, 2008, 2012). Congruently, the timeline in 
which affect sharing and perspective taking emerge parallels the maturation of the 
cortical structures underlying them, with the limbic, para-limbic and somatosensory 
regions developing earlier than the prefrontal cortex, which mature later (Giedd et al., 
1999; Gogtay, et al., 2004; Raz et al., 2005; Singer, 2006; Sowell et al., 2003).   
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In summary, there is substantial empirical evidence from developmental, clinical, 
and neuroscientific research that support the theoretical distinction between 
components in the generation and modulation of empathy. This model has important 
consequences for the study of the mechanisms underlying empathy, suggesting the 
presence of dissociable systems with distinct neural bases, having different 
developmental trajectories and serving different functions. Next, this thesis will provide 
a deeper description of the affective and cognitive components of empathy and their 
nominated mechanisms. 
Emotional Component: Affect Sharing 
Precursor of Empathy 
Affect sharing refers to the tendency to resonate with the affective response 
produced by another person without the need to acknowledge that the other is the source 
of one’s own emotion (Batson, 2011; de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; McCall & Singer, 
2013; Singer & Lamm, 2009). This emotional resonance response tends to translate into 
the synchronization of another’s person affective facial expressions, vocalizations or 
body postures (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Although there is a strong 
conceptual overlapping between mimicry and emotional resonance, it is worth 
mentioning that they are not the same process. Motor mimicry does not always involve 
an affective dimension, while affect sharing does not always involve motor mimicry 
for its occurrence since one can simply “catch” other people’s emotions without the 
need to mimic an affective expression (Singer & Lamm, 2009). 
Nowadays it is widely assumed that affect sharing is a likely precursor of 
empathy, even though this assumption has not yet been directly tested (Decety & 
Lamm, 2006; Decety & Mischalska, 2010; Hatfield, Rapson & Le, 2009; Knafo & 
Israel, 2012; Knafo & Uzefovsky, 2013; Simner, 1971; Singer, 2006; Singer & Lamm, 
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2009; McCall & Singer, 2013). This notion was first supported by empirical evidence 
from behavioral studies on contagious crying with neonates, which illustrates that as 
early as few hours after birth newborns are more inclined to cry when exposed to the 
crying of another newborn (Dondi, Simion & Caltran, 1999; Field, Diego, Hernandez-
Reif & Fernandez, 2007; Geangu et al., 2010; Martin & Clark, 1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 
1976; Simner, 1971). Throughout the first year of life, infants continue to respond with 
facial and vocal distress to the crying sounds of their peers (Geangu et al., 2010), and 
this increase in arousal persists throughout toddlerhood, although with lesser intensity 
(Nichols, Svetlova, & Brownell, 2009, 2015). When jointly presented with the 
corresponding facial expressions, these overt responses elicited by peer emotional 
vocalizations are accompanied by autonomic arousal changes as indexed by 
modifications in pupil dilation (Geangu, Hauf, Bharwaj, & Bentz, 2011; Upshaw, 
Kaiser, & Sommerville, 2015).  
Interestingly, these overt emotional responses seem to be modulated by the 
acoustical properties of the cry-like sounds, such that infants cry significantly more 
often when exposed to the sound of another infant crying as opposed to a synthetic cry 
(Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971), to an infant chimpanzee cry (Martin & Clark, 
1982), or to the sound of their own cry (Dondi et al., 1999; Martin & Clark, 1982). 
Likewise, the intensity of the distress stimulus has also proven to be a crucial feature, 
together with infants’ ability to regulate their emotions, in the generation of affect 
sharing. For instance, those studies in which infants were observed to exhibit strong 
self-distress responses used long and intense stimuli of cry, increasing the likelihood of 
over-arousal and emotional dysregulation (e.g., Geangu et al., 2010; Simner, 1971). In 
contrast, infants rarely became distress themselves (as indexed by the occurrence of 
distress vocalizations) in those studies where shorter and milder distress stimuli were 
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used (Hay et al., 1981; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Taken together, this pattern of results 
suggests that milder negative stimuli may have enabled infants to regulate their arousal 
in a more effective way and remain other-focused, yet this hypothesis remains untested. 
It is thus important to control the affective intensity of the cry stimuli in order to account 
for variability in distress reactions and physiological measures (Stevenson & James, 
2008). 
Child-caretaker interactions also offer a unique framework for infants to 
experience affect sharing. Behavioral studies examining affective responsiveness 
suggest that by 10 - 12 weeks of age infants already show emotional resonance to their 
own mothers’ facial and vocal displays of happiness, sadness, and anger in similar 
degree (Fernald et al., 1989; Field, Pickens, Fox, Gonzalez & Nawrocki, 1998; 
Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Kahana- Kalman & Walker-Andrews, 2001; Vaish, 
Grossmann & Woodward, 2008). This resonance response seems to be true in those 
cases where infant-mother dyads are characterized by positive affective synchrony, 
where mothers are likely to imitate infants’ emotional expressions –mostly joy and 
interest –while avoiding to display of negative emotions toward their baby (Malatesta 
& Haviland, 1982; Stern, 1985; Trevarthen, 1979).  
Critically, in reviewing the evidence gathered so far on emotional resonance, 
attention is drawn to the lack of studies on affect sharing for positive emotions. Our 
little knowledge is limited to a small number of studies accentuating the presence of an 
asymmetry in the way infants process positive versus negative affective cues, 
displaying stronger physiological responses towards negative rather than positive 
stimuli (Geangu et al., 2011; Upshaw et al., 2015). This trend is partially supported by 
social referencing studies showing that negative cues from a caregiver or experimenter 
are quite effective in inhibiting infants’ interactions with a novel toy while positive cues 
GENERAL	INTRODUCTION	 18	
do not increase the interaction with that novel target (e.g., Hornik, Risenhoover & 
Gunnar, 1987; Mumme & Fernald, 2003; Mumme, Fernald & Herrera, 1996). Infant 
ERP studies on emotion processing also provide indirect evidence for this asymmetry 
by showing that at the age of 7 months infants exhibit greater attentional preference 
towards fearful faces, as shown by the generation of a larger fronto-central Nc 
component for fearful faces, in comparison to happy and neutral facial expressions (de 
Haan, Belsky, Reid, Volein & Johnson, 2004; Leppänen, Moulson, Vogel-Farley, & 
Nelson 2007; Nelson & de Haan, 1996; Peltola, Leppänen, Mäki, & Hietanen,, 2009). 
Likewise, at the age of 7 months infants’ brain shows greater attentional preference (i.e. 
enhanced early negativity) for angry voices in comparison to happy or neutral prosody 
(Grossmann, Striano, & Friederici, 2005). Together, these findings support the notion 
that affect sharing may undergo a negative bias by the end of the first year of life (Vaish 
et al., 2008).  
In summary, the developmental data suggest that infants are sensitive to others’ 
emotions soon after birth, which is seen by some authors as a direct evidence for an 
inborn empathetic distress reaction. The reviewed evidence also suggests that there is 
some degree of self-other distinction already functioning after birth. Nonetheless, 
multiple relevant questions remain unanswered in this field of research. Undoubtedly, 
more infant studies are needed to examine whether infants resonate to positive 
emotions, whether negative emotions are more contagious than positive ones, and 
ultimately which ontogenetic mechanisms account for infants’ emotional resonance 
emergence. Regarding the mechanisms, there is still debate about the automaticity of 
the affect sharing response, with some theorists claiming that this early contagious 
response is primarily rooted in automatic mimicry processes while others argue that 
affect sharing requires certain emotional information appraisal. This debate will be 
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further described in the next section.  
Motor Mimicry and the Perception-Action Model: Evidence for and against 
Previously considered as a “primitive form of sympathy” (Hatfield et al., 2009; 
Smith, 1976; Spencer, 1870), emotional resonance is thought to rely on two entwined 
mechanisms hypothetically implemented by motor neurons: motor mimicry and 
perception-action coupling (Decety, 2010a, 2010b; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Decety & 
Michalska, 2010; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Preston & de Waal, 2002). This idea is in 
line with the theoretical account of the automatic transmission of emotions, which 
argues that humans tend to automatically mimic others’ facial, vocal or postural 
expressions of emotions and that such motor mimicry evokes the same emotions in the 
observer through perception-action matching (e.g. de Waal, 2009; Hatfield et al., 1994; 
Lipps, 1907).  
Neurophysiological evidence for this perception – action mechanism comes from 
empirical research on mirror neurons in monkeys using single cell electrophysiological 
recordings, which report a cluster of neurons that are selectively active during the 
execution of a specific motor action and during the observation of another person 
performing the same action (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, 
Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Evidence for the existence of these neurons in humans is 
more indirect, and primarily has derived from functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) studies showing an overlap in the activation of the neural networks involved in 
action execution and action observation (e.g., Blackmore & Decety, 2001; Decety & 
Grezes, 2006). Remarkably, these overlapping regions are homologous to the brain 
areas activated in the monkey brain, including the inferior frontal gyrus, the ventral 
premotor cortex or the inferior parietal lobe. Further evidence comes from transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (TMS) which show that transient disruptions to the motor cortex 
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result in impairments in the ability to recognize and anticipate others’ actions (Michael 
et al., 2014; Stadler et al., 2012). Similarly, electroencephalographic (EEG) studies 
have also reported desynchronization of the mu rhythm over central sites corresponding 
to the location of the sensoriomotor cortex during action observation (Leocani, Toro, 
Manganotti, Zhuang, & Hallett, 1997; Toro et al., 1994). Traditionally the mu rhythm 
(8-13 Hz) has been linked to activity in the sensoriomotor cortex and its 
desynchronization (i.e., reduction of amplitude) during overt movements and action 
observation is believed to index the activation of shared action-perception 
representations (see Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011 for a review).   
The idea that perception-action matching mechanism is causally related in the 
generation of emotional contagion responses mostly comes from a series of studies 
exploring spontaneous facial responses (SFRs) by using facial electromyography 
(EMG). These SFRs, which are sometimes covert and not visible through direct 
observation (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Tassinary & Cacioppo, 1992), are 
thought to play crucial roles in how we communicate and empathise with each other, 
as well as in establishing cohesive social groups (Hatfield et al., 1993; Hess & Fischer, 
2013). Overall, this line of research suggests that adults and older children precisely 
and rapidly mimic the facial expressions displayed by the people with whom they 
interact (e.g., Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Moody, 
McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007). At the neural levels, these findings converge with 
those reported by fMRI studies with adults showing that similar brain areas are 
activated during the observation and imitation of various emotional facial expressions 
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Dapretto et al., 2006; Pfeifer, 
Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008). There is also some direct evidence that 
participants’ tendency to mimic facial expressions is linked to individual differences in 
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dispositional empathy, with participants classified as high-empathizers producing 
greater facial mimicry (facial EMG) when exposed to static facial expression of anger 
and happiness than the low- empathizer participants (Sonnby-Borgstrom, Jonsson, & 
Svensson, 2003). Together, these studies have been interpreted as evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that perception-action coupling networks might be the mechanism 
underlying affect sharing 
However, several findings are difficult to integrate with this perception-action 
matching proposal. On one hand, not all EMG studies find evidence that mimicry 
facilitates emotion recognition. In this respect, there are two well-known studies that 
failed to report evidence that emotion recognition accuracy or shared affect are 
mediated by mimicry (Blairy, Herrera, & Hess, 1999; Hess & Blairy, 2001). In these 
studies, mimicry and emotional resonance were not found to be related to each other. 
Nor was mimicry related to decoding accuracy. On the other hand, facial mimicry does 
not always occur. For example, Moody et al. (2007) and Beall et al. (2008) found that 
observing others’ angry faces did not elicit matching EMG responses specific for anger 
but for fear. Only when angry individuals are perceived as physically weaker and 
threatening one’s social status, their facial displays of anger elicit similar EMG 
responses in the observer (Hess, Adams, & Kleck, 2005; Soussignan et al., 2013). 
Finally, there are other studies that report counter-mimicry effects in competitive 
environments, responding with negative displays to their competitors’ pleasure 
(Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2011). 
Overall, these findings are consistent with the idea that facial movements alone carry 
simple affective information and that the context needs to be jointly encoded to make 
more specific inference about individual’s emotion (Barrett & Kensinger, 2010; 
Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 2011). In all these examples, the facial responses 
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converge with the meaning and the informative value for the observer of the emotional 
signals received from others, rather than its motor characteristics. Thus, mimicry may 
be somewhat less automatic and not always responsible of affect sharing.  
To account for these additional findings, some researchers suggest that affect 
sharing is the result of early and quick evaluations of the emotional signal (Dezecache, 
Eskenazi, & Grèzes, 2016; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Soussignan et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, the appraisal of emotional cues relies on neural mechanisms extending 
beyond shared action and emotion representations (Dezecache et al., 2016; Greèzes & 
Dezecache, 2014). Notably, processing emotional information relies on complex neural 
networks involving those that are part of the emotion-related brain circuits (e.g., the 
amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex - Adolphs, 2002; Pessoa, 2017; Vuilleumier, 
Armony, Driver, & Dolan 2003; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 
2004) and those functionally linked with motor preparation for action and estimating 
others’ immediate intent for action (Balconi & Bartolotti, 2013; Baumgartner, Willi, & 
Jäncke, 2007; Coelho, Lipp, Marinovic, Wallis, & Riek, 2010; Coombes et al., 2009; 
Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Hamilton, 2015; Oliveri et al., 2003; Schutter, Hofman, & 
Van Honk, 2008). Of special interest, a growing body of fMRI studies have started to 
document functional links between systems that sustain emotional appraisal and those 
that underlie action preparation (e.g., Baconi & Bartolotti, 2013; Baumgartner et al., 
2007; Conty, Dezecache, Hugueville, & Grèzes, 2012; Oliveri et al., 2003; Schutter et 
al., 2008), suggesting that the early evaluation of emotional cues is followed by the 
selection and execution of an optimal action for the immediate situation, which can be 
either congruent or incongruent with the observed emotional display. Functional links 
between systems that sustain emotional appraisal and shared motor representations 
have also been suggested (Dezecache et al., 2016; Hamilton, 2015; Kilner et al., 2007). 
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However, in this case the attributed role of the shared neural networks has more to do 
with the anticipation of others’ behavior and intentions  (Dezecache et al., 2016; 
Hamilton, 2015; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007). Thus, this proposal emphasizes that 
our reactions to other’s emotional displays are ultimately a result of an early emotional 
evaluation and estimation of other’s intentions.  
In summary, although there is some empirical evidence supporting the important 
role of motor mimicry and action-perception coupling mechanism in the generation of 
affect sharing, current findings suggest that this explanation is not sufficient to account 
for the whole phenomenon. On the other hand, although this mechanism has been well 
documented in adults and to a lesser degree in children, debates regarding its early 
ontogeny and the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms remain unexplored 
(Dezecache et al., 2016; Isomura & Nakano, 2016; Magnée, Stekelenburg, Kemner, & 
de Gelder, 2007; Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Thus, studies exploring facial mimicry in 
infancy are needed to shed light on the mechanisms underlying affect sharing. 
Emotion Perception during Infancy 
Closely link with the ability for two people to resonate with each other 
affectively, it is the ability to detect, discriminate and recognize others’ emotional 
expressions through vocalizations, faces or body postures. This ability acquires special 
importance during the first year of life, prior to any cognitive understanding of 
emotions, when infants seem to depend on the perception of overt emotional cues to 
resonate with others (e.g., Geangu et al., 2011; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971). 
Developmental research suggests that as children develop, they are gradually less 
dependent on perceptual cues as they are able to use more complex and different types 
of information to infer emotions from others such as contextual cues or target’s internal 
states (see Harris, 1994 for a review). In the domain of empathy, this ability is thought 
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to be crucial for the development of empathy and children’s interpersonal and social 
skills (e.g., Decety, 2015; Decety & Howard, 2013; Geangu, 2015; Hoffmann, 2001). 
Although infants’ sensitivity to other’s emotions may rely on their ability to extract 
emotional cues, this is not enough to explain the full experience of empathy. Other 
cognitive processes are needed into the “empathy” equation such as the ability to 
understand other’s perspective or the ability to regulate own emotional arousal to avoid 
personal distress. In this line, current developmental models of social cognition agree 
to concieve the ability to detect and process information form social stimuli as the first 
stage of a chain of complex afective and cognitive processes (Grossmann & Johnson, 
2007; Leppanen & Nelson, 2009; Nelson et al., 2005, 2016). 
An extensive amount of behavioral studies suggest that infants are able to 
discriminate between emotions that differ in valence at 4 months if these are expressed 
multimodally (i.e. using the face and voice) (Flom & Bahrick, 2007; Montague & 
Walker-Andrews, 2001), at 5 months if they are expressed vocally (Fernald, 1993; 
Flom & Bahrick, 2007; Walker-Andrews & Grolnick, 1983; Walker- Andrews & 
Lennon, 1991), and at 7 months if they are communicated facially (Flom & Bahrick, 
2007; Kestenbaum & Nelson, 1990; Nelson, Morse & Leavitt, 1979; Ludemann & 
Nelson, 1988). The field of social neuroscience has also shed some light on the infants’ 
neural mechanisms underpinning the processing of emotional information conveyed in 
the form of faces or vocalizations (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2005; Grossman, Oberecker, 
Koch & Friederici, 2010; Leppänen et al., 2007; Peltola et al., 2009).  
In particular, EEG-ERP work on face processing reveals that early during the first 
year of life infants process differently faces as compared to non-face objects as indexed 
by differences in the neural activity recorded over occipito-temporal regions (de Haan 
& Nelson, 1999; de Haan, Pascalis, & Johnson, 2002; Halit, Csibra, Volein, & Johnson, 
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2004; Halit, de Haan, & Johnson, 2003). These findings converge with additional 
neuroimaging evidence suggesting that the fusyform area and the superior temporal 
sulcus (regions linked to face processing in adults) are already tuned to faces in 2- to 8-
month-old infants (Otsuka et al., 2007; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002). Conversely, ERP 
research on infants’ processing of affective facial expressions suggests that certain 
components are modulated by the type of emotional expression. In brief, findings from 
these studies have shown that infants at the age of 7-months show a greater attentional 
preference toward fearful faces, as shown by the generation of a larger fronto-central 
Nc component for fearful faces as compared to happy and neutral facial expressions 
(de Haan et al., 2004; Leppänen et al., 2007; Nelson & de Haan, 1996; Peltola et al., 
2009). The Nc component is known to reflect allocation of attentional resources 
(Courchesne, Ganz, & Norcia, 1981; Nelson, 1994; Richards, 2003). Besides cortical 
attention networks, fearful facial expressions also enhance activity in cortical face-
sensitive networks. Specifically, 7-month-old infants seem to allocate more resources 
for the visual processing of fearful faces as indexed by a larger occipito-temporal P400 
in response to fearful faces compared to both happy and neutral expressions (Leppänen 
et al., 2007), and greater for fearful compared to angry faces (Kobiella, Grossmann, 
Reid, & Striano, 2008). The P400 has been previously linked to perceptual processing 
of structural information from faces (de Haan, Johnson, & Halit, 2003; de Haan & 
Nelson, 1999; de Haan et al., 2002),  
Fewer functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) studies have also 
investigated the neural correlates underlying emotional face processing in infants (Fox, 
Wagner, Shrock, Tager-Flusberg, & Nelson, 2013; Minagawa-Kawai et al., 2009; 
Nakato, Otsuka, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & Kakigi, 2011). Taken together, these studies 
provide evidence for the presence of different hemodynamic patterns/responses to 
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distinct types of facial expressions (happy and angry) over temporal and frontal regions. 
Specifically, Minagawa-Kawai et al. (2009) found an increase brain activity in the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in response to smiling as compared to neutral faces. 
Similarly, Fox et al. (2013) found greater activation of the right frontal cortex in 
response to smiling faces as opposed to neutral faces in 6- to 7-month-old infants. 
Further evidence is provided by Nakato et al. (2011) who observed an asymmetric 
pattern of activation within temporal areas, with the left hemisphere being more 
responsive to happy facial expressions and the right hemisphere being more responsive 
to angry facial expressions. Furthermore, this study revealed differences in the temporal 
course of the hemodynamic responses.  The observation of happy faces elicited a 
gradual and sustained increase of the hemodynamic response even after the 
disappearance of the face whereas the neural response to angry faces peaked and 
decreased much more rapidly.  
Although auditory information seems to be dominant over visual input early in 
development (Bugental, Kaswan, Love & Fox, 1970; Caron, Caron & MacLean, 1988; 
Flom & Bahrick, 2007; Gottlieb, 1971; Fernald, 1993; Lewkowicz, 1988a, 1988b), less 
attention has been paid to the neural correlates underlying infants’ perception of 
emotional vocal expressions (see Grossmann, 2010; Walker-Andrews, 1997 for 
reviews). The few existing studies have provided converging evidence toward an early 
emergence of cerebral specialization for affective prosody during the first year of life 
(Cheng, Lee, Chen, Wang & Decety, 2012; Grossmann et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2014), 
suggesting that at this age the discrimination is automatic, and possibly related to the 
activity of primary and non-primary auditory areas in the temporal cortex (Näätänen, 
Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007). The available ERP evidence reveals that as early as 
few days after birth the infants’ brain shows larger ERP responses (e.g., mismatch 
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response – MMR –) for angry voices in comparison to happy, neutral (Cheng et al., 
2012; Grossmann et al., 2005), and fearful voices (Zhang et al., 2014). Consistent with 
ERP studies on emotional face processing, these findings support the idea of enhanced 
sensitivity and greater allocation of attentional resources to negative emotional (angry) 
vocalizations. This pattern of results has been partially replicated by a recent fNIRS 
study with 7-month-old infants, in which negative emotional voices evoked greater 
activation in the superior temporal cortex as compared to positive and neutral voices, 
again stressing an enhanced sensitivity to negative emotional prosody in the infants’ 
brain (Grossmann et al., 2010). Following the lack of infant studies, there is a huge gap 
in the literature on the neural correlates of vocal emotional processing during 
childhood. In typically developmental children, so far a single study developed by 
Chronaki et al. (2012) has found an effect of vocal emotion on the amplitudes of  the 
N100 (90 – 180 ms) and N400 (380-500 ms) at posterior locations (Chronaki et al., 
2012). An emerging body of research on atypical development have also reported 
effects of emotional vocalizations on N100 and P300 amplitudes in ADHD children 
(Chronaki, Benikos, Fairchild, & Sonuga-Barke, 2015) as well as on N100 latencies in 
children with autism during the performance of emotion recognition tasks using 
prosody (Lerner, McPartland, & Morris, 2013). 
It is worth mentioning that all of the studies reviewed before used speech human 
vocalizations to examine the neural correlates underlying emotional processing from 
the voice. Little is known about the processing of emotional non-speech human 
vocalizations (e.g., laughter, crying), which is at most quite surprising taking into 
account that these type of signals are produced by pre-verbal infants from an early age 
and are thought to communicate pure, “raw” emotional states (Barr, Hopkins & Green, 
2000; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010; Scherer, 1995).  
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The importance of emotional non-verbal vocalizations. Non-verbal 
vocalizations of emotions such as laughter and crying are genuine signals produced 
already by pre-verbal infants that convey pure, and unambiguous information about 
own emotions (Barr, Hopkins & Green, 2000; Dunbar et al., 2012; Paulmann & Kotz, 
2008a; Provine, 2016; Provine, 2004; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010a; Scherer, 
1986, 1995). Crying is already present at birth, while laughter emerges about four 
months later (Soltis, 2004; Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972; Washburn, 1929). Both 
vocalizations are quite automatic and stimulus-driven during the first months of life and 
become more intentional, context-specific during the second half of the first year (Barr, 
2006; Barr et al., 2000; Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972; Wolff, 1963). Unlike crying, laughter 
often appears in the presence of others (Mireault & Reddy, 2016; Provine, 2004, 
Provine & Fischer, 1989), its occurrence is strengthen by multimodal stimuli (i.e. face 
and voice) (Vlahovic, Roberts, & Dunbar, 2012), and its causal source varies as the 
infant gets older, with social stimuli (e.g., playing tug, chasing the baby) being the main 
elicitor of laughter by the second half of the first year (Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972; Wolff, 
1963).  
Importantly, the typical production and perception of non-verbal vocalizations is 
thought to be essential for the emergence of later positive social outcomes such as social 
bonding, empathy and prosocial behaviors (Decety, 2015; Decety & Howard, 2013; 
Geangu, 2015; Hoffmann, 2001). Indeed, the presence of an atypical sensitivity to 
others’ emotional non-verbal vocalizations or an atypical production of these signals 
has been associated with high-risk developmental populations characterized by 
impaired social functioning, such as autism (Esposito, Nakazawa, Venuti, & Bornstein, 
2013; Esposito, Venuti, & Bornstein, 2011; Reddy, Williams, & Vaughan, 2002; Blasi 
et al., 2015). Furthermore, behavioral evidence suggests that these signals, and in 
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particular laughter, are essential during adult-infant interactions to promote social 
closeness and interaction, as well as the development of mentalizing skills (Ishijima & 
Negayama, 2017; Mireault, Sparrow, Poutre, Perdue, & Macke, 2012; Mireault, Poutre, 
Sargent-Hier, Dias, Perdue & Myrick, 2012). Despite their significance in our early 
social lives, the processing and use of non-verbal vocalizations of emotions, 
particularly during early development, remains understudied (Geangu, 2015; Pell et al., 
2015; Dunbar et al., 2012; Provine, 1996).  
Further neuroimaging studies with infants are needed to clarify the developmental 
course of both expressions. From this perspective, the investigation of the 
neurocognitive mechanisms underlying emotional information processing and potential 
individual variations during infancy is essential for understanding typical and atypical 
social development, as well as for identifying methods for early detection and 
intervention (e.g., Bunford, Kujawa, Swain, Fitzgerald, Monk, & Phan, 2017b; 
Johnson, Gliga, Jones, & Charman, 2015; Morales, Fu, & Pérez-Edgar, 2016). At this 
respect, infancy offers a unique time window to explore the development of social 
cognition and their underlying brain networks given that the brain begins to become 
tunned with social stimuli. Up to date, only two studies have explored the neural 
correlates underlying the processing of emotional non-verbal vocalizations in infants 
and both agree to report the recruitment of more neural sources for the processing of 
crying sounds as compared to laughter sounds at early stages, suggesting the emergence 
of negativity bias (Blasi et al., 2011; Missana, Altvater-Mackensen, & Grossmann, 
2017). 
From Affect Sharing to Empathy: In the Search of Prosocial Motivations 
Traditionally, it has been hypothesised that the ability to share others’ emotions 
may motivate other-oriented responses, which in turn may support prosocial behaviors 
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(e.g., Decety & Lamm, 2006; Hoffman, 1982; Knafo & Israel, 2012; Singer, 2006). 
Although affect sharing and empathy have been linked at the conceptual level, there is 
no empirical evidence supporting this link. Sparse evidence reports that between 6 and 
8 months of age infants begin to show other-oriented responses towards others in 
distress, as indexed by moderate levels of concerned affect (e.g., eyebrows down, brow 
furrowed, cooing, corners of mouth down) and hypothesis testing behaviors (Hay et al. 
1981; Liddle, Bradley & MacGrath, 2015; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). It is not until the 
age of 12-14 months when infants exhibit modest attempts to help or comfort others in 
distress (Howes & Farver, 1987; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006; 
Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007; Young, Fox, & Zahn-
Waxler, 1999; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). These apparently prosocial acts, are believed 
to arise from early understanding of goal-directed behaviors (Svetlova et al., 2010; 
Woodward, 1998), and continue to develop gradually into more complex forms during 
the second year of life (Demetriou & Hay, 2004; Liew et al., 2011; Nichols et al., 2010, 
2015; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; Svetlova et al., 2010; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). This 
development is partially associated with the development of motor and social-cognitive 
skills necessary to identify the particular needs and adequate interventions as well as 
perform such complex coordinated behaviors (Paulus, 2014; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; 
Svetlova et al., 2010; Walle & Campos, 2012).  
Although complex forms of helping, comforting and sharing behaviors may be 
rare prior to the first year of life, some developmental studies suggest that infants are 
able to display very simple forms of approach towards others in distress. For example, 
infants occasionally responded to their distressed peers with approach-oriented 
behaviors, as exemplified by modest attempts to point, lean, touch or reach towards the 
victim (Hay et al., 1981; Liddle et al., 2015; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). Studies using 
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looking time paradigms also show that as early as 6 months of age infants prefer agents 
who help others to agents who hinder others (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Hamlin 
& Wynn, 2011; Hamlin, 2013, 2015) and agents who comfort rather than harm (Buon 
et al., 2014; Holvoet, Scola, Arciszewski, & Picard, 2016). As much as these findings 
have received attention, the motivational mechanisms involved in infants’ emerging 
other-oriented responses are not well understood (Svetlova et al., 2010). 
Interestingly, over the last three decades an increasing number of infant EEG 
research has explored the relation of frontal hemispheric asymmetries in EEG activity 
and developing motivational tendencies within an approach-withdraw continuum (e.g., 
Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; Dawson, 1994; Diaz & Bell, 2011; Fox & Davidson, 
1986, 1987, 1988). In particular, frontal EEG asymmetry measures recorded during 
emotionally salient situations are considered to be a reliable index of prefrontal 
associations with individual motivational tendencies to either approach or avoid stimuli 
perceived as appetitive or aversive (e.g., Coan & Allen, 2004; Davidson & Fox, 1982, 
1989; Fox & Davidson, 1986, 1987, 1988). Within this framework, greater relative left 
frontal activation reflects approach-related tendencies while greater relative right 
frontal activation reflects withdrawal-related predispositions (Fox, 1991, 1994; 
Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010). This notion has been supported by a 
substantial amount of infant studies examining frontal EEG asymmetry scores during 
emotional tasks, which have revealed greater left frontal EEG activation in response to 
typically appetitive stimuli (e.g., mother approach, film of an adult displaying a happy 
facial expression, positively-valenced infant directed speech) and greater right frontal 
activation during the presentation of aversive stimuli (e.g., maternal distress simulation, 
maternal separation, stranger approach, film of an adult displaying a sad facial 
expression, arm restrain task, negatively-valenced infant directed speech) (e.g.,  Buss 
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et al., 2003; Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; Diaz & Bell, 2011; Fox & Davidson, 1986, 
1987, 1988; Killeen & Teti, 2012; LoBue, Coan, Thrasher & DeLoache, 2011; 
Santesso, Schmidt & Trainor, 2007).  
Additionally, frontal asymmetry patterns have also been related to individual 
differences in social behavior, highlighting the role of this measure as a potential 
predictor of infants’ social competence in peer settings. Multiple longitudinal studies 
have shown that early patterns of left frontal EEG asymmetry predicted higher levels 
of sociability during peer interactions across the toddler years. On the contrary, infants’ 
right frontal EEG asymmetry patterns turned out to be good predictors of elevated 
levels of social reticence during interactions with peers in the toddler years (e.g., 
Calkins, Fox & Marshall, 1996; Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, & Schmidt, 2001; 
Fox et al., 1995; Henderson, Fox & Rubin, 2001). There is also further evidence 
associating relatively left frontal activation with greater empathic responding (Paulus, 
Kuhn-Popp, Licata, Sodian, & Meinhardt, 2013). For instance, Paulus et al. (2013) 
found that found that greater relative left frontal activation at the age of 14 months was 
associated with infants’ better understanding of others’ distress at the age of 18 months 
as well as greater empathic responding during a comforting task at the age of 24 months. 
Similarly, Licata, Paulus, Kuhn-Popp, Meinhardt, & Sodian (2015) found a link 
between relative greater left frontal activation at the age of 14 months with higher 
frequencies of children approaching and initiating contact with their mothers during 
free play interactions at 50 months. 
In light of this information, the use of frontal EEG asymmetry arises as a 
promising measure to investigate the neurophysiological mechanisms supporting the 
emergence of other-oriented responses. In other words, this technique offers us with the 
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possibility to explore the neural correlates underlying infants’ motivational responses 
to approach or avoid others experiencing either happiness or distress.  
Cognitive Components: Theory of Mind and Emotion Regulation 
The capacity for two people to resonate with each other affectively is not 
sufficient to explain the emergence of more mature empathic responses. The transition 
from a more basic, self-focused form of empathy to a more complex other-oriented 
empathic response is possible due to the gradual emergence of cognitive processes that 
allow the individual to generate second-order representations of the feelings of another 
person, while regulating the own emotional arousal response to avoid personal distress 
(e.g., Decety, 2010a; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Decety & Michalska, 2010; Decety & 
Svetlova, 2012). These cognitive aspects are closely related to the development of 
theory of mind (ToM) and self-regulation (Decety & Michalska, 2010; Zelazo, Carlson, 
& Kesek, 2008). Interestingly, the neural correlates involve in both processes undergo 
a protracted developmental course that would explain the later emergence of the 
cognitive component of empathy (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Blakemore, 2008, 
2012; Kobayashi, Glover, & Temple, 2007). Next, we will discuss each of these 
processes independently.  
Theory of Mind (ToM) 
Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing is often defined as the ability to understand 
other people’s mental states, including beliefs, thoughts and feelings (Flavell, 1988; 
Frith & Frith, 1999; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). An essential milestone in the 
development of ToM is the emergence of false belief (FB) understanding, defined as 
the ability to appreciate that other people’s beliefs can differ from reality (Flavell, 1988; 
Luo, 2011; Rakoczy, 2011; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). Although for a long period of 
time it was assumed that children develop this ability around 4 years of age and that 
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younger children do not attribute FBs to a person (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 
Flavell, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001), recent behavioral 
studies using non-verbal tasks based on looking-time measures suggest that 
computations about others’ beliefs may be already present around the age of 15-18 
months (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Träuble et al., 2010; Scott & Baillargeon, 
2009; Song et al., 2008). These new findings are in line with a current model on ToM 
development proposed by Apperly & Butterfill (2009), in which they suggest that 
humans possess two distinct mechanisms for reasoning about beliefs: one that emerges 
early and is efficient but inflexible, and one that emerges later, is dependent on language 
and executive functions abilities, and is more flexible but also more demanding in terms 
of processing. Nonetheless, whether these results can be taken as evidence that children 
in their second year of life are able to attribute beliefs to others is still under debate and 
several alternative interpretations have been proposed, such the use of behavioral rules 
previously learned in similar situations (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 
2005; Song et al., 2008; Trauble et al., 2010).  Also, contrary to the usual belief that 
ToM is fully developed by the age of 5 (Flavell, 1988; Wellman, Cross & Watson, 
2001), neuroscientific research has shown that this ability follows a protracted 
development which extends well beyond the age of 4-years, reaching more mature 
levels of performance only towards the end of adolescence (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009; Blakemore, 2012, 2008; Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny & Saxe, 2012; Johnson, 
2001; Kobayashi et al., 2007).  
To date, several neuroimaging studies have examined the neural correlates 
associated with the attribution of mental states in adults using a wide variety of stimuli, 
including stories (Fletcher et al., 1995; Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003), cartoons (Brunet 
et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 2000), and animations (Castelli et al., 2000). Together, 
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these studies have documented the existence of a “mentalizing” network, which 
includes the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), the temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ), the temporal lobes, and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (see Frith & Frith, 
2003 for a meta-analysis). Lesion studies have corroborated these findings by showing 
that damage to the superior temporal lobes (Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & 
Humphreys, 2004) and PFC (Happé, Malhi, & Checkley, 2001; Rowe, Bullock, Polkey, 
& Morris, 2001) impairs metalizing skills.  Nonetheless, there is still some debate 
regarding whether these regions are specific for metalizing or rather they are part of 
more domain-general functions.  
Recent work in developmental cognitive neuroscience has begun to examine the 
neural correlates of ToM in children compared to adults (e.g., Gweon et al., 2012; Saxe, 
Whitifield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009; Sommer et al., 2010). In particular, 
these studies suggest that the brain regions normally recruited for ToM in adults are 
also found in 5- to 12-year-olds children, yet the functional profile of some of these 
regions undergo age-related changes. For example, the TPJ shows an increasing 
selective activation with age in response to mental state information (Gweon et al., 
2012; Saxe et al., 2009; Sommer et al., 2010). Critically, developmental changes in the 
TPJ have been correlated with children’s performance on ToM tasks outside the scanner 
(Gweon et al., 2012). Also, the prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulate, which are 
relevant for monitoring and regulating behavior, display a different developmental 
pattern with children engaging these areas to a larger extent that adults when reasoning 
about others beliefs (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Sommer et al., 2010). These 
developmental differences are also corroborated by few developmental EEG studies on 
FB processing, which reveal that although children’ ERP components are similar to the 
adult ones, these also show marked differences (Liu, Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellmann, 
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2009; Meinhardt, Sodian, Thoermer, Dohnel, & Sommer, 2011). In particular, they tend 
to be delayed, have greater duration and smaller amplitude, and may even be inverted 
in polarity and present different scalp distributions.  
Although more and more behavioral studies suggest that already in the second 
year of life infants are sensitive to information about others beliefs, it remains unclear 
which processes underlie this sensitivity. Certainly, the investigation of the neural 
underpinnings of belief processing may help us to clarify this gap. We still have only 
limited understanding of the neural processes underlying infants’ performance in ToM 
tasks and their relation to those reported in older children and in adults. Critically, the 
understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying ToM in infancy is central to 
elucidate the developmental course of empathy given that evidence from 
developmental studies suggest that the progressive emergence of ToM gives way to 
more sophisticated forms of empathy like concern, hypothesis testing or even attempts 
to approach/assist the victim. Specifically, these studies suggest that the emergence of 
behavioral expressions of concern for others during the second year of life appears to 
be linked with the development of perspective-taking skills (e.g., Knafo, Zahn-Waxler, 
Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992). In this respect, a series 
of longitudinal studies conducted by Zhan-Waxler and colleagues report a significant 
increase in hypothesis testing behaviors (often considered a cognitive marker of 
empathy) in conjunction with an increase in empathic concern in response to the 
observation of others’ in distress over the second year of life (Zahn-Waxler, Radke-
Yarrow, & King, 1979; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, & Emde, 
1992). Hypothesis testing and empathy-related responses further develop through 
childhood (Bengtsson & Arvidsson, 2011) and adolescence (Schwenck et al., 2014), 
reflecting the protracted development nature of these processes.  
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Interestingly, the positive link between ToM and empathy development has been 
partially sustained by few fMRI studies with younger children (Decety, Michalska, & 
Akitsuki, 2008) and adolescents (Decety, Michalska, Akitsuki, & Lahey, 2009) 
exposed to painful situations intentionally or accidentally inflicted by another. In 
particular, these studies show that mentalizing about the pain of others when it has been 
intentionally caused recruits brain regions linked to the ToM network, namely the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ) and temporal poles (TP). Significant age-related changes in the 
functional organization of these neural structures was also found (Decety & Michalska, 
2010; Killgore, Oki, & Yurgelun-Todd, 2001; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2007), with 
older participants showing reduced activity of the amygdala and insula, and increased 
involvement of the mPFC or TPJ. Although these studies already reflect the existence 
of developmental changes during childhood, the age-related changes in infancy remain 
less explored.  
Taken together, developmental findings suggest that ToM helps to shape the early 
experience of affect sharing into a more sophisticated, cognitive form of empathy, 
which is sustained by neuroscientific advances showing that ToM and cognitive 
empathy engage common as well as distinct neural networks, with the ventro-medial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) being a core region for cognitive empathy. Despite these 
positive findings, there are still some controversy regarding the link between FB 
understanding (ToM) and empathy since not all developmental studies have succeeded 
in finding a link between both constructs (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Hugues, White, 
Sharpen, & Dunn, 2000) or have failed to report age effects on the development of 
cognitive empathy (Garaigordobil, 2009). Still more research needs to be done to 
disentangle what is common to both constructs, ToM and empathy, and how they 
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interact with and modulate each other from infancy to adulthood (Bensalah, Caillies, & 
Anduze, 2016; Decety & Svetlova, 2012). In this respect, up to know no study has 
investigated the link between empathy and ToM during the first two years of life or the 
neural correlates underlying mentalizing skills at this early age.  
Emotion Regulation 
Emotion regulation is an important cornerstone of children socio-emotional 
development, as indexed by its protective role in the onset of mood disruptions and 
behavioral problems during childhood (Calkins & Dedmon, 2000; Calkins & Fox, 
2002). Additionally, self-regulation skills are particularly important for the 
development of appropriate and adaptive social behaviors (Decety & Lamm, 2006; 
Dennis, 2010; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992). There is also solid evidence supporting a 
positive relation between emotional regulation and empathy-related responses in both 
adults and children. Eisenberg and Fabes (1992) proposed a model suggesting an 
interaction between the intensity at which emotions are experienced and the extent to 
which individuals can regulate their emotions. According to this model, individuals 
with increased emotional intensity and poor regulation skills would be more susceptible 
to experience personal distress rather than empathy. In contrast, for optimally regulated 
people, their dispositional emotionality should not be an important contributor to 
empathy-related responding. These predictions have been corroborated by multiple 
behavioral studies (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Eisenberg & 
Fabes, 1995; Guthrie et al., 1997; Murphy et al., 1999) and have been documented as 
early as 4 months of age (Ungerer et al., 1990).  
Broadly speaking, emotion regulation refers to a set of processes aimed at 
evaluating, monitoring, modulating and modifying internal states (i.e. thoughts and 
emotions) produced by external affective stimuli with the final objective of generating 
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the most adaptive behavioral response to one’s goal in a particular situation (Decety & 
Lamm, 2006; Thompson, 1994). Among the core capacities to support emotion 
regulation are the ability to control attention, decision-making, and other cognitive 
processes that take place in emotionally demanding context (Dennis, 2010; Dennis, 
Malone, & Chen, 2009). Current neuroscientific models of emotional regulation 
organize these strategies in a continuum that goes from pure attentional (i.e. attention 
shifting and/or focussing) to more cognitive change strategies (i.e. reappraisal of 
emotional information) (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005).  
Over the course of development, changes in the control of emotions are reflected 
by the transition from more automatic, reactive forms of self-control, mainly supported 
by the caregivers and tightly linked to sensory stimuli, to more controlled, self-initiated 
forms that allow the infant to gain independence for regulation (Bell & Wolfe, 2007; 
Calkins & Leerkes, 2004; Calkins & Fox, 2002). Early in the first year of life, beginning 
around 3 months of age, infants already use some rudimentary strategies such as self-
soothing (e.g., thumb-sucking), help seeking (e.g., reaching for caregiver), withdrawal 
behaviors and reflexive crying to alleviate their own distress (Kopp, 1982, 1989; Kopp 
& Neufeld, 2003; Shapiro, Fagen, Prigot, Carroll, & Shalan, 1998; Stifter & Braungart, 
1995; Rothbart, Ziaje, & O’boyle, 1992). Nonetheless, it is by the end of the first year 
when infants implement more active methods of self-regulation as indexed by the use 
of specific attention-based strategies (e.g. object distraction, shift attention) to attempt 
to manage their own emotions (Bell & Wolfe, 2007; Braungart-Rieker & Stifter, 1996; 
Calkins & Dedmon, 2000; Calkins, Gill, Johnson, & Smith, 1999; Shapiro et al., 1998). 
This transition is partly explained by the greater involvement of attentional control 
mechanisms implemented by the executive attention system (Bell & Wolfe, 2007; 
Calkins & Leerkes, 2004; Fox & Calkins, 2003; Rothbart, Ahadi, &Hershey, 1994), 
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which allow the infant engage and disengage more freely with emotional stimuli. 
Although the capacity for control of attention begins to emerge toward the end of the 
first year, its development continues throughout the preschool and school years, 
gradually leading to the emergence of an effortful control of behavior (Fox & Calkins, 
2003; Rothbart el al., 1994; Rothbart & Bates, 2006; Rothbart, Ellis, Rueda, & Posner, 
2003).  
The development of emotion regulation is functionally linked to the protracted 
development of the executive functions, and in particular, the executive attention 
network, both implemented by dorsal and ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
(Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Posner & Peterson, 
1990; Posner & Rothbart, 2009; Posner, Rueda, & Kanske, 2007). While ventral 
portions of the PFC appear to underlie rapid and automatic emotional arousal and 
motivational processes, dorsal portions support more deliberate executive functions 
such as attention regulation and cognitive control of reactivity and arousal (Dennis, 
2010; Luu, Tucker, & Derryberry, 1998; Ochsner et al., 2004). The anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) is also an important structure in emotion regulation as an intermediary 
between higher order cognition and emotional arousal (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000; 
Luu & Tucker, 2004). Particularly, the ACC is active during conflict monitoring tasks 
that require control of attention due to the presence of conflicting information, 
inhibitory control and detection of errors (see Botvinick, 2007 for a review). The 
protracted developmental course of these networks is evident behaviorally in tasks 
related to emotional regulation or executive functions, with children’s ability to regulate 
their internal states increasing as they get older (Casey, Giedd, & Thomas, 2000; Decety 
& Svetolova, 2012; Diamond, 2002; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2007; Philips, 
Ladouceur, & Drevets, 2008; Power, Fair, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2010).   
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EEG methods have proven to be particularly prolific to investigate how attention 
is modulated under emotional demands. For instance, some studies show that the 
induction of negative emotions in children is associated with the recruitment of more 
cognitive control processes (larger N200 amplitudes) in the service of emotional 
regulation (Lewis, Granic, & Lamm, 2006; Lewis, Lamm, Segalowitz, Stieben, & 
Zelazo, 2006; Nelson & Nugent, 1990; Stieben et al., 2007). Similar to EEG research, 
work focusing on measures of heart rate variability (HRV) has also proven to be 
relevant in the investigation of emotional regulation (Porges, 1991, 1996). The existing 
evidence suggests that the suppression of respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) during 
challenging situations is related to better state regulation, greater self-soothing, and 
more attentional control in infancy (DeGangi, DiPietro, Greenspan, & Porges, 1991; 
Huffman et al., 1998).  
In sum, the ability to regulate the own emotions is crucial for the development of 
complex social abilities such as empathy, by enhancing the production of adaptive and 
appropriate responses to other’s emotions. There is evidence suggesting that emotion 
regulation develops throughout infancy to adolescence and parallels the maturation of 
executive functions. In this line, recent studies from social neuroscience have stressed 
the important role of cognitive control processes for child emotional regulation. 
Modulation of Empathy Development 
Although the generation of empathy partly relies on bottom-up processes, which 
are automatic and unconscious, from our own experience it is evident that we do not 
always empathise with others in the same degree (intra-personal differences) and that 
our ability to experience empathy differs from that of others (inter-personal 
differences). Then, the question is: where does this variability in the tendency to 
empathize come from? It is increasingly clear that certain factors either enhance or 
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decrease the occurrence and degree of empathic responses while modulate the neural 
activity of brain structures linked to the experience of empathy – e.g. anterior insula 
(AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (e.g., Decety & Lamm, 2006; de Vignemont 
& Singer, 2006; Hein & Singer, 2008). Research on empathy development has stressed 
the importance of multiple intrapersonal and environmental factors associated with 
individual differences in the development of empathy (e.g., Eisenberg, Fabes, Schaller, 
Carlo, & Miller, 1991; Knafo & Uzefovsky, 2013; McDonald & Messinger, 2011; 
Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, et al., 1992). Next, we will discuss some of these modulating 
factors, including genetics and temperament as intrapersonal influences, as well as 
parenting styles as part of environmental (social) influences.  
Genetic Factors 
Early in life children differ in their expressions of empathy. Nowadays, there is 
substantial evidence that these individual variations are in part heritable as shown by 
several genetic studies using twin designs (Davis, Luce, & Kraus, 1994; Knafo, Israel, 
& Ebstein, 2011; Knafo et al., 2008; Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, & Eysenck, 1986; 
Volbrecht et al., 2007). Typically, twin designs compare identical twins (monozygotic 
[MZ]) with fraternal twins (dizygotic [DZ]) reared in their biological families. Since 
MZ twins share all their genes and DZ twins share on average 50% of their genes, this 
design assumes that MZ and DZ twins are equal in terms of how similar their 
environment are, in which case greater similarity of MZ twins for a particular trait 
reflects genetic influences (heritability). Similarities beyond this genetic effect are 
attributed to the environment the twins share (shared-environment) while differences 
between twins are attributed to an effect of the non-shared environment.  
Overall, the majority of studies conducted with children that have addressed the 
genetic and environmental influences on empathy report both genetic and shared 
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environment effects. Notably, the existing evidence suggests that genes account for 
approximately 30-40% of the variability for empathy (Knafo et al., 2011; Volbrecht et 
al., 2007; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, et al., 1992; see Knafo & Uzefovsky, 2013 for meta-
analysis). Additionally, when analysing the genetic and environmental influences on 
the emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy separately, the genetic effects are 
comparable (i.e. they overlap). Nonetheless, the shared environment seems to account 
for more variability in cognitive empathy than emotional empathy (Knafo et al., 2008; 
Volbrecht et al., 2007; Zahn-Waxler, Robinson, et al., 1992). Furthermore, longitudinal 
studies suggest that the heritability of empathy and prosocial behavior increases with 
age while the effects of shared environment decrease as children grow up (Knafo & 
Plomin, 2006; Knafo et al., 2008; Scourfield, John, Martin, & McGuffin, 2004). This 
meaningful developmental pattern is thought to reflect the strengthening of gene - 
environment interactions over time, as children have more opportunities to actively 
select environments that match their genetic predisposition (Fortuna & Knafo, 2014).  
Temperament  
An increasing body of evidence suggests that certain temperamental factors 
account for individual differences in toodlers’ empathy-related reactions. Because 
emotionality and self-regulation processes are closely related to the experience of 
empathy, both aspects of temperament have been extensively studied (Eisenberg, 2000; 
Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992, 1995; Eisenberg, Spinrad, & Sadovsky, 2006). Regarding 
the temperamental factor of emotionality, it is possible to identify the factors of 
negative emotionality and positive emotionality, both previously linked with empathy. 
Notably, low negative emotionality and positive affect have been often associated with 
greater empathy-related responses in young children (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1995; 
Eisenberg et al., 1996; Robinson, Zahn-Waxler, & Emde, 1994; Volbrecht et al., 2007; 
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Zahn-Waxler, Cole, Welsh, & Fox, 1995).  Additionally, fear reactivity, a component 
of negative emotionality, has been related to low empathic responding in infants and 
young children (Liew et al., 2011; Spinrad & Sitfter, 2006; van der Mark, Van 
Ijzendoorn, & Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2002; Young et al., 1999).  
 Individual differences in the temperamental factor regulation have also been 
linked to children’s empathy-related responses. Notably, effortful control has proven to 
be a good predictor of empathy-related responses. Although definitions vary, effortful 
control can be defined as “the ability to voluntary suppress a dominant response in order 
to perform a non-dominant response (response inhibition)” (Rothbart & Bates, 2006; 
Rothbart et al., 2003). This construct has been involved in a wide range of self-
regulatory outcomes from pre-school to school-aged children (Kochanska, Coy, & 
Murray, 2001). Empirical evidence has consistently shown that children high in 
effortful control display higher levels of empathy and prosocial behavior (Guthrie et 
al., 1997; Kochanska, Gross, Lin, & Nichols, 2002; Kochanska, 1995; Rothbart et al., 
1994; Valiente et al., 2004). These findings are consistent with evidence that toddlers’ 
inhibitory control is positively related to their conscience and empathy (Kochanska et 
al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001). Similar pattern of findings have been found for the 
temperamental regulatory dimensions of falling reactivity in infants exposed to the cry 
of a peer, suggesting that those infants who recovered faster from peak distress in their 
everyday life showed reduced self-distress responses (Geangu et al., 2011). Attentional 
control and attentional orientation, both important regulatory processes, have also been 
linked to reduced personal distress in infants and school aged children (Geangu et al., 





Several social and developmental psychologists have stressed the importance of 
parenting and parent-child relationships in the development of empathy (Bandura, 
1986; Chase-Lansdale, Wakschlag, & Brooks-Gunn, 1995; Hoffman, 2001; Zahn-
Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Parents who are sensitive to their children’s needs 
and effectively help them to reduce distress, often express and model moral emotions 
(e.g., guilt, shame, empathy), and develop warm, supportive interactions with their 
children, are likely to promote and foster the capacity to respond empathically in their 
offspring (Bandura, 1986; Chase-Lansdale et al., 1995; Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 
2001). Traditionally, parental warmth and parental control, two major dimensions of 
parenting styles have been linked to empathy and prosocial development (Barnett, 
1987; Chase-Lansdale et al., 1995; De Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 1997; Krevans & 
Gibbs, 1996; Soenens, Duriez, Vansteenkiste, & Goossens, 2007; Zhou et al., 2002).  
Empirical research on this topic has shown that children who show more 
empathy-related behaviors have parents who offer supportive, responsive and warm 
interactions (parental warmth) (Barnett, 1987; Carlo, Mestre, Samper, Tur, & Armenta, 
2010; Chase-Lansdale et al., 1995; Clark & Ladd, 2000; Wolff & van Ijzendoorn, 1997; 
Krevans & Gibbs, 1996; Robinson et al., 1994; Zhou et al., 2002). Similarly, parental 
support (Laible & Carlo, 2004; Soenens, Duriez, Vansteenkiste, & Goossens, 2007) 
and stable secure child-parent relationships (Kestenbaum, Farber, & Sroufe, 1989; Teti 
& Ablard, 1989) are good predictors of high levels of empathy in children. In contrast, 
there is substantial support for a positive relationship between excessive parental 
control and antisocial behaviors. Notably, high parental control mixed with harsh verbal 
and physical disciplining practices (Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002; Hoffman, 2001; 
Maccoby & Martin, 1983), low parental warmth combined with inconsistency 
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(Barnow, Lucht, & Freyberger, 2005), authoritarian or punitive parenting (Grogan-
Kaylor, 2005), and permissive or disengaged parenting (Beck & Shaw, 2005; Hawkins 
et al., 2000) have been all linked to aggressive and antisocial behaviors. Therefore, 
while supportive parenting styles and practices have been linked to empathy in children, 
authoritarian and permissive parenting have been linked to antisocial behavior in 
children.  
Introduction to EEG-ERP Methodology 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) has been widely used in infancy research to 
examine different aspects of infant cognitive development ranging from visual 
perception (Bach, Wolfe, & Maurer, 2005; Pieh, McCulloch, Shahani, & Bach, 2005), 
auditory perception (Kushnerenko et al., 2002; Kurtzberg et a., 1984), attention (de 
Haan, & Nelson, 1997, 1998, 1999), memory (Bauer, Wiebe, Carver, Waters, & 
Nelson, 2003; Carver, Bauer, & Nelson, 2000) or emotion processing from faces and 
voice (Grossmann, Striano, & Friederici, 2005; Nelson & de Haan, 1996). Importantly, 
EEG is a relatively inexpensive, non-invasive and easy to use technique, which makes 
it well-suitable to study developmental populations (Bell & Cuevas, 2012; Thierry, 
2005). Furthermore, this method allows to measure infants perception and cognition in 
the absence of overt behaviors while offers a high temporal resolution, making possible 
to keep track of the timing and sequence of cognitive processes (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; 
Thierry, 2005).  
The EEG measures ongoing brain electrical activity at the scalp, reflecting the 
sum of postsynaptic potentials produced by pyramidal neurons in the cortex (Davidson, 
Jackson, & Larson, 2000; Hoehl & Wahl, 2012). Multiple neural measures can be 
derived from the overall EEG signal associated with specific sensory, cognitive and 
motor events, such as event-related potentials (ERPs), EEG coherence (Bell & Fox, 
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1996; Mundy, Fox, & Card, 2003), or EEG power (Morasch & Bell, 2011; Stroganova, 
Orekhova, & Posikera, 1999). In this section, I first review the ERP technique, and then 
briefly describe each of the main ERP components targeted in the thesis. 
ERPs refer to averaged brain electrical activity time-locked to a particular event. 
By averaging brain electrical responses associated with specific events, it is possible to 
reduce the noise-to-signal ratio and increase the ability to differentiate specific neural 
processes from other unwanted noise produced by eye movements or strong motor 
movements (Luck, 2005; Hoehl & Wahl, 2012). The ERP waveforms are characterized 
by the presence of peaks and troughs which vary as a function of the physical 
characteristics of the stimuli and the cognitive demands of the task (Luck, 2005; 
Thierry, 2005). Early components are thought to index automatic, sensory processes – 
often modulated by attention – while later ERP components tend to index more 
effortful, high cognitive processes (Luck, 2005; Thierry, 2005). Up to date, many ERP 
components have been defined according to its latency, polarity, brain location and 
stimulus modality. For the purpose of this thesis I will only discuss the components 
related to infant auditory processing of emotional vocalizations and semantic 
information processing. 
Auditory Processing of Emotions: N100, P200 and LPC  
In relation to infants’ neural responses to their peer’s emotional non-verbal 
vocalizations (see Paper 1), special attention has been placed on the early components 
N100 and P200 as well as the late positive component (LPC). Importantly, all these 
components have been related to auditory emotion processing during infancy (Cheng, 
Lee, Chen, Wang & Decety, 2012; Grossmann, Striano & Friederici, 2005; Missana, 
Altvater-Mackensen, & Grossmann, 2017) but mostly adulthood (Jessen & Kotz, 2011; 
Pell et al., 2015; Sauter & Eimer, 2009). Notably, there is a gap in the ERP literature 
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on auditory emotional processing during childhood. The N100 and P200 waveforms 
are thought to underlie the automatic processing of auditory information across the 
lifespan. These auditory components can be discerned in infants at fronto-central 
locations at about the age of 6 months with the N100 peaking around 250 ms after the 
onset of a sound and the P200 peaking around 350 ms after stimulus presentation 
(Ceponiene, Cheour, & Naatanen, 1992; Choudhury & Benasich, 2011; Kushnerenko 
et al., 2002). An increasing number of studies on infants’ cortical auditory evoked 
potentials (CAEPs) suggests that with age the peak latencies of these components 
decrease while their peak amplitudes increase, specially the amplitude of the negative-
going peaks (Choudhury & Benasich, 2011; Novak, Kurtzberg, Kreuzer & Vaughan, 
1989; Ohlrich & Barnet, 1972; Ohlrich, Barnet, & Weiss, 1978). Although it is not clear 
whether the peaks observed during infancy are functionally similar to those found in 
adults (Ponton, Eggermont, Kwong, Don, 2000; Ponton, Eggermont, Khosla, Kwong, 
& Don, 2002), it is thought that the observed peaks at the age of 12 months may be 
functionally similar to those found in 3-9 year old children, which in turn may be the 
precursors of the adult components (Ceponiene, Cheour & Naatanen, 1998; Neville, 
Coffey, Holcomb, & Tallal, 1993; Paetau, Ahonen & Salonen, 1995). Undoubtedly, 
further longitudinal studies in the context of auditory processing are needed to elucidate 
the developmental course of the auditory evoked potentials and its functional 
significance across time (see Wunderlich & Cone-Wesson, 2006 for a review).  
Traditionally, the N100 component has been suggested to index the processing 
of acoustic features of sounds (e.g., amplitude, pitch, duration; Näätänen & Picton, 
1987) and the allocation of processing resources to form and maintain a sensory 
memory trace (Obleser & Kotz, 2011). Notably, evidence  suggests that the amplitude 
of the N100 can be modulated by attention, with higher negative amplitudes reflecting 
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the recruitment of more attentional resources (Woldorff et al., 1993; Woods, 1995). The 
age at which N1 becomes a reliable feature of the auditory evoked potentials is not 
clear. Although some studies already report an N1 in newborns (Barnet, Ohlrich, Weiss, 
& Shanks, 1975; Kushnrenko et al., 2002; Little, Thomas, & Letterman, 1999; Molfese, 
2000; Ohlrich et al., 1978; Rapin & Graziani, 1967), this component is often absent in 
young children (Wunderlich & Cone-Wesson, 2006). It is not until later in childhood, 
around the age of 9, when the N100 is systemically reported (Ceponiene et al., 1998; 
Pang & Taylor, 2000; Sussman, Steinschneider, Gumenyuk, Grushko & Lawson, 2008; 
Wunderlich, Cone-Wesson & Shepherd, 2006). 
Often following this component, there is the P200, a positive deflection thought 
to reflect the processing of semantically-relevant acoustic parameters involved in the 
early meaning detection or general stimulus categorization (Garcia-Larrea, 
Lukaszewicz, & Mauguiére, 1992; Pell et al., 2015; Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). Further 
evidence suggests that the P200 can be modulated by stimuli arousal (Jessen & Kotz, 
2011; Paulmann, Bleichner, & Kotz, 2013; Pell et al., 2015). Views on the development 
of the P200 are inconsistent. Some researchers posit that the auditory P2 emerges early 
in infancy (Barnet et al., 1975; Kurtzberg et al., 1984; Novak et al., 1989), while others 
state that it does not appear until 5-6 years of age (Ponton et al., 2002; Ceponiene et al., 
2002). Interestingly, the scalp distribution of this response is similar between infants 
and adults, mostly broad across frontal areas (Barnet, 1971; Wunderlich & Cone-
Wesso, 2006), while it is generally more posterior in children than in adults (Ponton et 
al., 2000; Tonquist-Uhlen, 1996). These differences may be reflecting developmental 
changes in the underlying generating neural networks responsible for these 
neurophysiological markers.  
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Later stages of acoustical processing are also affected by the emotional 
significance of the stimulus, as shown by changes in neural components with longer 
latencies such as the late positive component (LPC) (Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Kotz & 
Paulmann, 2011; Paulmann & Pell, 2010; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003, 2006; Schirmer, 
Chen, Ching, Tan, & Hong, 2013). Traditionally, the LPC has been linked to evaluative 
processes and sustained attention rather than to mere sensory processing (Cuthbert et 
al., 2000; Foti et al., 2010; Kanske and Kotz, 2007). In infant research, a series of ERP 
studies on memory recognition have consistently reported the emergence of enhanced 
long-latency positive waveforms to infrequently familiar stimuli as compared to novel 
stimuli by the age of 6 months  (Nelson & Collins, 1991; 1992; Nelson & deRegnier, 
1992). These results were thought to reflect the updating of memory representations of 
partially encoded stimuli (Nelson & Collins, 1991; 1992; Nelson & deRegnier, 1992). 
Similar slow positive waveforms have been reported in infant studies on emotion 
processing from faces (Nelson & de Haan, 1996) and speech (Grossmann et al., 2005). 
Although it is unclear whether the slow positive waveforms reported in the 
aforementioned studies reflect the same cognitive process (i.e. memory updating) given 
their differences in topography and morphology, all these late latency components have 
been interpreted as indexing more sustained and effortful operations. To the author 
knowledge, up to date there is no a single EEG study that has reported frontal late 
latency components in response to vocal emotional stimuli during childhood. While 
there has been much progress in the understanding of auditory evoked potentials in 
infancy and childhood, the emergence and characteristics of late latency positive 
components linked to emotional auditory processing remains to be further investigated. 
Hemispheric differences. Compelling behavioural and neuroimaging evidence 
supports the emergence of hemispheric specialization for different types of sounds as 
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early as few days after birth (see Paelle, 2012; Schirmer & Kotz, 2006 for a review). In 
general, empirical evidence emphasizes the dominant role of the left hemisphere in the 
processing of speech (Liegeois-Chauvel et al., 2004; Scott, Blank, Rosen, & Wise, 
2000; Zatorre & Belin, 2001), while greater selective responsiveness in the right 
hemisphere has been reported in response to human non-speech vocalizations sounds 
(e.g. crying, laughing) in infants (Blasi et al., 2011, Molfese, Freeman, & Palermo, 
1975) and adults (Belin, Zatorre, Lafaille, Ahad, & Pike, 2000). Yet, no differences 
across hemispheres have been reported in front of most non-human auditory stimuli, 
whether these are pure tones (Belin, Zatorre, Hoge, Evans, & Pike, 1999) or noise (Hart, 
Palmer, & Hall, 2003; Overath, Zhang, Sanes, & Poeppel, 2012). Altogether, this 
evidence suggests that both hemispheres are recruited unevenly by different types of 
sound, with the left hemisphere being dominant during the processing of fined grained 
sounds such as speech, and the right hemisphere being dominant during the processing 
of pitch (Homae, Watanabe, Nakano, Asakawa, & Taga, 2006; Meyer, Liem, Hirsiger, 
Jancke, & Hanggi, 2013; Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). Given these findings, I decided to 
explore further the contribution of each hemisphere in the processing of non-verbal 
emotional vocalizations in the first experimental chapter by including hemisphere 
(left/right) as a factor in the statistical analysis (see Paper 1).  
Semantic Processing: N400 
As a part of the fourth experimental chapter, the N400 component has also been 
examined.  The N400 is a large negative going component peaking at about 400 ms that 
has been observed in adults  (Ferguson, Cane, Douchkov, & Wright, 2015; Sabbagh & 
Taylor, 2000), children (Pace, Carver, & Friend, 2013; Sheehan, Namy, & Mills, 2007) 
and infants as young as 13 months of age (Friedrich & Friederici, 2005; Mills, Conboy, 
& Paton, 2005). N400 responses peaking at a later latency (600 – 800 ms) have also 
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been observed in 9-month-old infants (Reid et al., 2009). Typically, this component has 
been related to the processing of semantic information (see Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, 
2011 for review) and it has been proved to be sensitive not only to the meaning 
processing of words (e.g., Camblin, Gordon, & Swaab, 2007; Holcomb, 1993; Kutas & 
Hillyard, 1980, 1984; van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999) but also to the semantic 
processing of actions  (e.g., Bach, Gunter, Knoblich, Prinz, &, Friederici, 2009; Gunter 
& Bach, 2004; Proverbio & Riva, 2009; Shibata, Gyoba, &, Suzuki, 2009), with higher 
amplitudes to stimuli that are incongruent with the preceding context. Interestingly, this 
component has been reported over anterior areas in EEG studies using non-verbal visual 
stimuli (similar to the one I have used in the forth experimental chapter) designed to 
explore goal and intention driven action processing (infant studies: Pace, Carver, & 
Friend, 2013; Reid et al., 2009; Reid & Striano, 2008; adult studies: Ganis, Kutas, & 
Sereno, 1996; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; Proverbio et al., 2012; Proverbio & Riva, 
2009; Sitnikova, Holcomb, Kiyonaga, & Kuperberg, 2008; Sitnikova, West, 
Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2006; West & Holcomb, 2002). 
Thesis Aims 
Undoubtedly, empathy is a complex phenomenon whose examination is not 
without difficulties, mostly when involving developing populations. Although it is 
widely assumed that affect sharing is a likely precursor of empathy, this notion has not 
been directly tested in infants. We still do not have a clear understanding of the different 
mechanisms underlying infants’ ability to share others’ emotions and how they relate 
to the production of later other-oriented and prosocial responses. There is also some 
controversy regarding when and how theory of mind processes start modulating infants’ 
ability to resonate with others’ emotional states. Therefore, important questions on 
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early empathy development still remain unanswered. The present thesis aims at 
addressing some of these questions.  
Through a series of experimental studies, this thesis aims to provide further 
evidence regarding the affective and cognitive processes involved in the generation of 
empathy during infancy, ranging from infants’ ability to process emotional cues to 
infants’ ability to process others’ mental states. Paper 1 reports a study that examined 
the neural correlates underlying infants’ ability to process emotional cues from non-
verbal vocalizations produced by peers (i.e. crying, laughing and coughing), which are 
thought to be crucial in the elicitation of prosocial behaviors and early precursors in 
empathy development (Decety, 2015; Decety & Howard, 2013; Geangu, 2015; 
Hoffmann, 2001). The novelty of this study is that it probes individual differences in 
infants’ neural correlates underlying emotional processing, which is essential for a 
better understanding of those personal traits that may predispose infants to experience 
greater empathy. Investigating emerging individual differences is also crucial for the 
prediction of later behavioural outcomes. In this study, 8-month-old infants’ neural 
responses were measured by using an event-related potential (ERP) paradigm. On the 
basis of previous studies on emotion perception from speech in infants (Cheng et al., 
2012; Grossmann et al., 2005; Missana et al., 2017) and adults (Jessen & Kotz, 2011; 
Liu et al., 2012; Pell et al., 2015), we hypothesized that infants’ ERP responses to 
emotional non-verbal vocalizations would differentiate from neutral non-verbal 
vocalizations. Additionally, following previous infant research on temperament 
(Martinos, Matheson, & de Haan, 2012; Missana, Grigutsch, & Grossmann, 2014; 
Rajhans, Missana, Krol, & Grossmann, 2015; Ravicz, Perdue, Westerlund, Vanderwert, 
& Nelson, 2015), we predicted a significant relation between aspects of infants’ 
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negative emotionality and their ERP responses to their peers’ emotional non-verbal 
vocalizations. 
Paper 2 expands on Paper 1 by investigating the link between infants’ early 
responsiveness to their peers’ crying and laughing and the neural correlates underlying 
these behaviours in 8-month-olds. The main objective was to clarify the neural indices 
of motivational tendencies underpinning infants’ emerging other-oriented responses to 
their peers’ negative and positive emotions. This is important since early afftect sharing 
may motivate later other-oriented responses. Identifying the neurophysiological 
mechanisms underlying approach/withdrawal motivations in infancy will help us better 
understand how such other-oriented responses develop. In our second study, we used 
frontal EEG asymmetry analysis as our method. This measure has been previously used 
to investigate infants’ motivational tendencies to approach or avoid emotional 
situations (e.g., Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; Fox & Davidson, 1986, 1987, 1988). 
Following previous infant EEG studies on emotion reactivity (e.g., Buss et al., 2003; 
Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1898; Fox & Davidson, 1988; Jones et al., 2000), we 
hypothesized that those infants who show more right frontal activation when observing 
a peer crying would respond with more withdrawal-related behaviors (e.g., negative 
vocalizations, facial expressions of anger, attempts to escape from chair) towards a peer 
crying. Additionally, we hypothesised that infants who show more left frontal 
activation when observing a peer laughing would respond with more approach-related 
behaviors (e.g., positive vocalizations, facial expressions of joy, attempts to reach 
towards the stimuli) in response to a peer laughing. Together, the first two studies 
provide substantial data regarding infants’ responsiveness to their peers’ positive and 
negative emotions, adding new insights into the field of social cognition development. 
Following on, Papers 3 and 4 address higher order cognitive processes by 
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investigating the potential neurocognitive mechanisms underlying affective and 
cognitive aspects of empathy. The study presented in Paper 3 used electromyopraphy 
(EMG) to examine the role of motor mimicry and emotion evaluation processes as 
potential neurocgontive mechanisms involved in the generation of in infants’ 
spontaneous facial reactions (SFRs) to others’ emotional facial expressions. Infants 
were presented three dynamic facial expressions (i.e., happiness, anger, and fear). We 
measured three facial muscle groups that are selectively activated in response to these 
facial displays (i.e., zygomaticus major for smiling during happiness, corrugator 
supercilli for frowning in anger, and frontalis for forehead raising in anger displays). 
The main goal of this study was to test the automatic transmission of emotions account 
in infancy, where the influence of language, cultural norms and values in the processing 
of emotional information is minimal. If SFRs rely solely on motor mimicry processes 
then we would expect infants’ SFRs towards others’ facial emotional expressions to 
closely resemble the observed motor model  (e.g., the activation of the zygomaticus 
major – the muscle which raise the corner of the mouth during smiling - when observing 
someone smiling but not when observing a fearful face). Conversely, if SFRs rely on 
additional neurocognitive mechanisms, different to motor mimicry, we would expect 
infants’ SFRs to converge with their own, i.e., the observer’s, affective state, which 
might differ from the emotion perceived (e.g., fear in response to anger).  
Paper 4 goes on to explore the ontogenesis of cognitive aspects of empathy by 
examining the neural correlates underlying 15-month-olds’ ability to process others’ 
beliefs, thought to be crucial for the development of more mature forms of empathy 
during the second year of life. This fourth study used a non-verbal false belief (FB) task 
consisting of visual narratives depicting a female agent acting congruently or 
incongruently with her FB about the location of an object. EEG activity was recorded 
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during the entire duration of the task. The main objective was to test the extent to which 
infants’ brain responses are sensitive to the incongruences between the agent’s actions 
and the visual narrative suggestive of her FBs by analysing the effects on the N400 
component. We anticipated that if 15-month-old infants in our study process the 
character’s actions as being related to the narrative context suggestive of her knowledge 
about the object’s location rather the infants’ own knowledge about reality, then an 
increased N400 will be observed during the last scene of the FBi (false-belief 
incongruent) trials compared to the FBc (false-belief congruent) trials. Alternatively, if 
infants are more likely to process the character’s actions in relation to the real location 
of the object, we expect a more negative anterior N400 to be elicited by the FBc than 
FBi trials. 
As a whole, this thesis extends our knowledge of early empathy development by 
investigating several key processes and mechanisms underpinning the generation of 
empathic responses during infancy. Identifying the neurophysiological mechanisms 
involved in early forms of empathy should help us to better understand the ontogeny of 
some developmental disorders such as autism or psychopathy, in which empathic 
deficits are common. In this way, the findings here may help improve early diagnosis 
of children with atypical social development and contribute to more efficient prevention 
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Abstract 
Infants’ ability to process others’ emotional expressions is fundamental for the later 
development of children’s interpersonal and social skills. Much research has been done on how 
infants process emotions from faces and speech, while less is known about how infants process 
emotions embedded in non-verbal vocalizations and how individual differences may affect this 
ability. Here, we recorded event-related potentials (ERPs) from 8-month-old infants while they 
were listening sounds of another infant crying, laughing and coughing. Infants’ temperament 
was measured via parent report using the Infant Behavior Questionnaire -Revised (IBQ-R). 
Our ERP results revealed that hearing another infant laugh and cry elicited differential ERP 
activity at frontal locations, as indexed by differences in the N100, P200 and LPC components. 
Hearing another infant crying elicited an early enhanced negativity (N100) and a later enhanced 
positivity (LPC) compared to positive and neutral peers’ non-verbal vocalizations of emotions, 
whereas P200 amplitudes did not show any differentiation among conditions. Temperamental 
differences in negative emotionality showed significant relations with the amplitude of P200 
and LPC responses to non-verbal emotional vocalizations. These results shed new light into 
the links between infant temperament and emotion information processing development, with 




Non-verbal vocalizations of emotions such as laughter and crying are human universals, 
providing unambiguous and genuine information about our emotions (Barr, Hopkins & Green, 
2000; Dunbar, Baron, & Frangou, 2012; Paulmann & Kotz, 2008a; Provine, 2016; Provine, 
2004; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010a; Scherer, 1986, 1995). Both the production and 
the accurate interpretation of these social signals are thought to play crucial roles in 
communication, social bonding, and elicitation of prosocial behaviors and may be the early 
precursors to empathy development (Decety, 2015; Decety & Howard, 2013; Geangu, 2015; 
Hoffmann, 2001). Evidence sugests that the atypical production and perception of non-verbal 
vocalizations during the first year of life may be a good predictor of the later emergence of 
developmental disorders characterized by deficts in social communication skills such as autism 
(Esposito, Nakazawa, Venuti, & Bornstein, 2013; Esposito, Venuti, & Bornstein, 2011; Reddy, 
Williams, & Vaughan, 2002; Blasi et al., 2015). Despite their significance, our ability to 
process, respond, and use non-verbal vocalizations of emotions, particularly in early 
development, remains understudied (Geangu, 2015; Pell et al., 2015; Dunbar et al., 2012, 
Provine, 1996).  
Infancy is a crucial time period for tuning and optimising the brain circuitry for 
processing stimuli with socio-emotional relevance and emotional responsivity, setting the stage 
for both the refinement of the early acquired social skills and the emergence of new and more 
complex ones later in life (Johnson, 2011; Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). From this perspective, the 
investigation of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying emotional information processing 
and potential individual variations during infancy is essential for understanding typical and 
atypical social development, as well as for identifying methods for early detection and 
intervention (e.g., Bunford, Kujawa, Swain, Fitzgerald, Monk, & Phan, 2017;  Johnson, Gliga, 
Jones, & Charman, 2015; Morales, Fu, & Pérez-Edgar, 2016). Towards this aim, the current 
NEURAL	RESPONSES	TO	PEERS’	CRY	AND	LAUGHTER	 112	
study investigates infants’ neural responses to their peers’ non-verbal vocalizations of emotions 
and temperamental variations in such responses by using event-related potentials (ERPs). 
Within a few hours after birth infants already manifest distress vocalizations when they 
hear the sound of another infant crying (Dondi, Simion & Caltran, 1999; Field, Diego, 
Hernandez-Reif & Fernandez, 2007; Geangu, Benga, Stahl & Striano, 2010; Martin & Clark, 
1982; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971). Such distress responses are more intense when 
neonates hear a human infant cry rather than an infant chimpanzee cry (Martin & Clark, 1982), 
while artificial noise does not elicit such responses (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971). 
Neonates also have the capacity to perceptually discriminate between their own cry and the cry 
of another same age infant (Dondi et al., 1999; Martin & Clark, 1982). Throughout the first 
year of life, infants continue to respond with facial and vocal distress to the crying sounds of 
their peers (Geangu et al., 2010), and this increase in arousal persists throughout toddlerhood, 
although with lesser intensity (Nichols, Svetlova, & Brownell, 2009, 2015). When jointly 
presented with the corresponding facial expressions, these overt responses elicited by peer 
emotional vocalizations are accompanied by autonomic arousal changes. In 6-, 12-, and 15-
months-old infants (Geangu, Hauf, Bhardwaj, & Bentz, 2011; Upshaw, Kaiser, & 
Sommerville, 2015), observation of audio-video recordings of a peer crying or laughing elicited 
an increase in pupil diameter reflecting autonomic sympathetic activation (Bradley, Miccoli, 
Escrig, & Lang, 2008). The valence of the stimuli, however, moderated the latency of pupil 
response with crying eliciting an early response already present at 6 months while laughter 
showed a delayed pupil response at 6 months but had a similar latency as crying by 12 months 
(Geangu et al., 2011). Overall, observing a peer crying elicited greater arousal compared to 
observing a peer laughing (Geangu et al., 2011; Upshaw et al., 2015). Taken together, these 
early signs of affect sharing suggest that infants’ ability to detect and process non-verbal 
vocalizations of emotions is present from birth and continues to develop throughout infancy.  
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Schirmer and Kotz (2006) proposed a three-stage model for processing emotional 
vocalizations based on electrophysiology evidence from adults. At the first stage of processing, 
the brain shows sensitivity to the embedded emotional information as early as 100-200 ms after 
stimulus onset, as indexed by the emergence of an N100 and P200 (Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Liu 
et al., 2012; Pell et al., 2015; Paulmann, Bleichner, & Kotz, 2013; Schirmer, Kotz, & Friederici, 
2005). The N100, a negative deflection in the ERP waveform occurring around 100 ms, is 
considered to be an index of early sensory encoding of the physical properties of the sound 
(Näätänen & Picton, 1987) and the effort associated with the allocation of processing resources 
to form and maintain a sensory memory trace (Obleser & Kotz, 2011). Recently, evidence 
found that the amplitude of the N100 is modulated by the emotional valence of auditory stimuli 
(Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Liu et al, 2012). The positive component observed around 200 ms (P200) 
is proposed to reflect the processing of the semantically-relevant acoustic parameters involved 
in the early meaning detection or general stimulus categorization at the second stage of the 
model (Garcia-Larrea, Lukaszewicz, & Mauguiére, 1992; Pell et al., 2015). The P200 is 
modulated by the motivational saliency of the acoustic signal as indicated by both the discrete 
emotional qualities of the stimulus and the associated arousal (Paulmann et al., 2013). The 
latency of both the N100 and the P200 shows that non-verbal vocalizations of emotions are 
processed much faster than emotional speech prosody, emphasizing the heightened relevance 
afforded by these crude means of expressing genuine emotions (Pell et al., 2015). More 
advanced analysis of the emotional meaning expressed by human vocalizations, including their 
social relevance and memory representations (Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; 
Paulmann & Pell, 2010; Schirmer & Kotz, 2003, 2006; Schirmer, Chen, Ching, Tan, & Hong, 
2013) are usually reported at the third stage of processing, as indicated by the late positive 
component (LPC). For example, the amplitude of the LPC has been found to vary as a function 
of stimulus level of arousal and emotional expression, with increased amplitude for cues of 
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threat (e.g., anger) compared to non-threat (e.g., sadness, happiness) or for expressions with 
higher versus lower levels of arousal (Paulmann et al., 2013; Pell et al., 2015). Such differences 
may reflect the evaluation of the stimulus meaning as related to the representations stored in 
an individual’s memory; with preferential allocation of processing resources to the stimuli 
highly relevant for the individual (Hinojosa et al., 2009; Paulmann et al., 2013; Pell et al., 2015; 
Kanske & Kotz, 2007). The emotional modulations of the LPC are also more pronounced and 
faster for non-verbal vocalizations of emotions compared to emotional prosody embedded in 
speech (Pell et al., 2015), suggesting that the emotional meaning of non-verbal vocalizations 
maintain prioritised processing continuing into adulthood. 
Emotionally loaded human vocalizations have been reported to modulate infant ERP 
responses as well (Cheng, Lee, Chen, Wang & Decety, 2012; Grossmann, Striano, & Friederici, 
2005; Missana, Alvater-Mackensen, & Grossman, 2017; Zhang et al., 2014). The infant brain 
seems to differentiate between emotional prosody embedded in speech soon after birth (Cheng 
et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2014) and suggests that at this age the discrimination is automatic, 
and possibly related to the activity of primary and non-primary auditory areas in the temporal 
cortex (Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007). While there is limited evidence to make 
such claims, auditory processing of emotion prosody in infancy and childhood resembles adult-
like processing demonstrating sensitivity to emotional content both at early processing stages 
(Chronaki et al., 2012; Grossmann et al., 2013) and at later ones, including the LPC 
(Grossmann et al., 2005). Recent evidence from an EEG study suggests that 8-month-old 
infants’ ERP responses may also be sensitive to peers’ non-verbal vocalizations of emotions 
(Missana, Alvater-Mackensen, & Grossmann, 2007). In this study infants were presented with 
the sounds of their peers’ cry and laughter, as well as the neutral humming of an adult. While 
early positive and negative components were selectively modulated to either peer crying or 
laughter sounds as compared to neutral vocalizations, no differentiation between emotions was 
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reported at late stages of processing. The aforementioned findings have been partially 
corroborated by an fMRI study that examined the infants’ brain responses to crying, laughter 
and coughing sounds produced by adults (Blasi et al., 2011). In this case, crying but not 
laughter vocalizations evoked a stronger activation in infants’ insula and orbitofrontal cortex 
compared to neutral vocalizations. Unlike Missana et al. (2017), this study did not find any 
differences between laughing and neutral vocalizations.  
The disparate results reported by these studies may be explained by the differences in 
the temporal resolution of the methods used (EEG/ERP vs. fMRI) and the fact that they may 
reflect different stages of processing, or they may be due to differences in the stimuli. While 
Blasi et al. (2011) compared hemodynamic responses to non-verbal vocalizations produced by 
adults, Missana et al. (2017) contrasted ERPs to peer emotional non-verbal vocalizations with 
adult neutral vocalizations. As reported above, behavioural studies have demonstrated infants’ 
sensitivity to the age of the voice expressing non-verbal vocalizations of emotions (Martin & 
Clark, 1982). Further, the effect of familiarity, a well-known effect in the processing of visual 
information (e.g., faces – Kahana-Kalman & Walker-Andrews, 2003; de Haan, Johnson, & 
Halit, 2003), may have driven the reported ERP findings, not by the emotional content, but by 
the degree of familiarity of adult versus peer voices (Kooijmann, Hagoort, & Cutler, 2005; 
Thierry, Vihman, & Roberts, 2003). Thus, contrasting infants’ ERP responses to emotional and 
neutral non-verbal vocalizations which both belong to their peers is essential for providing a 
clear picture of the neurocognitive mechanisms involved in processing this type of emotional 
expressions. 
Additionally, despite the well-known fact that humans vary greatly in how they respond 
to emotional cues, none of the above studies has examined the role of individual differences in 
the processing of vocal emotional cues. Importantly, individuals vary greatly in terms of how 
intensely they react to emotional information (Hamann & Canli, 2004). These differences are 
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present starting with early infancy (Fox et al., 2005) and have been associated with individual 
temperamental characteristics (e.g., Jarcho et al., 2014). Variations in temperamental reactivity 
and self-regulation are thought to stem from a person’s enduring biological make-up, shaped 
by the interplay between heredity, maturation and experience (Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981). 
Infants’ and young children’s temperamental characteristics manifest stable influences on an 
individual’s emotional life (Jarcho et al., 2014) and are significantly linked to adult personality 
traits (Kagan et al., 1984; Fox et al., 2005). Importantly, these early individual differences in 
emotional reactivity and regulation are important predictors for several socio-emotional 
development outcomes. Understanding how temperamental differences in emotional reactivity 
and regulation relate to the processing of emotional cues beginning with infancy is thus crucial 
for the early detection and intervention of those individuals more likely to manifest atypical 
patterns of development (e.g., the development of anxiety disorders, depression, aggression 
and conduct disorders – Frick & Morris, 2004; Olson, Sameroff, Kerr, Lopez, & Wellman, 
2005; Pérez-Edgar & Fox, 2005). Recent studies have shown that infants’ neural responses to 
visual cues of others’ emotions are significantly related to their temperamental characteristics 
(Martinos, Matheson, & de Haan, 2012; Missana, Grigutsch, & Grossmann, 2014; Rajhans, 
Missana, Krol, & Grossmann, 2015; Ravicz, Perdue, Westerlund, Vanderwert, & Nelson, 
2015). In particular, infants with a disposition to express negative emotions during everyday 
life were more likely to manifest increased attention allocation to positive facial expressions 
(Martinos et al., 2012). In contrast, infants lower on negative emotionality were more likely to 
allocate their attention to processing negative emotional expressions (Rajhans et al., 2015). 
Infants’ with better emotion regulation abilities also seem to allocate more attention in 
processing fearful emotional facial expressions (Martinos et al., 2012). The specific ability to 
recover from peak arousal was related to the degree of attentional engagement in processing 
angry facial expressions, suggesting that those infants who are better able to control their own 
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state, are more likely to focus on processing facial cues of threat (Missana et al., 2014). Further, 
both infants’ regulatory abilities and aspects of their negative emotionality have been 
significantly associated with their behavioral emotional responses to peer cry sounds (Geangu 
et al., 2011). Taken together, this suggests that temperament may play in important role in 
individual differences in the processing of emotional vocalizations. This is the first study to 
systematically investigate temperamental variance in infants’ neural responses to their peers’ 
non-verbal vocalizations of emotions. 
The aim of our study is two-fold: to test whether infants’ neural processing of peers’ 
non-verbal emotional vocalizations is sensitive to the valence of the conveyed emotion; and 
whether these neural responses can be modulated by the infants’ temperamental characteristics. 
Towards these aims, we measured 8-month-old infants’ ERPs in response to audio recordings 
of emotional (negative/crying and positive/laughing) and non-emotional (i.e., coughing) non-
verbal vocalizations. Crucially, unlike Missana et al. (2017), all the non-verbal vocalizations 
in this study were produced by infants. On the basis of previous studies on emotion perception 
from voice in both infants (Cheng et al., 2012; Grossmann et al., 2005; Missana et al., 2017; 
Zhang et al., 2014) and adults (Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Liu et al., 2012; Paulmann et al., 2013; 
Pell et al., 2015; Schirmer et al., 2005), we examined differences between affective and neutral 
auditory stimuli at the level of the early ERP components, in particular those corresponding to 
the N100 and the P200. Given the sensitivity of the N100 and P200 amplitude to emotional 
information, we hypothesized that emotional non-verbal vocalizations would evoke larger 
N100 and P200 amplitudes relative to neutral vocalizations. In addition, we hypothesized that 
the emotional sounds would evoke sustained cognitive processing in comparison to the neutral 
condition, as reflected by a LPC. In terms of the temperamental characteristics, we predicted a 
significant relation between aspects of infants’ negative emotionality and their ERP responses 
to their peers’ non-verbal vocalizations of emotions since this relation has been more 
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systematically reported in previous studies. 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty 8-month old infants (13 females, Mage = 291.90 days, SDage = 110.49 days) 
were included in the final EEG data analysis. An additional 14 infants were tested but not 
included in the final sample due to excessive artifacts and insufficient number of trials (N = 
10) or missing IBQ-R data (N = 4). All participants were recruited from a small urban area in 
North West England, did not suffer from any neurological or other medical condition, and 
were observed to have a normal audition for their age. 
Prior to the experiment, all parents were informed that at the end of the experiment they 
would receive £10 in order to cover traveling expenses and that the infant will be rewarded 
with a book for their participation. Informed consent was obtained from all parents. All data 
were collected in accordance with the ethical principles of the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 
1991; 302: 1194) and the study was approved by the Faculty Ethics Committee.  
Stimuli  
A sample of 12 non-verbal emotional vocalizations produced by pre-verbal infants was 
gathered from sound library sources. The stimuli consisted of 4 positive (i.e., laughter), 4 
negative (i.e., crying), and 4 neutral (i.e., coughing) non-speech sounds. Each vocalization was 
produced by a different individual. The use of coughing sounds as emotionally neutral contrasts 
is in line with previous investigations of auditory emotion processing (Armony, Chochol, 
Fecteau, & Belin, 2007; Blasi et al., 2011; Fecteau, Belin, Joanette, & Armony, 2007). The 
sound recordings were edited to a 1.4 sec length and rated by a group of 20 university students 
(10 females; Mage = 26 years; SD = 2.82 years) with respect to perceived arousal and 
authenticity of the emotion by using a 7-point Likert scale (Table 1). 
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Table 1. 




































Note. Ratings from n = 20 adults 
  
Separate one-way ANOVA with emotion (laugh/positive, cry/negative, cough/neutral) 
as a factor was performed on the arousal and authenticity ratings for the non-verbal stimuli. No 
significant differences between affective stimuli were found on authenticity (F(2, 59) = 1.693; 
p = .193), while a main effect of emotion was obtained for the arousal ratings (F(2, 59) = 
80.244; p < .001). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that coughing sounds were rated as less 
arousing than both crying (p < .001) and laughing vocalizations (p < .001). 
In addition, participants were asked to indicate the valence of the stimuli (positive, 
negative or neutral). On average, crying sounds were judged as “negative” by 97% of 
participants, laughing sounds were rated as “positive” by 99% of participants, and neutral 
sounds were rated as “neutral” by 75% of participants. These ratings are similar to those 
reported in previous studies using vocal emotional expressions (e.g., Belin et al., 2008; Pell et 
al., 2015). Basic acoustic properties of the stimuli are presented in Figure 1. The non-verbal 
vocalizations were edited so that all audio stimuli had an average root mean square intensity of 
40 dB, after edge smoothing (linear rise/fall times of 20 ms) by applying cosine-squared ramps 
to the onset and offset. All sounds were bandpass filtered from 1 to 10,000 Hz with a digital 
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finite impulse response filter in order to remove any potential background noise. 
 
Figure 1. Waveforms and spectrograms of exemplary non-verbal vocalizations 
included in the study and the average acoustic features for each affective category. The 
fundamental frequency (f0) or pitch is measured in Hertz (Hz), while the intensity in decibels 
(dB). The values represent the averages across all exemplars within a category, calculated for 
the entire stimulus duration. The range for f0 and intensity is calculated by subtracting the 
minimum from the maximum value recorded for each stimulus and then averaged across all 
exemplars. 
Temperament Measure: Infant Behavior Questionnaire - Revised (IBQ-R) 
Parental reports of infant temperament were obtained using the Infant Behavior 
Questionnaire – Revised (IBQ-R) that characterises temperament along 3 scales and 14 
subscales from a total of 191 items. This instrument is widely used and is typically reported to 
have satisfactory reliability and validity (Rothbart & Gartstein, 2003). For the current study, 
we focused on the temperamental dimension Negative Emotionality and its subscales since this 
dimension had been previously related to differences in infant ERP responses to emotional 
information conveyed by facial and body expressions (Martinos et al., 2012; Missana et al., 
2014; Rajhans et al., 2015). Negative Emotionality (α = .757)  refers to the tendency to show 
various forms of negative affect such as generalised distress, fear, and anger, and it is defined 
by four scales: Sadness (lowered mood and activity related to personal suffering, physical state, 
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object loss, or inability to perform a desired action; general low mood, α = .763), Distress to 
Limitations (fussing, crying or showing distress while in a confining place or position; in 
caretaking activities; or when unable to perform a desired action, α = .810), Fear (startle or 
distress to sudden changes in stimulation, novel physical objects or social stimuli; inhibited 
approach to novelty, α = .902) and Falling Reactivity (rate of recovery from peak distress, 
excitement, or general arousal; ease of falling asleep – typically regarded to reflect infants’ 
ability to regulate their own state, α = .883). Table 2 illustrates a description of the full 
distribution of the IBQ-R scores for the main temperamental dimensions (and its subscales) for 
the whole sample.  
Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics for infants’ IBQ-R scores on the temperamental dimensions and its 
subscales (N = 30). 
 
 Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Negative Emotionality 3.195 .641 -.153 -.972 
Distress 3.93 .866 -.077 -.242 
Fear 2.417 .889 .640 -.275 
Falling Reactivity 5.059 .966 -.585 .640 
Sadness 3.494 .877 -.095 -.979 
Surgency 5.154 .568 .281 -1.111 
Approach 5.545 .604 -.093 -.307 
Vocal Reactivity 5.298 .746 -.097 -.873 
High Intensity Pleasure 6.154 .492 -.241 -.204 
Smiling 4.848 .876 .136 -1.221 
Activity Level 4.781 .889 .220 -1.280 
Perceptual Sensitivity 4.297 1.099 .178 -.704 
Regulation 4.756 .484 -.330 1.026 
Low Intensity Pleasure 4.822 .815 .805 -.306 
Cuddliness 5.434 .749 -.610 .014 
Orienting 3.928 1.013 -.144 -.392 







ERPs were recorded while infants sat on their parent’s lap at a distance of 
approximately 70 cm from a 17-inch monitor in a dimly lit room. The auditory stimuli were 
randomly presented using MATLAB software (MathWorks, Natick, MA), over two hidden 
speakers placed to the left and right of the monitor. No more than two sounds of the same 
emotional category were presented consecutively. A trial consisted of 1400 ms sound stimulus 
followed by a silent inter-stimulus interval, which varied randomly in duration between 1200 
ms and 2000 ms. A black fixation cross on a grey background was displayed on the monitor 
during the entire procedure. The procedure continued until a maximum of 138 trials were 
presented (46 per category) or until the infant showed signs of boredom and unrest. In order to 
minimize infants’ movements and maintain their interest, an experimenter was present to 
quietly blow soap bubbles throughout the whole procedure. Both the parent and the 
experimenter avoided visual contact and any attempt for social interaction with the infant. The 
procedure lasted approximately 8 min. After stimulus presentation, parents filled in the IBQ-R 
questionnaire. 
Electroencephalogram Recording and Data Analysis  
The EEG was recorded continuously using a 128-electrode HydroCel Geodesic Sensor 
Net (Electrical Geodesic Inc., Eugene, OR) and amplified using an EGI NetAmps 300 
amplifier. The signal was referenced online to the vertex electrode (Cz), a bandpass filter of .1-
100 Hz was applied, and the data were sampled at 500 Hz. Impedances were checked prior to 
the beginning of the recording and considered acceptable if lower than 50 KΩ. EEG data were 
further processed offline using NetStation v4.6.4 (Eugene, OR). The signal was band-pass 
filtered (0.3-30 Hz), and the ERP trials were segmented with a 200 ms baseline and 1400 ms 
following stimulus onset. Data were corrected to the average voltage during baseline and re-
referenced to the algebraic mean of channels. To eliminate artifacts, trials were automatically 
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rejected whenever the signal exceeded ± 200 µV at any electrode for more than eighteen 
channels. Of the remaining trials, individual bad channels were replaced using spherical spline 
interpolation. Data were further checked through visual inspection for eye-movements, eye-
blinks and other body movement artifacts not detected by the automated algorithm. Individual 
subject averages were computed separately for each channel across all trials within each 
condition and then data re-referenced to the average reference. Across participants, the mean 
number of trials contributing to the average ERP was 18 per each condition (Coughing: M = 
18.41, SD = 6.49; Crying: M = 17.19, SD = 5.67; Laughing: M = 18.53, SD = 5.88). 
On the basis of visual inspection of ERP waveforms and previous adult and infant 
auditory ERP studies (Kushnerenko, Ceponiene, Balan, Fellman, & Näätänen, 2002; 
Kushnerenko et al, 2007; Little, Thomas, & Letterman, 1999; Ohlrich & Barnet, 1972; 
Shucard, Shucard, Cummins, & Campos, 1981; Shucard, Shucard, & Thomas, 1987; 
Wunderlich & Cone-Wesson, 2006), mean amplitudes were analysed at three time-windows at 
frontal locations: 50-150ms (N100), 150-200ms (P200), and 550-950ms (LPC). At central 
locations, mean amplitude effects were assessed for the time window of 150-200ms (P200). 
The regions of interest (ROIs) were: frontal (left - 23, 24, 27, 28; right - 3, 117, 123, 124), and 
central (left - 36, 41, 42, 47; right - 93, 96, 103, 104). Separate 3 (emotion: positive, negative, 
neutral) x 2 (hemisphere: left, right) repeated-measures ANOVAs were conducted for each of 
these time windows at their respective regions of interest. We did not correct the results for 
multiple comparisons to avoid inflating Type II error and thereby obscuring expected results 
(O’Reilly et al., 2017; Rothman 1990, 2014). Multiple comparisons were kept to the minimum 
by using hypothesis-led predictions informed by previous research (e.g. Grossmann et al., 
2005; Liu et al. 2012, Missana et al., 2017; Pell et al., 2015). All ERP statistical tests were 
conducted at .05 level of significance (two-tailed). Note that we labelled the ERP components 
included in the statistical analysis according their polarity and peak latency.  
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Results 
The grand averages for all conditions at different scalp locations are presented in Figure 
2. A more detailed illustration of the scalp topographies for the frontal components is included 
in Figure 3. No gender effects were found for any of the ERP components. For further 
information see Appendix A.  
ERP analysis  
Frontal  
N100 (50-150 ms) 
A main effect of emotion was found for the N100 mean amplitude at frontal leads, 
F(2,58) = 5.847; p = 0.005; η2 = 0.168. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the N100 was 
significantly more negative for crying (M = -.547 µV; SE = .527) than for laughter sounds (M 
= 1.931 µV; SE = .571; p = .007). This effect remained when correcting for multiple 
comparisons (p = .020). No significant differences were observed between the neutral and 
emotional sounds (p > .069). No other main effects or interaction was found (p > .262).   
 
Figure 2. Grand average ERPs for the crying (dark solid line), laughter (light gray solid 
line) and coughing (dotted line) sounds over frontal (A), and central (C) locations. The location 
of the analyzed ROIs is indicated in B). 
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P200 (150-200 ms)     
At frontal locations, the analysis of P200 mean amplitude revealed a significant main 
effect of emotion, F(2,58) = 4.481; p = 0.016; η2 = 0.134. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
laughter sounds elicited more positive P200 amplitudes (M = 6.241 µV; SE = .848) than crying 
vocalizations (M = 3.510 µV; SE = .745; p = .012), and marginally more positive amplitudes 
than coughing sounds (M = 4.645 µV; SE = .713; p = .057). The difference between crying and 
laughter sounds on P200 amplitudes survived after applying Bonferroni correction (p = .036). 
No differences were observed between crying and coughing vocalizations (p > .223). Similar 
mean amplitudes were recorded for both hemispheres, F(1,29) = .476; p = .496; η2 = .016 . No 
significant emotion x hemisphere interaction was found, F(2,58) = .449; p = .640; η2 = .015. 
Given the temporal proximity between this component and the N100 at frontal 
locations, it is possible that variations in the N100 parameters may have affected the P200 
component differently across conditions. Thus, complementary peak-to-peak measurement and 
analysis were performed to control for N100 variations. With this purpose, same statistical 
analyses were performed on the measure of the mean amplitude difference between the peak 
of the P200 and the N100 (i.e. P200-N100). These analyses revealed no significant main effects 
or interactions (p > .606). Therefore, when accounting for peak-to-peak amplitude differences, 
the main effect of emotion disappears. 
LPC (550-950 ms)  
For this late time window at frontal locations, a main effect of emotion was found for the 
mean amplitude, F(2,58) = 4.161; p = 0.020; η2 = 0.125. Follow up planned comparisons 
revealed that LPC amplitudes were more positive for crying (M = 4.754 µV; SE = .812) than 
laughter (M = 2.480 µV; SE = .603; p = .028) and coughing sounds (M = 2.163 µV; SE = .726; 
p = .030). These differences did not hold after Bonferroni corrections (p = .085 and p = .089 
respectively). No difference was observed between laughter and coughing sounds (p = .691). 
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No other main effects or interaction were found (p > .341). 
Central  
P200 (150 -250 ms) 
A similar mean amplitude was elicited by all conditions, F(2,58) = 2.114; p = .130; η2 = 
.068. No main effect of hemisphere, F(1,29) = .150; p = .702; η2 = .005, or interaction between 
condition and hemisphere was identified, F(2,58) = 2.768; p = .071; η2 = .087. 
 
Figure 3. Scalp topographies for the frontal ERP components. (A) Voltage topographies 
of the frontal ERP components over the scalp for coughing (first column), crying (middle 
column) and laughing (last column) sounds. (B) Bar graphs showing the mean amplitude values 
(plus standard errors of the mean) per experimental condition for the frontal ERP components. 




Pearson correlations (two tailed, p < .05) were computed to examine the relations 
between infants’ general score on the Negative Emotionality scale, as well as the scores for its 
subscales (i.e., Sadness, Distress to Limitations, Fear, and Falling Reactivity), and the mean 
amplitude difference scores of the N100, P200 corrected and LPC between affective conditions 
(i.e., laughter vs. cry, cry vs. coughing, laughter vs. coughing). For each time window the mean 
amplitude obtained in response to coughing sounds was subtracted from the mean amplitude 
recorded in response to laughter sounds (i.e. Laughter [Lg] – Coughing [Cg]: N100Lg-Cg, 
P200Lg-Cg, LPCLg-Cg) and crying sounds (i.e. Crying [Cr] – Coughing [Cg]: N100Cr-Cg, P200Cr-
Cg, LPCCr-Cg). In addition, for each component the mean amplitude elicited by crying sounds 
was subtracted from the mean amplitude elicited by laughter sounds (i.e. Laughter [Lg] – 
Crying [Cr]: N100Lg-Cr, P200Lg-Cr, LPCLg-Cr). 
For the N100, there was no apparent relation between negative emotionality scores and 
the amplitude difference scores (p > .647).  
For the P200 corrected, the factor negative emotionality was negatively associated with 
the P200Lg-Cg amplitude difference score, r(30) = -.400, p = .028. Additionally, our analysis 
revealed a significant positive correlation between infant’s ability to recover from distress 
(IBQ-R Falling Reactivity scale) and the mean amplitude scores for P200Lg-Cg (r(30) = .513, p 
= .004) and P200Cr-Cg scores  (r(30) = .481, p = .007) (Figure 4). These correlations did not hold 
after correcting for multiple comparisons with an adjusted alpha of .05/15 = .003.  
For the LPC component, no association was observed with the main factor negative 
emotionality (p >.129). Nonetheless, a closer inspection of the subscales revealed a significant 
negative correlation between infants’ ability to recover from distress (IBQ-R Falling Reactivity 
scale) and the LPCLg-Cr score, r(30) = -.527, p = .003 (Figure 4). Our analyses also showed a 
significant positive correlation between the scale falling reactivity and the LPCCr-Cg amplitude 
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difference score, r(30) = .558, p = .001 (Figure 4). These correlations survived the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons.  
 
Figure 4. Correlations between infant ERP data and Falling Reactivity scores (IBQ-R). 
This figure shows the correlation between the mean amplitude difference scores of the frontal 
P200 corrected and frontal LPC and infants’ scores on IBQ-R falling reactivity (the correlations 
are significant on the p < .01 level). 
Discussion 
Non-verbal vocalizations such as cry and laughter are powerful cues for communicating 
emotions (Barr et al., 2000; Davila Ross et al., 2009; Dunbar et al., 2012; Pell et al., 2015; 
Provine 2015; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2010; Scherer, 1986, 1995; Scott, Lavan, Chen, 
& McGettigan, 2014). Particularly the cry and laughter of pre-verbal infants, the primary means 
of vocal communication at this age, are highly efficient in eliciting a response from others (e.g., 
Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Sander, Frome, & Scheich, 2007; Simner, 1971). In this study, we 
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aimed to investigate 8-months-old infants’ ERP responses to their peers’ non-verbal 
vocalizations of emotions and whether these were modulated by temperamental characteristics. 
Sounds of infants crying and laughing were presented alongside neutral non-verbal productions 
(i.e., coughing) and parents reported on their infants’ temperamental characteristics. Results 
showed that the processing of emotional information from non-verbal vocalizations at the age 
of 8 months was associated with differential ERP activity at frontal locations, indexed by the 
N100, P200 and LPC components. Importantly, the differentiation in response between 
emotional and non-emotional stimuli was significantly related to temperamental differences in 
negative emotionality. 
ERP Results 
 In line with several previous studies reporting a sensitivity to emotional vocalizations 
within the early stages of auditory processing (Missana et al., 2017; Pell et al., 2015; Schirmer 
& Kotz, 2006), our results show that 8-months-old infants responded with a more negative 
N100 amplitude to their peers’ crying sounds than to their peers’ laughter sounds. Infants’ 
N100 amplitudes were also more negative when hearing another infant crying than when 
hearing another infant coughing, yet the difference did not reach significance. The N100 is 
considered to be at least partially generated by the processing of the acoustic input in the 
auditory cortex (Eggermont & Ponton, 2003; Näätänen & Picton, 1987). Empirical evidence 
from infants suggests that the N100 is not likely to be influenced by the novelty of the sound, 
but more likely to be modulated by other auditory properties such as spectral richness (Csibra, 
Kushnerenko, & Grossmann, 2008; Kushnerenko et al., 2007), the sound intensity at the edges 
(e.g. slope, amplitude of sounds rise/fall) (Čeponiene, Aku, Westerfield, Torki, & Townsend, 
2005; Čeponiene, Torki, Alku, Koyama, & Townsend, 2008), and fundamental frequency 
(Annett & Kotz, 2006; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011). The early processing of auditory cues 
contributes to the extraction of the emotional salience (Jessen & Kotz, 2008; Schirmer & Kotz, 
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2006) and may explain the differences observed in our study, with crying and laughing sounds 
being the most distinct in relation to each other. 
Because of the sensitivity of N100 amplitude to sound audibility and acoustic energy 
levels, these results suggest that infant crying is perceptually more salient than laughter sounds 
(regardless of their equal intensity and duration) leading to an early detection and orienting 
response. Yet, these results do not provide information about the specific acoustic features that 
may have contributed to the effect of emotion on the N100. Although the auditory stimuli used 
in this study was designed to control for a wide range of acoustic parameters, some of the 
fundamental acoustic characteristics (e.g., mean fundamental frequency, harmonics, spectral 
structure variation) were preserved in order to maintain the ecological validity and 
generalizability of results. Undoubtly, it will be particularly interesting for future research to 
show which, if any, of these properties may be driving the effect of emotion. Interestingly, the 
differences found on the N100 mean amplitude among emotional vocalisations fit with the 
fundamental frequency (f0) indexes reported for these sounds, with the highest f0 mean 
corresponding to crying sounds and the lowest to laughing sounds, with coughing sounds being 
in the middle. However, without directly testing these hypothesis, it is not possible to provide 
a conclusive answer in this respect. 
 Contrary to our expectations, emotional non-verbal vocalizations did not elicit a larger 
P200 at frontal and central areas as opposed to neutral vocalization. Although laughter 
appeared to elicit larger amplitudes compared to the sound of peers crying and coughing, this 
effect did not hold when correcting for the N100 amplitude differences. Therefore, all non-
verbal vocalizations, independently of emotion, evoked a P200 of similar amplitude at frontal 
and central locations. The P200 has been traditionally associated with attentional shifts that 
facilitate preferential processing of emotionally or motivationally relevant stimuli (Paulmann 
et al., 2013; Paulmann et al., 2010; Schutter et al., 2004). In consonance with these 
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interpretations, our results may suggest that 8-monht-old infants in this study perceived all non-
verbal vocalizations as socially relevant information. However, our P200 results do not fit with 
the existing limited evidence on emotional processing using non-verbal vocalizations. For 
instance, in infants, Missana et al. (2017) reported a main effect of emotion at central locations 
at a later time window (P300: 200 - 350 ms), with peer laughter vocalizations eliciting higher 
positive amplitudes compared to infant crying and adult neutral sounds. This positive 
enhancement to laughing vocalizations was thought to reflect processes detecting the 
familiarity of positive affect expressed in voices. Conversely, ERP research in adults tends to 
report larger P200 amplitudes for emotionally than for neutrally non-verbal vocalizations (e.g., 
Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Liu et al., 2012; Sauter & Eimer, 2009). The lack of consistency across 
studies regarding the P200 response may be reflecting developmental differences in the ability 
to process emotional cues from non-verbal vocalizations, with emotionally non-verbal 
vocalizations (positive and negative) being only preferentially processed later in time. Further 
research is needed to compare ERP signature in infants and adults exposed to same non-verbal 
stimuli. Additionally, little it is known about how preschool- and school-aged children process 
emotion form this type of vocalizations.  
Our study also revealed late effects of emotion, with the sounds of crying peers eliciting 
higher amplitude of the frontal LPC compared to both laughter and coughing. Modulations of 
the LPC by the valence of verbal and non-verbal emotion vocalizations was systematically 
reported in adults and it is proposed to reflect the sustained cognitive processing of these social 
cues (e.g., Jessen & Kotz, 2011; Kotz & Paulmann, 2011; Paulmann et al., 2013; Schirmer et 
al., 2013; Schirmer & Kotz, 2006; Wildgruber, Ethofer, Grandjean, & Kreifelts, 2009). In 
infants, differentiation at the level of similar positive slow waves has been suggested to reflect 
the updating of existing memory representations (Nelson, Thomas, de Haan, & Wewerka, 
1998). Our results showed that after 8-month-olds perceive both cry and laughter as similarly 
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salient social cues, they engage in the sustained processing of only the cry sounds. These 
findings are in line with previous reports that listening to adult crying compared to laughter 
and neutral non-verbal vocalizations leads 3- to 7-month-old infants to increased activation of 
the orbitofrontal cortex and the insula (Blasi et al., 2011), areas known to be involved in the 
automatic appraisal of the emotional stimuli outside awareness and the generation of emotional 
experiences (see Koelsch et al., 2015 for a review). Our findings are in contrast to those recently 
reported by Missana et al. (2017), who found no difference in LPC amplitude between crying 
and laughing that may come down to some differences in methods. In our study we used 
positive, negative, and neutral vocalizations from other infants, which have greater salience in 
meaning to infants (Dondi et al., 1999; Martin & Clark, 1982) whereas Missana et al. (2017) 
included adults humming as a neutral stimulus. It is thus possible that the lack of LPC 
differentiation between the emotional conditions reported by Missana et al. (2017) was driven 
by the contrast between infant and adult voices.  
The selective enhancement of the N100 and LPC components for the processing of peer 
crying vocalizations in the current ERP study is in line with a substantial body of evidence 
suggesting the emergence of a negativity bias in the processing of emotional information at the 
age of 7 months, with enhanced allocation of attention and sensorial processing for negative 
emotions rather than positive (see Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward for a review). ERP studies 
on infants’ perception of emotional faces and voices have provided some indirect evidence in 
this respect. For instance, the perception of angry and fearful voices has been associated with 
larger ERP amplitudes than happy or neutral prosodies, suggesting increased attention for 
negative emotional expressions (Cheng et al., 2014; Grossman et al., 2005). Accordingly, 
infants use more successfully negative cues than positive cues to efficiently guide their own 
behavior in new or ambiguous situations (e.g., Hertenstein & Campos, 2001; Hornik, 
Risenhoover, & Gunnar, 1987; Mumme & Fernald, 2003; Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996). 
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One possible explanation is that negative emotional expressions are more salient than the 
positive ones given that they convey information regarding possible threats in the environment 
relevant to the self (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001). Indeed, threat-
related emotions are hypothesized to carry greater informational value than positive ones, and 
to thus require greater attention and cognitive processing (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; 
Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vuilleumier, 2005; Williams, 2006). Therefore, our study extends 
previous research by showing that 8-month-old infants also manifest a negativity bias in their 
processing of peers’ non-verbal vocalizations of emotions. 
Effects of Negative Emotionality on Vocal Emotion Processing 
 
Variations in infants’ tendencies to respond with negative emotionality during everyday 
life events were not related to differences in N100 amplitude between conditions. One possible 
explanation is that at such an early stage of processing, infants are primarily extracting the 
sensory properties of the stimuli, operations that are not related to individual differences in 
emotional responsiveness. It is also possible that these relations become more obvious once 
these individual differences manifest with higher intensity and in a more stable manner later in 
ontogeny since adults who tend to be highly anxious show increased N100 amplitude for 
emotional non-verbal vocalizations (Pell et al., 2015).  
Although we did not find a link between individual differences and the N100 
component, we found that variations in infants’ ability to recover from distress (IBQ-R Fall 
Reactivity) were related to differences in the amplitude of the P200 and LPC components. 
Specifically, the temperamental scale fall reactivity helped to clarify differences for the P200 
amplitude between emotional and neutral non-verbal vocalizations. The higher parents rated 
their infants’ ability to recover from distress, the more positive the amplitude of the P200 for 
emotional (crying and laughter) as compared to neutral non-verbal vocalizations (coughing). 
This suggests that infants better at self-regulation were better at extracting emotionally relevant 
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information. Likewise, fall reactivity helped to clarify differences for the LPC amplitude 
between threatening (crying) and non-threatening stimuli (laughter and coughing), with infants 
rated higher in their ability to recover from distress being more likely to exhibit larger LPC 
amplitudes for crying as opposed to laughter and coughing. Hence, this suggests that infants 
better at self-regulation were also more efficient recruiting further cognitive resources for 
threat-related stimuli. These results go in line with recent findings suggesting a relation 
between infants’ temperamental variations in fall reactivity and their ERP responses to 
emotional facial expressions (Martinos et al., 2010; Missana et al., 2014). Overall, these studies 
showed that infants who were better at recovering from distress displayed larger Nc responses 
(marker of attention) to fearful faces (Martinos et al., 2012) and anger faces (Missana et al., 
2014), suggesting that infants higher on regulatory skills deployed greater effort to take control 
of attention and regulate their emotions when viewing negative emotions.  
Additionally, the temperamental factor negative emotionality was related to variations 
in the amplitude of the P200. In this case, low levels of negative emotionality enlarged the 
differentiation of infants’ ERP responses between positive and neutral sounds such that infants 
lower in negative emotionality exhibited larger P200 amplitudes for peer laughter as compared 
to peer coughing sounds. Notably, infants with low negative emotionality have been reported 
to be less prone to intense and frequent negative emotions in their everyday life, and more 
likely to experience positive affect (Rothbart & Ahadi, 1994; Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey, & 
Fisher, 2001). Thus, it is possible that infants with lower levels of negative emotionality were 
better at distinguishing positive emotionally loaded vocalizations from neutrally loaded 
vocalizations at the level of the P200 due to they are more familiar with the expression of 
positive emotions. In support of this view, Missana et al. (2017) suggested that larger early 
positivities for peer laughter vocalizations (as opposed to coughing and crying sounds) 
reflected infants’ detection of familiarity. However, this interpretation must be taken with 
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caution given the limited evidence available and the mixed results. In contraposition to our 
results, Martinos et al. (2012) reported a link between high negative emotionality and increased 
ERP responses to positive facial expressions (Martinos et al., 2012). Nonetheless, these 
dissimilarities may also be accounted by differences in stimuli. Further studies are needed to 
elucidate the relationship between the temperamental factor negative emotionality and infants’ 
processing of emotional information.  
Limitations and Conclusions 
 
This study is not without limitations. Although the sample size included in this study 
could be regarded as relatively small in comparison to other investigations of temperamental 
variations in infants, a post hoc power analysis using the programme GPower (Erdfelder, Faul 
& Buchaner, 1996) revealed that our study had ample power (over 95%) to detect an effect of 
emotion for the N100 and LPC components. To check whether the absence of a significant 
main effect of emotion for the P200 were due to a lack of statistical power, we conducted a 
post hoc analysis with power (1 - b) set at 0.90 and  a = .05 (two-tailed). The projected sample 
size would have to increase to 174 for this within-group comparison of h2p = .003 to reach 
statistical significance. A second limitation is linked to our stimuli. In particular, 25% of the 
adult raters judged the neutral sounds as something other than neutral. This may mean that any 
contrast involving neutral stimuli was not nearly as robust as one would hope. Interferingly 
similar data has been obtained with visual stimuli, indicating that neutral faces in particular 
may be interpreted as potentially negative or threatening given their ambiguity and lack of clear 
approach signals (Lee, Kang, Park, Kim, & An, 2008; Wieser & Brosch, 2012).  
To summarize, our ERP data suggests that 8-month-old infants discriminated between 
emotionally valenced and neutral non-verbal vocalizations even when they were presented with 
the more difficult task of processing infant only voices. Although 8-month-old infants appeared 
to perceive all non-verbal vocalizations as salient, only the sounds of another infant crying 
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elicited enhanced auditory processing during early stages and engaged in further sustained 
processing at later stages of sensory processing. Importantly, infants’ ability to regulate high 
states of arousal was significantly related to their ability to discriminate between emotional and 
neutral stimul and their preferential processing of crying vocalizations at later stages. This is 
particularly important given the high relevance of the individual variability in reactivity and 
regulation for different typical and atypical social development outcomes (e.g., Frick & Morris, 
2004; Pérez-Edgar & Fox, 2005; Olson et al., 2005). Our findings add novel information to an 
increasing body of knowledge suggesting important links between infant temperament and 
emotion information processing development, with potential implications for understanding 
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Abstract 
Although it is believed that infants’ ability to share others emotions motivates the 
generation of other-oriented behaviors, this link has not been empirically tested. Little it 
is known about the neural mechanisms and motives underlying infant-oriented behaviors 
towards others. The present study aims at examining the neurophysiological mechanisms 
linked to infants’ responses to a peer crying and a peer laughing by looking at frontal 
EEG hemispheric asymmetries. With this purpose, 8-month-old infants underwent two 
assessment sessions on separate days. In both sessions infants were presented with two 
video-films depicting a peer crying and a peer laughing each. Frontal asymmetry patterns 
were recorded by means of electroencephalography (EEG) during the first session while 
infants’ other-oriented and emotional behaviors were recorded during the second visit to 
the lab. EEG analysis showed that distinct neural patterns were related to the observation 
of a peer laughing and a peer crying, with greater right frontal activation being associated 
with the observation of a peer crying. Furthermore, correlational analysis suggested a 
positive relation between left frontal cortical activation and infants’ attempts to approach 
a peer crying or infants’ attempts to engage with a peer laughing. These findings reveal 
that particular neurophysiological asymmetry patterns are associated with infants’ 










Empirical evidence suggests that infants in the first year of life are already socially 
attuned to the their peers’ emotions, as shown by their ability to respond with matching 
vocal and facial affective states to their peers distress (Martin & Clark, 1982; Simner, 
1971; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). Notably, these findings are at least quite surprising taking 
into account that interactions with same-age peers are rare prior to the age of 18-months 
(Brownell & Brown, 1992; Eckerman & Peterman, 2001), thus suggesting the presence 
of an inborn ability to respond to others’ emotions (Hoffman, 2000; Dondi, Simion & 
Caltran, 1999). In the domain of empathy, it has been argued that this early 
responsiveness to others’ emotions, in conjunction with certain level of emotion 
understanding and perspective taking, may further motivate other-oriented responses, 
which in turn may prompt prosocial behaviors (e.g., Batson, 1991, Decety & Lamm, 
2006; Eisenberg, 1997; Hoffman, 1975, 1982; Knafo & Israel, 2012; Singer, 2006). 
Although these links have been established at the conceptual level, it remains to be 
determined whether the affective responses to a peer’ distress observed in the first year 
of life are real precursors to later forms of other-oriented responses. Furthermore, little 
it is known about the mechanisms involved in infants’ emerging other-oriented 
responses, and whether they are selective to negative emotions. In light of the lack of 
empirical evidence, the current study aims at expanding previous behavioral research on 
infants’ affective responsiveness to peers’ emotions by exploring the link between 
infants’ motivational responses to their peers’ positive and negative emotions and the 
neural correlates (as reflected by EEG activity) underlying these tendencies in 8-month-
old infants. 
As early as few hours after birth, newborns show the ability to resonate with their 
peers’ negative emotions as shown by contagious cry studies (Dondi et al., 1999; Field, 
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Diego, Hernandez-Reif & Fernandez, 2007; Martin & Clark, 1982; Simner, 1971; Sagi 
& Hoffman, 1976). These affective resonance responses seem to persist across the first 
year of life (Geangu, Benga, Stahl & Striano, 2010) and when jointly presented with the 
corresponding facial expressions, these overt responses are accompanied by autonomic 
arousal changes (as reflected by larger pupil diameters) in infants as early as 6 months 
of age (Geangu, Hauf, Bhardwaj, & Bentz, 2011; Upshaw, Kaiser, Sommerville, Ford, 
& Perlman, 2015). Similar autonomic responses have been reported in infants when 
exposed to video-recordings of a peer laughing, yet in lower degree compared to the 
observation of a peer crying (Geangu et al., 2011; Upshaw et al., 2015). There is also 
limited ERP evidence suggesting that emotionally loaded vocalizations produced by 
peers modulate 8-month-old infants’ brain responses (Crespo-Llado, Vanderwert, & 
Geangu, 2018; Missana, Alvater-Mackensen, & Grossman, 2017), with the sound of an 
infant crying eliciting greater sustained cognitive processing compared to both infant 
laughter and infant coughing sounds (Crespo-Llado et al., 2018). Notably, these initial 
results suggest the emergence of a differential developmental pattern in the processing 
of laughter and crying sounds. 
The transition from these early affective matching responses to more other-
oriented empathic responses remains to be determined. In juxtaposition with influential 
theoretical models arguing that other-oriented responses to others’ negative emotions 
emerge beginning in the second year of life (Hoffman 2000), sparse evidence suggests 
that infants as young as 8 months of age already manifest other-oriented affective 
responses towards their peers in distress, as indexed by moderate levels of vocal and 
facial expressions of concern –empathic concern– and rudimentary comforting 
behaviors towards a peer in distress (Liddle, Bradley & MacGrath, 2015; Roth-Hanania, 
Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011). There is also suggestive evidence that these empathic-
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related responses continue to develop in the subsequent months, as shown by their 
gradual increase over toddlerhood (Liew et al., 2011; Nichols, Svetlova, & Brownell, 
2015; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011). However, it is not until the second year of life when 
infants’ reactions to peer emotions evolve from empathic concern and simple comforting 
acts to actual “prosocial” behaviors such as instrumental helping and sharing (Liew et 
al., 2011; Nichols, Svetlova, & Brownell, 2010, 2015; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; 
Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, & Burns, 2013; Svetlova, Nichols, & Brownell, 2010). 
These results are in contraposition with naturalistic studies suggesting that unprompted 
prosocial responding to peers in distress is rare but also quite diverse among toddlers 
(Demetriou & Hay, 2004; Farver & Branstetter, 1994; Howes & Farver, 1987; Lamb & 
Zakhireh, 1997). These differences in responsiveness may be accounted by a variety of 
contextual factors, such as familiarity, experience with siblings or day-care experience 
(Demetriou & Hay, 2004; Hay, Payne, & Chadwick, 2004; Howes & Farver, 1987; Lamb 
& Zakhireh, 1997) but also by individual differences in the motor and socio-cognitive 
skills needed to perform other-oriented responses (Paulus, 2014; Roth-Hanania et al., 
2011; Svetlova et al., 2010; Walle & Campos, 2012).  
As much as these findings have received attention, little is known about the 
motivational mechanisms involved in infants’ rudimentary prosocial responses during 
the first year of life (Cowell & Decety, 2015; Paulus, 2014; Svetlova et al., 2010), and 
especially the neural mechanisms underlying infant-oriented responses towards others’ 
happiness. The quest for the motives underlying these early empathic-related behaviors 
is not exempt of difficulties taking into account the inability for preverbal infants to 
disclose their intents. In this context, combining neuroimaging methods with behavioral 
measures is critical to clarify the nature of developing other-oriented behaviors in 
infants, often considered the precursors to later more complex prosocial behaviors. 
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Electroencephalography (EEG), and in particular frequency-power analysis, has been 
successfully used to investigate infants’ motivational tendencies to approach or 
withdrawal emotional situations (e.g., Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; Fox & Davidson, 
1986, 1987, 1988).  
Over the last three decades, an increasing number of infant EEG research has 
explored the relation of frontal hemispheric asymmetries in EEG activity and developing 
motivational tendencies within an approach-withdraw continuum (e.g., Davidson & Fox, 
1982, 1989; Dawson, 1994; Diaz & Bell, 2011; Fox & Davidson, 1986, 1987, 1988). In 
particular, frontal EEG asymmetry measures recorded during emotionally salient 
situations are considered to be a reliable index of prefrontal associations with individual 
motivational tendencies to either approach or avoid stimuli perceived as appetitive or 
aversive (e.g., Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; Fox & Davidson, 1986, 1987, 1988; Coan 
& Allen, 2004). Within this framework, greater relative left frontal activation reflects 
approach-related tendencies while greater relative right frontal activation reflects 
withdrawal-related predispositions (Fox, 1991, 1994; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 
2010). This notion has been supported by a substantial amount of infant studies 
examining frontal EEG asymmetry scores during emotional tasks, which have revealed 
greater left frontal EEG activation in response to typically appetitive stimuli (e.g., 
mother approach, film of an adult displaying a happy facial expression, positively-
valenced ID speech) and greater right frontal activation during the presentation of 
aversive stimuli (e.g., maternal distress simulation, maternal separation, stranger 
approach, film of an adult displaying a sad facial expression, arm restrain task, 
negatively-valenced ID speech) (e.g.,  Buss et al., 2003; Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; 
Diaz & Bell, 2011; Fox & Davidson, 1986, 1987, 1988; Killeen & Teti, 2012; LoBue, 
Coan, Thrasher & DeLoache, 2011; Santesso, Schmidt & Trainor, 2007).  
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Additionally, frontal asymmetry patterns have also been related to individual 
differences in social behavior. In this respect, multiple longitudinal studies have shown 
that early patterns of left frontal EEG asymmetry predicted higher levels of sociability 
during peer interactions across the toddler years. On the contrary, infants’ right frontal 
EEG asymmetry patterns turned out to be good predictors of elevated levels of social 
reticence during interactions with peers in the toddler years (e.g., Calkins, Fox, & 
Marshall, 1996; Fox, Henderson, Rubin, Calkins, & Schmidt, 2001; Fox et al., 1995; 
Henderson, Fox & Rubin, 2001). There is also further evidence associating relatively 
left frontal activation with greater empathic responding (Paulus, Kuhn-Popp, Licata, 
Sodian, & Meinhardt, 2013). For instance, Paulus et al. (2013) found that greater relative 
left frontal activation at the age of 14 months was associated with infants’ better 
understanding of others’ distress at the age of 18 months as well as greater empathic 
responding during a comforting task at the age of 24 months. Similarly, Licata, Paulus, 
Kuhn-Popp, Meinhardt, & Sodian (2015) found a link between relative greater left 
frontal activation at the age of 14 months with higher frequencies of children 
approaching and initiating contact with their mothers during free play interactions at 50 
months. Together, these studies highlight the role of frontal EEG asymmetry as a 
potential predictor of infants’ social competence in peer settings. 
For the study of empathy, infant-infant settings offer a unique window to examine 
early prosocial tendencies given that infants’ understanding of peers’ emotions do not 
rely on previous experiences since they have little or non exposure to peers prior to the 
first birthday (Nichols, Svetlova, & Brownell, 2009, 2015). Moreover, unlike adult-
infant interactions, when infants are confronted with their peers in distress, normally 
they do not have the help of an adult to understand the scenario (Nichols et al., 2009, 
2015). Hence, they must rely on their own unripe skills, without the assistance of adults, 
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to interpret and respond appropriately to their peers’ emotions. On the other hand, 
responding to peers’ emotion may place different demands on infants’ emergent social 
understanding skills than responding to adults’ emotions. Indeed research suggests that 
12-month-old infants are less skilled at interpreting other children’s emotional 
communication than they are at understanding those of adults (Nichols et al., 2010). 
Altogether, child-child interactions provide a unique setting to study infants’ 
independent motives underlying other-oriented responses to their peers’ emotions.  
Taking into account the aforementioned framework, the current study had three 
main goals. The first goal was to explore the frontal EEG asymmetry patterns elicited by 
the observation of a peer crying and a peer laughing in 8 month-old infants. Since 
increased left hemisphere activation has been associated with positive-eliciting 
situations while increased right hemisphere activation has been linked to negative-
eliciting situations, we hypothesized that infants would exhibit greater relative right 
frontal activity when exposed to a crying peer as compared to a laughing peer and greater 
relative left frontal activity when watching a laughing peer as opposed to a crying peer.  
The second major goal was to assess whether infants’ responsiveness towards 
others’ emotional states fluctuates across different valenced emotions by assessing their 
responses to peers experiencing distress and happiness. To capture the full range of 
infants’ responses to peers, we distinguished vocal and facial signs of affective 
responding from approach-withdrawal responding, while also including measures of 
passive attention and general motor activation. Following the scarce pre-existing 
literature on the topic (Geangu et al., 2011; Roth-Hanania et al., 2011; Upshaw et al., 
2015), we expected to find differences in infants’ reactions due to emotion condition, 
with 8-month-old showing more positive affective responses and approach-related 
behaviors (e.g., positive vocalizations, facial expressions of joy, smiles, attempts to 
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reach towards the stimuli) in front of a peer laughing and more negative affective 
responses (e.g., negative vocalizations, facial expressions of anger, attempts to escape 
from chair) in front of a peer crying. Because the behavioral evidence is mixed for infant-
oriented responses to peers in distress during the first two years of life, we had no strong 
expectations about the crying peer condition eliciting more approach than withdrawal 
behaviors. Additionally, we had not strong predictions regarding motor activation 
measures. Regarding the attentional measures, in agreement with the literature on 
negativity bias in the processing of emotional cues (see Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward, 
2008), we expected 8-month-old infants to look longer at a peer crying than a peer 
laughing.  
The third and final goal was to investigate the relationship between behavioral 
responses and concurrent measures of frontal EEG asymmetry, both when infants were 
exposed to a peer’s crying and a peer’s laughter. Following previous infant EEG studies 
on emotion reactivity (e.g., Buss et al., 2003; Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1898; Fox & 
Davidson, 1986, 1988), we hypothesized that those infants who show greater relative 
right frontal activation when observing a peer crying would respond with more negative 
affective responses and withdrawal-related behaviors (e.g., negative vocalizations, facial 
expressions of anger, attempts to escape from chair) to the presentation of a peer crying. 
In the same vein, we hypothesised that infants who show greater relative left frontal 
activation when observing a peer laughing would respond with more positive affective 
responses and approach-related behaviors (e.g., positive vocalizations, facial 
expressions of joy, attempts to reach towards the stimuli) in response to a peer laughing. 
Therefore, we expected individual changes in frontal EEG asymmetry to be associated 





Forty 8-months-old infants responded to the invitation to participate in this study. 
Out of this sample, 32 infants (15 females, Mage = 254.16 days, SDage = 9.36 days) 
provided analysable data for the EEG peer emotion task (Session 1) based on the criteria 
described below. For the behavioral peer emotion task (Session 2), 22 infants (13 
females, Mage = 254.45 days, SDage = 9.68 days) provided analysable data based on the 
criteria described below. A total of 18 infants (12 females, Mage = 252.61 days, SDage = 
8.93 days) contributed analysable data for both session 1 and Task 2. From the sample 
participating in Session 1, 9 participants did not return to the lab for Session 2 because 
the parents found it difficult to fit another visit in their schedule. More information about 
attrition rates for each session is presented in the following sections. All participants 
were recruited from a small urban area in North West England, did not suffer from any 
neurological or other medical condition, and were observed to have a normal vision and 
audition for their age. 
Prior to both sessions, all parents were informed that at the end of the experiment they 
would receive £10 in order to cover traveling expenses and that the infant will be 
rewarded with a book for their participation. Informed consent was obtained from all 
parents and the study was approved by the Faculty Ethics Committee.  
Procedure and Measures 
The procedure unfolded across two sessions, approximately one week apart from 
each other (M = 6.52 days; SD = 3.55 days). This strategy was adopted in order to 
accommodate infants’ reduced attention span and maximize attendance to the tasks and 
good data quality, as well as to account for any potential carry over effects from one task 
to another. 
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EEG recording (Session 1) 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli consisted of audio-video recordings of a peer infant crying and of a 
peer infant laughing, adapted from Geangu et al. (2011). The infants depicted in the 
stimuli were 8- to 9-months-old at the time of the recording. Each video recording had a 
sound average intensity of 70dB and duration of 90 seconds. Stimuli were presented at 
a size of 24x16cm on 17-inch CRT computer monitor using MATLAB R2012b 
(MathWorks, Natick, MA). The order of presentation of the stimuli was counterbalanced 
across participants. The stimulus presentation began with the display of a dynamic non-
social attention grabber, which varied in duration as a function of participant’s attention 
to the screen. Whenever the experimenter judged that the participants are attentively 
watching the screen, the first stimulus was presented. Between first and second stimulus, 
an attention grabber was always displayed with a duration that varied randomly between 
30 sec and 60 sec. If infants became distressed during the stimulus presentation, max 30-
sec was allowed for spontaneous recovery before the procedure was stopped and mothers 
were invited to comfort their infants. During the entire task, infants sat on their parent’s 
lap at a distance of approximately 70 cm from the monitor in a dimly lit room. Figure 1 
illustrates the stimulus presentation. In order to minimize the possibility that mothers 
could influence infants’ responses to the stimuli, mothers were instructed not to interact 
with their infant (e.g., talk with, draw attention to the stimuli, display emotional 





Figure 1. Example of trial structure for Task 1 (A) and Task 2 (B).  
  EEG recording and analysis 
EEG was recorded continuously using a 128-electrode HydroCel Geodesic 
Sensor Net (Electrical Geodesic Inc., Eugene, OR) and amplified using an EGI NetAmps 
300 amplifier. On-line recordings were referenced to the vertex electrode (Cz), and then 
off-line re-referenced to an average reference. The signal was band-pass filtered at .1 - 
100 Hz. EEG data were digitized on-line at a sampling rate of 500 Hz per channel. 
Electrode impedances were checked prior to the beginning of the recording and 
considered acceptable if lower than 50 KΩ, which is a conservative threshold for infants 
and in accordance with the methodological recommendations for this age group 
(Johnson et al., 2001; Ferree, Luu, Russell, & Tucker, 2001).  EEG data were further 
processed offline using NetStation v4.6.4 (Eugene, OR). EEG data were band-pass 
filtered (0.3-30 Hz), and segmented according to recording condition (cry film and 
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laughter film), arising 1.5-min epochs for each task for participant. Next, the segments 
were checked through visual inspection for eye-movements, eye-blinks and other body 
movement artifacts. Segments with more than 8 bad channels (besides the 11 marked as 
bad eye-leads) were manually rejected. For the remaining segments, individual bad 
channels were replaced using spherical spline interpolation. EEG data were then 
processed in Matlab R2012b (Mathworks Inc., Natick, MA) for artifact rejection and 
power analysis. EEG segments showing amplitudes greater than +/-175 µV were marked 
as bad. The artefact-free segments were analysed with a Fast Fourier transform (FFT) 
with a 1-s Hanning window and 50% overlap with a frequency bin of 0.25 Hz. 
Participants with less than 10 free-artifact epochs of the 179 one-second overlapping 
epochs were removed from further analysis to ensure a stable estimate of alpha activity 
(n = 4). Another 4 participants were removed from further analysis because the EEG 
recording was stopped early due to their distress, failing to provide sufficient data points. 
The final sample had an average of 67.53 epochs (min = 10, max = 179) in the laugh and 
70.41 epochs (min = 11; max = 156) in the cry conditions. Absolute power spectral 
density (psd) values for each segment were computed for the 4 - 7 Hz frequency band 
for two reasons: 1) majority of the EEG power was represented within this frequency 
band; 2) previous studies have associated this frequency with emotion reactivity and 
emotion regulation during infancy (e.g., Calkins et al., 1996; Santeso et al., 2007; 
Schmidt, 2008). Alpha power spectral density values were analysed after being natural 
log (ln) transformed to normalize the distribution.  
Frontal asymmetry scores for each infant in each condition (cry video - ASYMcry; 
laugh video - ASYMlaugh) were obtained by subtracting the left frontal hemisphere (F3) 
log-transformed alpha power from the right frontal hemisphere (F4) log-transformed 
alpha power values (i.e., ln(F4) – ln(F3)). Therefore, positive scores correspond to 
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greater alpha power in the right hemisphere (or increase left activity interpreted as 
approach-oriented activity) while negative scores correspond to greater alpha power in 
the left hemisphere (or increased right activity interpreted as withdrawal-oriented 
activity).  
Behavioral recordings (Session 2) 
Stimuli and procedure 
The stimuli were equivalent to those used in Session 1, although they differed with 
respect to length (120 seconds) and the identity of the infant peer displaying crying and 
laughing. The video recordings were sourced from a professional online database 
(www.istockphoto.com) and were edited to the required duration and an average sound 
intensity of 70dB. Each stimulus was displayed at 43 x 27 cm on a 17” computer monitor. 
The procedure begun with the presentation of a non-social attention grabber, to ensure 
that the participants are attending to the screen. During the entire procedure, the infant 
was seated in an age appropriate chair (Bumbo), at the same height and approximately 
70 cm away from the screen. The participants’ behavior was recorded by 4 cameras, 
three located in corners of the room and one placed above the monitor, allowing a close 
view of the face. Between the stimuli, a 180 seconds break was introduced, during which 
the experimenter came back to the room and played with the infant. During the break, 
an animation film was played on the screen. For the entire duration of the task, the 
parents were instructed to sit approximately 2 meters behind the infant, reading a 
magazine, and without engaging through eye contact or voice with the infant. See Figure 
1 for an illustration of the stimulus presentation.  
Behavior coding criteria 
Based on previous research (e.g., Gill & Calkins, 2003; Markova & Legerstee, 
2006; Spinrad & Stifter, 2006) and a preliminary inspection of the recordings, several 
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empathy-related responses were coded: a) visual engagement; b) negative emotional 
vocalizations; c) positive emotional vocalizations; d) emotionally neutral vocalizations; 
e) positive facial expressions; f) negative facial expressions; h) approach behaviors; and 
i) withdraw behaviors. The coding criteria were adapted from the Laboratory 
Temperament Assessment Battery (Lab-TAB; Goldsmith & Rothbart, 1999). In terms 
of negative facial expressivity, our aim was to capture facial responses which may 
suggest that infants respond to their peers with emotionally congruent expressions. Thus, 
we opted for a more generic category, which includes displays of anger, sadness, and 
fear, as they might be present during infant cry. Table 1 provides a detailed description 
of the coding criteria for each type of behavior, together with the reliability coefficients. 
A second observer coded 20% of the recordings in order to establish reliability 
(intraclass correlation coefficient for absolute agreement).  
For coding purposes, all video recordings were divided in 10-sec units. Some of 
the behaviors (b-i) were coded as present or absent for each unit. In order to account for 
variations in stimulus duration length caused by participant’s emotional state, a 
percentage of units with behavior present was calculated from the total number of units 
coded for each participant. For visual engagement, the duration of looking time towards 
the screen was coded for the entire stimulus presentation. In order to account for 
variations in stimulus duration, a percentage looking time was calculated out of the entire 
duration of the stimulus presentation. The behaviors were tagged on the recording using 
Datavyu 1.3 coding software (http://datavyu.org). A total of 9 infants were removed 
from the final dataset for Session 2 due to excessive movement resulting in the 





Coding Criteria for the Infant-Oriented and Emotional Responses coded during the Peer 
Empathy Task. 
Behavioral response  Coding Criteria 
Visual engagement 
(.981) 
The duration of infant looking towards the stimulus.   
NOTE: Blinks were considered as part of a continuous fixation to 
the stimulus. 
Positive Facial Expression 
(.973) 
Facial expression indicative of positive affect. Specific movements 
in both of the following face regions should be displayed. 
Upper Face (eyes, brows, forehead): eyes are squinted or do not 
change, furrow below the eyes deepens. 
Lower Face: cheeks are raise, lip corners are raised (either 
unilaterally or bilaterally) 
NOTE: When a brow movement was originated as a consequence 
of an eye/head movement (i.e. infant looking up/down), the action 




Facial expression indicative of negative affect. Specific movements 
in both of the following face regions should be displayed.  
Upper Face (eyes, brows, forehead): inner corner of the eyebrows 
are lowered and drawn together resulting in furrows between the 
eyes, inner corners of the eyebrows are raised and drawn together 
resulting in furrows in the middle of forehead, squinted eyes, 
furrow below the eyes deepens. 
Lower Face: Wide-opened square mouth specific for cry, sad pout, 
lips pressed together. 
NOTE: When a brow movement was originated as a consequence 
of an eye/head movement (i.e. infant looking up/down), the action 
was not coded as brow movement. 
Positive Vocalizations 
(.976)  
Any vocal production that can be identified as being positively 





Any vocal production that can be identified as being negatively 




Any vocal production that cannot be evaluated as having neither 
positive nor negative emotional intonation (e.g., emotionally 
neutral babbling).  
Approach 
(.976) 
Changes in the upper body position which reduce the distance 
between the participant and the screen. In order to be coded as 
approach, these responses need to be associated by visual 
engagement with the stimulus.  
Withdraw 
(.978) 
Changes in the upper body position which increase the distance 
between the participant and the screen. Attempts to escape from the 
chair, including turning away, leaning away, arching back, or 
twisting in the chair were also coded as withdraw behaviors. Some 
of these behaviors may be associated with visual disengagement 
from the stimulus, although this was not mandatory. Head turning 
in the absence of the upper body turning away was not coded as 
withdraw behavior. 
 
 Other behavioural variables were coded but not included in this study such as 
smiling, strong motor activation, self-soothing and social reference. Smiling responses 
were clustered together with positive facial expressions. Strong motor movements 
resulted to be a redundant measure that overlapped quite often with approach-withdrawal 
behaviours. In order to avoid redundancy, we decided to remove this measure. With 
respect to self-soothing and social reference behaviours, these two measures revealed 
interesting results regarding infants’ emotional regulation skills. Thus, we decided not 
to report them in this manuscript in order to explore them further in relation with 




Results         
Frontal EEG Asymmetry Results (Session 1) 
In order to analyze whether the exposure to peer emotions elicited asymmetric 
frontal EEG activity, separate one sample t-tests (n = 32) were performed on the frontal 
EEG asymmetry score obtained during each condition (i.e. laughing and crying). 
Observing a peer crying elicited an increased left relative to right absolute alpha power 
(M = -.077, SD = .178), which was significantly different from 0 (t(31) = -2.451; p = 
.020).  Observing a peer laughing elicited some increased right relative to left absolute 
alpha power (M = .015, SD = .216), but the difference from 0 did not reach statistical 
significance (p = .700).  
Additionally, in order to disentangle the separate contributions of the absolute 
alpha power recorded on the left and right hemisphere to differences in asymmetry 
scores recorded for each condition, a 2 (condition: laughing vs. crying) x 2 (hemisphere: 
right vs. left) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the log-transformed alpha 
power values. A significant Emotion x Hemisphere interaction was obtained (F(1,31) = 
5.787; p = .022; η2 = .157). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that when infants 
were exposed to a peer crying, higher absolute alpha power was recorded in the left (M 
= 3.513 µV; SE = .086 µV) compared to the right hemisphere (M = 3.436 µV; SE = .086 
µV), p = .020. Moreover, exposure to a laughing peer elicited higher absolute alpha 
power (M = 3.518 µV; SE = .083 µV) in the right hemisphere compared to when 
participants observed a crying peer (M = 3.436 µV; SE = .086 µV), p = .047. All other 
comparisons were not significant (p > .391) (See Figure 2). No gender effects were 
found. For further information see Appendix B. 
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Figure 2.  A) Means and standard errors for frontal alpha asymmetry scores 
collected during the two affective conditions; and B) Means and standard errors for the 
EEG ln alpha power (4-7Hz) recorded at frontal sensors F3 (left) and F4 (right) during 
the two affective conditions. Note: EEG power is inversely related to activity, so high 
power is thought to reflect lower activity. 
Behavioral Results (Session 2) 
Table 2 provides an overview of infants’ responses to their peer emotions (n = 22).  
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted in order to analyze the differences 
between the stimuli in terms of facial and vocal expressivity. Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrections were applied whenever the assumptions of sphericity were violated. For 
looking time, approach and withdraw behaviors, repeated measures t-tests were 
performed. All tests were interpreted at a significance threshold of p = .05.  
The 2 (Condition: Cry, Laughter) x 2 (Emotion: Positive, Negative) repeated 
measures ANOVA for facial expressivity revealed a significant interaction between 
stimulus and emotion, F(1,21) = 16.353; p = .001, η2 = .438. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons indicated that infants responded with more negative facial expressions to 
 
 p = 0.020 
p = 0.047 
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the crying peer than to the laughing one, and with more positive facial expressions to the 
laughing peer than the crying one (Table 2). Also, infants displayed more positive than 
negative facial expressions while observing the laughing peer (p = .008). No other 
significant differences were observed (p > .304). The 2 (Condition: Cry, Laughter) x 3 
(Emotion: Positive, Negative, Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA for vocal 
expressivity revealed a significant main effect of condition, F(1,21) = 7.727; p = .011, 
η2 = .269, which was qualified by a significant interaction with emotion, F(1.31,21) = 
4.724; p = .030, η2 = .184. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that infants 
manifested more emotionally negative vocalizations while observing the crying peer 
than the laughing one. Observing the crying peer also elicited more negative (p = .029) 
and neutral (p = .015) vocalizations than the positive ones. In response to the laughing 
peer, infants manifested more emotionally neutral vocalizations than negative (p = .007) 
and positive (p = .021) ones. No other significant differences were observed (p > .432).  
Infants looked longer at the crying than at the laughing peer, t(21) = 2.449; p = 
.023. Interestingly, gender differences were observed on infants’ looking time scores 
during the laughter condition (p = .014), such that females tended to look longer than 
males to a peer laughing (Females: M = 67.13%, SD = 16.69; Males: M = 49.21%, SD = 
13.03 ). No other gender effects were found for behavioural measures (See Appendix 
B). No significant differences between the stimuli emerged for the approach and 







Table  2. 
Descriptive statistics for infants’ behavioral responses during Session 2 and the results of 
comparisons between stimuli (N = 22) 
 Peer Crying  Peer Laughing   
M SE % M SE % p 
Looking timea 68.88 4.16 NA 59.80 3.73 NA .02 
Vocalizationsb        
Negative  24.62 8.12 50.0 6.16 2.74 27.3 .01 
Positive  3.79 2.10 18.2 6.44 2.68 31.8 .43 
Neutral  18.18 5.10 59.1 20.90 5.05 54.5 .57 
Facial expressionsb        
Negative  21.21 7.61 45.5 6.29 3.28 27.3 .02 
Positive  11.36 3.36 50.0 28.74 6.27 72.7 .00 
Approachb 24.62 5.04 72.7 27.55 6.19 68.2 .61 
Withdrawalb 51.52 6.41 91.9 47.74 5.33 95.5 .52 
Note. % Refers to the percentage of infants displaying the behavioral response; 
aPercentage of absolute duration from the stimulation duration; bPercentage of 10-
seconds units for which the behavior was present from the total number of units. 
 
Relation between Frontal EEG Asymmetry and Behavioral Responses to Peers’ 
Emotions (Session 1&2) 
Pearson’s correlations among frontal EEG asymmetry scores (Session 1) and the 
behavioral responses (Session 2) to peers’ emotions were performed (n = 18). The 
number of correlations were kept to a minimum, strictly following the predictions 
formulated based on previous literature. Because of the small sample size, we did not 
correct the results for multiple comparisons to avoid inflating Type II error and thereby 
obscuring expected results (Rothman, 1990, 2014). 
Infants’ frontal asymmetry scores recorded in response to the peer crying (i.e. 
crying LnF4-LnF3 = ASYMcry) were negatively correlated with the percentage of time 
infants spent looking at a peer crying during the second session (r = -.528; p = .024) (See 
Figure 3A). This indicates that infants who showed a greater degree of right frontal 
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asymmetry when observing a peer crying spent more time visually engaging with their 
peer distress in separate occasion. Furthermore, ASYMcry was positively correlated 
with the proportion of approach behaviors (r = .472; p = .048) and neutral vocalizations 
(r = .490; p = .039) displayed when watching a peer crying in the second session. In 
other words, infants who displayed greater degree of left frontal asymmetry when 
watching a peer crying spent more time exhibiting approach behaviors and neutral 
vocalizations when exposed to the peer crying film in the second session.  
Infants’ frontal EEG asymmetry scores recorded in response to the laughing peer 
(i.e. laughter LnF4-LnF3 = ASYMlaugh) were positively correlated with the amount of 
time infants visually engaged with a happy peer (r = .507; p = .032) in the second session 
(See Figure 3B). That is, infants who exhibited more left frontal asymmetry during the 
laughter film spent more time looking at a peer laughing. Additionally, AYMlaugh was 
positively correlated with the proportion of neutral vocalizations emitted in response to 
the sound of a peer laughing (r = 0.466; p = 0.051), with greater degree of left frontal 
asymmetry being linked to greater emission of neutral vocalizations during the laughter 
condition. No other significant correlations between the frontal EEG asymmetry scores 





Figure 3. Correlations for frontal EEG asymmetry and looking time scores. This 
figure shows the correlation between frontal EEG asymmetry observed in infants during 
the presentation of video-films of a peer crying (A) and a peer laughing (B) with their 
looking time scores. Note: Correlations were significant on the p < .05 level. 
 
Discussion 
The main goal of this study was to investigate infants’ brain responses to peers’ 
emotional states, and their relation to simple behavioral manifestations of social 
approach and disengagement. To this end, we assessed 8-month-old infants’ frontal EEG 
alpha power as well as infants’ empathic-related behaviors when exposed to a peer 
laughing and a peer crying. In line with the approach-withdrawal motivational model, 
the current study shows that observing peers’ positive and negative emotions induces 
distinctive patterns of brain activation and behavioral manifestations in 8-month-old 
infants.  
In line with current models of frontal asymmetry, our EEG analyses demonstrated 
that the processing of positive and negative affective stimuli elicited different patterns 
of frontal EEG asymmetry, probably reflecting current emotional and behavioral 
tendencies. In particular, we found that the observation of a peer crying (negative 
affective stimuli) was associated with greater relative right frontal brain activation in 8-
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month-olds. This distinct pattern of frontal brain activation has been previously linked 
to the tendency to display negative emotions (e.g. sadness, fear) during the processing 
of negative-eliciting situations in children and infants. For example, Fox and Davidson 
(1987, 1988) found that 10-month-old infants who displayed greater relative right frontal 
activation during a series of negative-related tasks (i.e. maternal separation and stranger 
approach) were more likely to exhibit behaviors reflecting active withdrawal (e.g. 
distress, gaze aversion). Likewise, Buss et al. (2003) reported that 6-month-old infants 
who showed greater right frontal asymmetry during a stranger approach task also 
displayed more expressions of fear and sadness. Similar association was also reported in 
10 month-old infants during a stranger approach task, but also across other contexts 
involving non-social fearful-related situations (e.g. presentation of a toy spider and 
masks) (Diaz & Bell, 2012). Therefore, we suggest that our EEG finding reflects infants’ 
tendency to respond with withdrawal behaviors and negative affect in front of a peer 
crying. 
Contrary to our expectations and previous findings (e.g. Buss et al., 2003; Fox and 
Davidson, 1987, 1988; LoBue et al., 2011; Santesso et al., 2007), although observing a 
peer laughing evoked greater relative activation of the left hemisphere relative to the 
right hemisphere, this difference was not significant and very small (d = .033). One 
possible explanation for this finding is linked to the feasibility of our stimuli. Multiple 
authors have argued that not all forms of positive affect include an approach component 
(e.g. Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990; Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Gable 
& Harmon-Jones, 2008; Killeen and Teti, 2012). In this respect, a recent EEG study 
suggests that low-level, internally focused, positive emotions without an approach-
orientation are associated with shifts toward greater relative right frontal activation 
(Light, Coan, Frye, Goldsmith, & Davidson, 2009). Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
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the primary positive emotion elicited by the peer laughing stimuli used in this study did 
not evoke sufficient approach tendencies to engage asymmetrical frontal cortical 
activation. Nonetheless, when looking at our behavioral data this hypothesis does not 
seem reasonable given that infants displayed more positive affect towards a peer 
laughing (i.e. greater facial expressions of happiness) than to a peer crying.  
A further plausible explanation is that the infants had a generally high degree of 
positive affect or approach orientation and that the laughter stimuli did not generate any 
greater left frontal asymmetry from that baseline state. Alternatively, it could be that 
infants’ ability to process and respond to the communicative value of their peers’ 
laughter may be insufficiently developed before the age of 12-months (Crespo-Llado et 
al., 2018; Geangu et al., 2011; Upshaw et al., 2015). Although from an early age infants 
are able to laugh (Nwokah, Hsu, Dobrowolska, & Fogel, 1994), this emotional 
expression appears to be more frequently associated with the interactions with adults 
(Mireault et al., 2015). As a result, infants may encounter less frequently these specific 
facial expressions and non-verbal vocalizations when interacting with peers (Rubenstein 
& Howes, 1976; Vandell & Mueller, 1980), with consequences for the development of 
their abilities to extract the corresponding social message. In this line, recent evidence 
suggests that although 7 to 8 month-olds ERP responses discriminate between 
emotionally valenced and neutral non-verbal vocalizations at very early stages of 
auditory processing (Crespo-Llado et al., 2018; Missana et al., 2017), only peers’ cry 
sounds engaged in later sustained cognitive processing compared to both infant laughter 
and infant coughing (Crespo-Llado et al., 2018). It is thus possible that compared to 
crying, the development of laughter processing is more protracted and dependent on 
more advanced social cognitive and communicative abilities. In this respect, several 
fMRI studies with adults on laughter perception suggest that the processing of emotional 
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laughter places higher demands on social cognitive processes as indexed by the stronger 
activation of frontal brain areas implicated in mentalizing and affect evaluation such as 
the medial prefrontal cortex (MFC) (Szameitat et al., 2010; Wildgruber et al., 2013; 
Tschacher, Schildt, & Sander, 2010). Furthermore, behavioral research suggests that it 
is not until the end of the first year when infants show increased understanding of those 
social situations where laughter is more common (Mireault et al., 2014; Reddy, 2001, 
2008). 
At the behavioral level, 8-month-old infants’ emotional responses tended to 
converge with the affect displayed by their peers. Importantly, this emotional 
convergence was recorded not only in response to peers’ negative affect as previously 
shown by several studies (e.g., Dondi et al., 1999; Field, et al., 2007; Geangu et al., 
2010), but also to manifestations of happiness. That is, infants tended to display more 
negative affect (i.e. negative vocalizations, negative facial expressions) towards a peer 
crying relative to a peer laughing. In turn, infants tended to display more positive affect 
towards a peer laughing (i.e. greater positive facial expressions) than to a peer crying. 
Certainly, these only represent approximations of their real encounters with peers. 
Nevertheless, similar video recordings of peer affect were shown to elicit sympathetic 
arousal in infants as reflected by changes in pupil diameter (Geangu et al., 2011; Upshaw 
et al., 2015), suggesting good ecological validity. Moreover, infants in our study 
appeared to be interested in the stimuli as they engaged visually with them for more than 
half of their duration. Although they did so for both emotional expressions, they tended 
to look more at the crying infant. This suggests that infants showed more visual interest 
(as indexed by their looking times) for the infant crying, supporting the emergence of a 
negativity bias in affective processing around the age of 7 months (see Vaish et al., 2008 
for a review).  
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Surprinsingly, in our study 8-month-old infants exhibit similar levels of  approach 
and withdraw-oriented responses to their peer’s distress and happiness. Nonetheless, the 
examination of variations in the asymmetric frontal EEG alpha helped to differentiate 
specific behavioural responses. Specifically, infants who were more likely to respond 
with greater relative left frontal activation  to crying were also more likely to physically 
approach their distressed peer and to vocalize in an emotionally neutral tone. These 
findings fit with previous EEG work with younger children showing a link between left 
frontal activation and empathy-related reactions (Cowell & Decety, 2015; Jones, Field, 
& Davalos, 2000; Jones, Field, Davalos, & Hart, 2004; Paulus et al., 2013). Similarly, 
infants who exhibited higher levels of relative left frontal activation when observing a 
peer laughing were also more likely to vocalize in an emotionally neutral tone to the 
cheerful peer. This finding parallels previous infant EEG studies linking left frontal 
asymmetry to higher levels of sociability with peers and right frontal asymmetry with 
higher degree of social wariness or social withdrawal. For example, Fox et al. (1995, 
1996) reported that preschool and elementary school children who were more sociable 
and displayed more socially competent behaviors during interactions with peers 
exhibited increased electrical activity in the left frontal region compared with the less 
sociable peers. Similarly, a longitudinal study run by the same group (Calkins et al., 
1996; Henderson et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2001) reported continuities between early infant 
EEG asymmetry patterns and later preschool social behavior. Together, these findings 
suggest that patterns of left frontal EEG asymmetry mediate social approach behaviors.  
Finally, we also found a link between frontal EEG asymmetry patterns and visual 
engagement. In particular, those infants who exhibited greater relative left frontal 
activation when confronted with a peer laughing were the ones who spent more time 
looking at the peer laughing in the second session, while those who display greater levels 
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of relative right frontal activation in response to the peer crying stimuli spent more time 
looking at the peer crying in session 2. These results are in line with previous studies on 
adults suggesting that motivational tendencies (approach vs. withdraw) elicited by the 
stimulus modulate attentional processes, with withdrawal motivation leading to greater 
attention towards threatening stimuli (Watts et al., 1986; Joormann et al., 2007; 
MacLeod, 2007) and approach motivation relating to attention to appetitive stimuli 
(Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011, 2013). At this respect, EEG research involving measures 
of frontal asymmetry has already shown that right frontal asymmetry is associated with 
attentional biases toward withdrawal-related stimuli (e.g., Grimshaw, Foster, & 
Corballis, 2014; Miskovic & Schmidt, 2010; Perez-Edgar, Kujawa, Nelson, Cole, & 
Zapp, 2013) while enhanced left frontal brain asymmetry during the perception of anger-
evoking pictures is related to enhanced motivated attention (e.g., Gable & Poole, 2014; 
Poole & Gable, 2014). Due to the correlational nature of the analysis it is, however, 
difficult to draw conclusions of the exact nature of this relation. The inclusion of a non-
emotionally valenced baseline, larger sample size and a wider age range, could allow in 
the future a more comprehensive analysis of the relation between frontal asymmetry in 
response to peers and looking behavior during infant interactions.  
 The present study is not without limitations. Although we included a larger 
sample of participants to begin with, only a subset completed both testing sessions. We 
are confident, however, that our results are not due to the sample size. First, our findings 
converge in several ways with those previously reported in studies using similar 
paradigms (Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989; Field et al., 1998; Geangu et al., 2011; Nichols 
et al., 2015) and show medium-large to large effects. Second, post-hoc power 
analyses confirm that our study had more than ample power to detect all the significant 
(large effect) results reported in this study (over 95% power). The lack of differences 
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between emotion conditions for approach and, separately, withdrawal behaviours in this 
study seems particularly relevant to the overall interpretation of results. A power analysis 
indicated that a total sample of 1.162, for approach, and 765, for withdrawal, would be 
needed to detect the observed effects of d = .095 (approach) and d  = .117 (avoidance), 
with setting power to 0.90 using paired-sample t-tests. 
It is also important to highlight that the peer emotion tasks used in both sessions 
differed in duration and the conditions under which they were applied, which could 
explained some of the differences observed. On the other hand, it is possible that infants’ 
responses have been dampened by the exposure to unfamiliar peers rather than familiar 
ones. In this respect, there is suggestive evidence that child-child interactions are 
modulated by familiarity, with infants being more likely to interact with familiar peers 
as opposed to unfamiliar peers (Demetriou & Hay, 2004; Howes & Farver, 1987; Stefani 
& Camaioni, 1983; Young & Lewis, 1979). Likewise, the presence of the caregiver in 
the room during the second session may have caused children to respond less. Their own 
mothers’ unresponsiveness toward the stimuli may have prompted them to be less 
interested themselves in the peer or they may have been waiting for their own mothers 
to intervene.  
In summary, the present study suggests that observing other infants crying or 
laughing elicits in 8-month-old infants distinct patterns of asymmetric frontal activity, 
as well as overt responses suggesting the presence of convergent emotional responses 
and social approach behaviors. These findings add valuable information to a limited 
body of knowledge about the potential early origins of empathy and pro-social 
behaviors, and their underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. The specific link between 
approach behaviors and variations in left frontal activity indicates the presence of a 
motivational dimension to infants’ responses to distressed peers and emphasizes the 
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importance of investigating the role of these simple behaviors in the ontogeny of 
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Abstract 
Viewing facial expressions often evokes facial responses in the observer. These 
spontaneous facial reactions (SFRs) are believed to play an important role for social 
interactions. However, their developmental trajectory and the underlying neurocognitive 
mechanisms are still little understood. In the current study, 4- and 7-month old infants 
were presented with facial expressions of happiness, anger, and fear. Electromyography 
(EMG) was used to measure activation in muscles relevant for forming these 
expressions: zygomaticus major (smiling), corrugator supercilii (frowning), and frontalis 
(forehead raising). The results indicated no selective activation of the facial muscles for 
the expressions in 4-month-old infants. For 7-month-old infants, evidence for selective 
facial reactions was found especially for happy faces (leading to increased zygomaticus 
major activation) and fearful faces (leading to increased frontalis activation), while angry 
faces did not show a clear differential response. This suggests that emotional SFRs 
cannot be explained via direct mimicry alone and that they may be the result of more 
complex neurocognitive mechanisms. Such mechanisms seem to undergo important 




 Emotional facial expressions are rich and powerful means of communicating 
information about one’s affective states, as well as about the environment in which we 
live in. Not surprisingly, by adulthood, we develop high expertise to process facial 
expressions fast and accurately. A testimony to their importance and saliency is the fact 
that the perception of emotional faces often elicits emotionally convergent facial 
responses in the observer. For example, during social interactions, we often respond 
rapidly with emotional facial expressions that are similar to those we observe in others, 
such as smiling when we see someone happy. These spontaneous facial responses 
(SFRs), which are sometimes covert and not visible through direct observation 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; Tassinary & Cacioppo, 1992), nonetheless are 
thought to play crucial roles in how we communicate and empathise with each other, as 
well as in establishing cohesive social groups (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1993; 
Hess & Fischer, 2013). Impairments in these social abilities are usually reported in 
pathologies characterised by atypical social functioning like autism, conduct disorders 
and psychopathy (Brid & Viding, 2014; Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2014), and 
thus understanding the extent to which they are associated with atypical manifestations 
of emotional SFRs is of high importance. The study of infants’ spontaneous facial 
responses to others’ emotions is essential in this respect. Infancy is a crucial time period 
for tuning and optimising the brain circuitry for processing stimuli with socio-emotional 
relevance, setting the stage for both the refinement of the early acquired social skills and 
the emergence of new and more complex ones later in life (Johnson, 2011; Karmiloff-
Smith, 1998; Sirois et al., 2008). In addition, infancy also provides unique opportunities 
for studying the SFRs to others’ emotions in relative isolation from the influence of 
cultural norms and values, as well as symbolic linguistic processing of emotional 
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information. Despite their relevance, the systematic investigation of infants’ facial 
responses to others’ emotions is limited (Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Isomura & Nakano, 
2016; Oostenbroek et al., 2016). In order to address this developmental gap, in this study 
we investigated SFRs to dynamic facial expressions of emotions in 4- and 7-months-old 
infants using electromyography (EMG). 
Different neurocognitive mechanisms have been proposed to underlie the SFRs 
which are congruent with others’ emotional expressions. One view regards them as 
instances of motor mirroring or motor mimicry, where the observation of others’ facial 
movements elicits the selective activation of the corresponding muscles in the observer. 
These responses are thought to be largely automatic, occurring outside the mimicker’s 
awareness, intention and control (Campbell & Cunnington, 2017; Heyes, 2011). In light 
of these characteristics, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) metaphorically referred to motor 
mirroring as the ‘chameleon effect’. Motor mimicry relies on perception-action 
matching mechanisms involving the shared representation of the observed and executed 
facial actions. At the neural level, the mirroring properties of a cortical network 
including the inferior frontal, premotor and inferior parietal cortex (mirror neuron system 
- MNS) are thought to be involved in implementing the perceived emotional facial 
expression onto observer’s own motor representations of producing that expression 
(Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Dapretto et al., 2006; Pfeifer, 
Iacoboni, Mazziotta, & Dapretto, 2008). The simple sensory input of observing another’s 
action leads to an activation of an internal motor representation in the observer because 
of the similarity of the perceived action and the motor representation used to control 
action execution (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Brass & Heyes, 2005). The relation between 
the motor cortex activation and the selective excitability of the muscles involved in 
performing an action has been regarded as supportive of this view (Fadiga, Fogassi, 
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Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). The re-enactment of the observed expression could, in turn, 
even lead to the alteration of the observer’s own affective state through muscular 
feedback (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994). Indeed, 
numerous studies have shown that adults and older children rapidly mimic the facial 
expressions displayed by the people with whom they interact (Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Moody, Mcintosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007).  
However, several findings are difficult to integrate with this perception-action 
matching proposal. SFRs which seem to match the observed emotions have also been 
recorded in response to emotional cues other than faces (i.e., body postures, vocal 
expressions, arousing pictures (Dimberg & Karlsson, 1997; Magnée, de Gelder, van 
Engeland, & Kemner, 2007; Soussignan et al., 2013; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2008), thus 
in the absence of the corresponding motor model which is important for a simple 
perception-action matching account. Moreover, observing others’ facial expressions 
does not always elicit matching SFRs in the observer. For example, observing others’ 
angry faces elicits SFRs specific for fear rather than anger (Beall, Moody, Mcintosh, 
Hepburn, & Reed, 2008; Geangu, Quadrelli, Conte, Croci, & Turati, 2016; Moody et al., 
2007). Angry individuals represent potential sources of threat (Adams, Gordon, Baird, 
Ambady, & Kleck, 2003; Frijda, 1987), and usually elicit fear in others, both at 
subjective and psychophysiological level (Critchley et al., 2005; Davis & Whalen, 
2001). Only when angry individuals are perceived as physically weaker and threatening 
one’s social status, their facial displays of anger elicit similar SFRs in the observer (Hess, 
Adams, & Kleck, 2005; Soussignan et al., 2013). Situations of competition were also 
shown to trigger facial responses that are incongruent with the observed emotional 
expressions. Instead of showing positive emotional facial expressions, adults respond 
with negative displays to their competitors’ pleasure (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989; 
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Likowski, Muhlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2011). In all these examples, the facial 
responses converge with the meaning and the informative value for the observer of the 
emotional signals received from others, rather than its motor characteristics. Studies 
have also shown that posing a certain emotional expression can alter one’s subjective 
emotional experience (Bush, Barr, Mehugo, & Lanzetta, 1989; Laird et al., 1989; 
Hennenlotter et al., 2009; Soussignan, 2002). However, the causal link between 
emotional facial mimicry and changes in affective state lacks definitive evidence 
(Dezecache, Eskenazi, & Grèzes, 2016).  
To account for these additional findings, it has been proposed that the SFRs 
which converge with the displays of affect observed in others involve emotion 
communicative processes (Dezecache et al., 2016; Fischer & Hess, 2017; Grèzes et al., 
2013; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014). At the heart of this emotion-communicative proposal 
is the idea that the evaluation of the information provided by the emotional cues for self 
is critical and varies as function of stimulus features and social context. The evaluation 
of the emotional information can occur at different levels, from relevance detection and 
coding the negative and positive reward value of the stimuli, to fast or more elaborate 
cognitive appraisal (Koelsch et al., 2015). At the neural level, the evaluation of the 
emotional cues involves a circuitry consistent of both subcortical and cortical structures 
(Adolphs, 2002; Koelsch et al., 2015; Pessoa, 2017; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & 
Dolan, 2003), amongst which the amygdala, the brainstem, and the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC) have been extensively investigated (see Koelsch et al., 2015 for a recent review). 
For example, the amygdala plays a role in the fast detection and evaluation of threat 
(Adolphs, 2010; Hoffman, Gothard, Schmid, & Logothetis, 2007; Ledoux, 1995; 
Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004), as well as in the processing 
of happy events (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla, 2003). The amygdala shows connectivity 
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and co-activation with the motor and pre-motor cortical structures involved in 
preparation for action (Balconi, Grippa, & Vanutelli, 2015; Baumgartner, Willi, & 
Jancke, 2007; Oliveri et al., 2003; Schutter, Hofman, & Honk, 2008), suggesting that the 
early evaluation of emotional cues informs the behavioral responses during social 
interactions (Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014). The shared motor representations comprising 
components of the perceived action and associated predicted somatosensory 
consequences are also considered to be active during the perception of emotional 
displays. However, the attributed role has more to do with the anticipation of others’ 
behavior and intentions (Dezecache et al., 2016; Hamilton, 2016; Kilner, Friston, & 
Frith, 2007). Components of neural network underlying these processes are also thought 
to play a role in implementing the appropriate motor responses afforded by the specific 
social situation (Hamilton, 2016). Recent neuroimaging investigations have shown that 
although the threat evaluation processes related to the amygdala slightly precede those 
involved in generating shared representations, these seem to interact and be integrated 
as soon as 200 ms after stimulus onset (Conty, Dezecache, Hugueville, & Grezes, 2012). 
Given the role of the amygdala in evaluating a range of emotional events, a similar 
sequence of operations may also be encountered for positive emotions or for other brain 
structures with evaluative properties (e.g., the OFC) which are functionally connected 
with the motor cortex (Koelsch et al., 2015; Pessoa, 2017; Sander et al., 2003).  
In order to understand the factors that influence facial reactions, it is important 
to investigate the development of the infant SFRs to others’ emotional facial expressions. 
Recently it was shown that 5-months-old infants selectively respond with increased 
activation of the zygomaticus major to audio-visual recordings of adults smiling and 
with increased activation of the corrugator supercilli to audio-visual recordings of adults 
crying. This selective muscle activation was not reported for unimodal presentations of 
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adult expressions of cry and laughter (i.e., voice-only, face-only; Isomura & Nakano, 
2016). Nonetheless, the absence of angry expressions and of contrasts between different 
negative emotional expressions, together with the lack of a truly developmental 
perspective given that only one age group was tested, highly limit the conclusions that 
can be drawn based on these findings.  
In the current study we employed an EMG paradigm which contrasts the 
responses towards three dynamic facial expressions of emotion (i.e., happiness, anger, 
and fear) in three facial muscles that have been found to be selectively activated in these 
facial displays (i.e., zygomaticus major for smiling during happiness, corrugator 
supercilli for frowning in anger, and frontalis for forehead raising in anger displays). The 
study was conducted with both 4- and 7-months-old infants. The choice of these age 
groups was motivated by the evidence suggesting that they represent important 
hallmarks in the development of the ability to process emotional information from faces 
(Hoehl, 2014). Although even very young infants are able to discriminate between 
different facial expressions of emotions (Barrera & Maurer, 1981; Farroni, Menon, 
Rigato, & Johnson, 2007; Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1995), it seems that only 
beginning with the age of 7-months they rely on adults’ specific emotional expressions 
to guide their behavior towards the stimuli in the environment (Hoehl, 2014; Hoehl & 
Striano, 2010; Striano & Vaish, 2006). For example, it is around this age that infants 
begin to perceive fearful facial expressions as specific cues for threat (Hoehl, 2014; 
Striano & Vaish, 2006).  
If SFRs were predominantly a case of automatic perception-action matching, one 
would expect stronger activation in the muscle mainly involved in this expression 
(zygomaticus major for happy faces, corrugator supercilii for angry faces, and frontalis 
for fearful faces) relative to the other facial muscles. Cases where SFRs do not match 
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facial expressions would support the view that additional mechanism to the direct mirror 
matching are responsible for SFRs, such as evaluative-communicative processes. From 
this perspective, emotion congruent SFRs are expected to occur at the age when infants 
are able to process the informative value of the perceived expression. In light of evidence 
suggesting that only towards the age of 7-months infants are more likely to process the 
informative value of certain emotional facial expressions, we anticipate SFRs congruent 
with the observed ones in 7- rather than 4-months-old infants. The comparisons across 
multiple emotions and multiple facial muscles at two developmental periods will allow 
us to draw conclusions with regard to the specificity and selectivity of the infant 
emotional SFRs.  
Methods 
Participants 
Twenty seven 4-month old infants (11 females, Mage = 135.11 days, SD = 10.08 
days) and 24 7-month old infants (14 females, Mage =  226.17 days, SD = 9.90 days) were 
included in the final analysis. An additional 5 4-months-old and 8 7-months-old infants 
were tested but not included in the final sample due to technical issues (n = 4) or 
inattentiveness resulting in less than 5 good trials per condition (n = 10).  All participants 
were recruited from a small urban area in North West England. Informed consent was 
obtained from all parents prior to the beginning of the procedure. The procedure was 
carried out in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki (BMJ 
1991; 302:1194). Ethical approval was granted by the Lancaster University Ethics 
Committee. Parents were reimbursed for their travel expenses (£10), while infants 





Fifteen grey-scale dynamic female human faces displaying happiness (n = 5), 
anger (n = 5), and fear (n = 5) were taken from the Cohn-Kanade Expression database 
(Kanade & Cohn, 2000), which has become one of the most widely used stimuli for 
studies of facial expression analysis (Kanade & Cohn, 2000; Lucey et al., 2010). One of 
the main strengths of this dataset are that all facial expressions have been fully FACS 
coded (Lucey et al., 2010). The chosen faces were selected for their emotional valence. 
The selection criteria for the stimuli was that all happy facial expressions included 
corners of the mouth raised in a smile, all anger expressions included furrowed brows, 
and all fear expressions included raised eyebrows. For all stimuli, the transition between 
neutral and emotional expression occurred between 0 and 1000ms, while the peak 
expressivity was reached between 1000 and 3000ms. The exact timing of the facial 
movements, specific for each emotion expression, varied within and between stimulus 
categories. Face images were cropped using an oval frame that allowed facial features 
to be visible but excluded hair, ears, and any other paraphernalia. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet and dimly lit room. Before placing 
the electrodes, the skin was cleaned with an alcohol-free wipe. The electrodes were 
attached by one of the experimenters, while the second blew soap bubbles or 
manipulated a rattle toy in order to maintain the participant calm and distract him/her, 
as needed. Once the facial electrodes were placed, the participants sat during the entire 
procedure on their mothers’ lap approximately 70 cm away from a 24-inch monitor. 
Parents were instructed to hold their infants’ hand as still as possible to prevent infants 
from pulling the facial electrodes, not to speak to them, and not to point towards the 
screen during the entire stimuli presentation.  
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Each trial started with a central fixation cross for 1000 ms, during which baseline 
muscle activity levels were established. Following the fixation cross, a black screen 
displaying the emotional facial expression appeared for 3000 ms, followed by a blank 
screen (see Figure 2). Between trials, a dynamic non-social attention grabber was played 
whenever needed in order to maintain the participants’ attention to the stimuli in case 
they showed signs of becoming distracted. The option of having experimental controlled 
presentation of the attention grabber rather than an automatic presentation after each trial 
is common to infant psychophysiology paradigms requiring the presentation of many 
trials (de Haan, 2013) and capitalizes on the infants’ natural bouts of attention. The 
procedure continued for as long as infants paid attention to the stimuli. On average, 
participants completed 55.12 trials (Happy faces: M = 18.35 trials, Min = 10, Max = 30; 
Angry faces: M = 18.12 trials, Min = 10, Max = 30; Fearful faces: M = 18.65 trials, Min 
= 11, Max = 30). The entire procedure was video recorded in order to establish whether 
the infants had watched the faces in each trial and to facilitate artifact detection during 
the data analysis. The complete experimental session took approximately 10 min. 
 
SPONTANEOUS	FACIAL	RESPONSES	TO	OTHERS’	EMOTIONS	 202	
Figure 2. Example of a trial structure and stimuli used in the study. After a 1000 
ms central fixation cross, the participants were presented for 3000 ms with the dynamic 
facial expression of either anger, happiness or fear displayed by a female adult. The 
emotional stimulus was followed up by a blank screen. The non-social attention grabber 
was presented whenever recapturing participants’ attention to the screen was required. 
(The face picture included in the figure is for illustration purposes only and not part of 
the stimuli used in the study.) 
 
EMG Data Acquisition and Analysis 
Electromyography was used to record the levels of muscle activity over the 
zygomaticus major (raises the cheek), the medial frontalis (raises the brow), and the 
corrugator supercilli (knits brow). This method was extensively used to record adults’ 
facial responses to others’ emotions (Likowski et al., 2011). Although the internal 
consistency of the recorded EMG signal in these studies tends to be low, the test-retest 
reliability is good (Hess et al., 2017). Recent studies show that facial EMG is a method 
suitable to be used with young children and infants (Beall et al., 2008; Geangu et al., 
2016; Turati et al., 2013). In the present study, a BIOPAC MP30 continuously recorded 
the EMG signal from the selected muscles using bipolar montages. Disposable surface 
adhesive 4mm Ag-AgCl EMG electrodes (Unimed) were placed on the infants’ face at 
locations corresponding to each muscle according to the guidelines by Fridlund & 
Cacioppo (1986) and as previously reported in facial EMG studies with infants (Natale 
et al., 2014; Turati et al., 2013) and toddlers (Geangu et al., 2016). Electrodes were 
positioned on the left side of the face to obtain maximal reactions (Fridlund & Cacioppo, 
1986). The reference electrode was positioned just below the hairline approximately 3 
cm above the nasion. The EMG signal was recorded at a sampling rate of 1 kHz-filtered 
offline (low pass: 150 Hz; high pass: 30 Hz), and rectified.  Rectified data was averaged 
in 200 ms time bins which where z-transformed for each muscle and participant 
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individually. This is a standard procedure in facial EMG studies allowing for a 
comparison between participants and muscles. Participants’ looking time toward the 
screen was coded offline in order to inform whether they attended the stimuli. This is 
common procedure in electrophysiology research with preverbal children (e.g., Lloyd-
Fox et al., 2017). Trials with a looking time of less than 70 % of the stimulus duration, 
as well as trials with excessive movement or noise artifacts were excluded. Only children 
with minimum five trials per condition were included in the final statistical analyses. 
This criterion was informed by previous studies with infants (Isomura & Nakano, 2016), 
children (Beall et al., 2008; de Wied et al., 2006), and adults (Dimberg & Petterson, 
2000; Dimberg et al., 2000; Hess & Blairy, 2001; Hess et al., 1998). Across participants, 
the mean number of trials contributing to the final statistical analyses was 33.10 (Happy 
faces: M = 11.04 trials, Min = 5, Max = 18; Angry faces: M = 10.18, Min = 5, Max = 17; 
Fearful faces: M = 11.88, Min = 5, Max = 19).  
Previous studies with children using a similar paradigm suggest that facial 
reactions towards emotional expressions start to show between 500 and 1000 ms for 
static facial stimuli that are already fully developed in their expressivity (Beall et al., 
2008; Geangu et al., 2016; Oberman et al., 2009), which is also consistent with adult 
studies (Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg & Petterson, 2000; Moody et al., 2007). As the 
dynamic stimuli in this study gradually developed over the first 1000 ms and remained 
at peak between the 1000 - 3000 ms, we averaged for each trial both the first onset phase 
(Time point 1) and the peak expression phase (Time point 2). Average activation was 
baseline-corrected by subtracting the 1000 ms interval immediately before stimulus 





Mean amplitude values expressed as z-scores were analysed using a mixed 
ANOVA with Muscle (frontalis, corrugator supercilli, zygomaticus major), Emotion 
(happy, anger, fear), and Time window (Time 1, Time 2) as within factors and Age group 
(4-months-old vs. 7-months-old) as a between factor. All statistical tests were conducted 
at the .05 level of significance (two-tailed), with Bonferroni correction for post-hoc 
comparisons.  The results show significant interactions between Time window x Age 
group (F(1,49) = 5.466, p = .024,  = .100), Emotion x Muscle x Age group (F(4,196) 
= 3.276, p = .013,  = .063), as well as Emotion x Muscle x Time window x Age group 
(F(4,196) = 2.749, p = .029,  = .053). No other significant main effects or interactions 
were observed (p > .052). Furthermore, to explore the Muscle x Emotion x Age Group 
x Time window interaction, we proceed to perform a 3 (Muscle: frontalis, corrugator or 
zygomaticus) x 3 (Emotion: happy, anger or fear) x 2 (Time window: Time 1, Time 2) 
repeated measures ANOVAs for each age group. Also, since we transformed facial 
reactions to z-scores, we were able to analyse whether the reactions to each emotion 









 Figure 1. Means (and 95% confidence interval) of facial reactions towards the 




For the 4-months-old group an ANOVA with the factors Emotion, Muscle, and 
Time window revealed a significant interaction Emotion x Muscle, F(4,104) = 3.275, p 
= .014,  = .112 (Figure 1). The post-hoc pairwise comparisons did not result in any 
significant differences in the muscle activation between emotions (p > .261), nor any 
differences in activation between muscles within emotions (p > .054). No other main 
effects or interactions were observed (p > .088). Thus we found no evidence of SFRs in 






For the 7-month olds, the results show a significant interaction between Emotion, 
Muscle, and Time window, F(4, 92) = 3.451; p = .011; = .130. No other main effects 
or interactions were observed (p > .052). This indicated that 7-months olds showed 
differential facial responses towards the emotional faces which were dependent on time. 
We conducted post-hoc pairwise comparisons in order to compare the effect of different 
emotions on each muscle. For the 0 to 1000 ms time window, no significant differences 
between emotions were found for any of the muscles (p > .213). For the 1000 to 3000 
ms time window, the corrugator supercillii showed significantly stronger reactions 
towards angry faces (M = .112, SE = .042) than happy faces (M = -.056, SE = .030), p = 
.042. There were no significant differences between angry and fearful faces (M = -.026, 
SE =.032), p = .167, or between happy and fearful faces, p > .900. For the frontalis, we 
found significantly stronger activation for fearful (M = .057, SE = .026) than for happy 
faces (M = -.098, SE =.039), p = .023. No significant differences were found between 
fearful and angry faces (M = .047, SE = .044), p > .900, or between angry and happy 
faces, p = .213. For the zygomaticus, no significant differences emerged between the 
emotion categories (all p-values > .074; Figure 1). For the 0 to 1000 ms time window, 
no significant differences in activation between muscles were found for any emotional 
facial expression (p > .849). For the 1000 to 3000 ms time interval, happy facial 
expressions elicited higher zygomaticus major activation (M = .084, SE = .055) 
compared to the corrugator supercilii (M = -.056, SE = .030), p = .036, and the frontalis 
(M = -.098, SE = .039), p = .018. There was no significant difference in reaction towards 
happy faces between corrugator and frontalis, p = .783. For fearful faces, the frontalis 
(M = .057, SE = .026) showed a significantly higher activation than the zygomaticus (M 




between frontalis and corrugator supercilii (M = -.026, SE = .032), p = .114, and no 
significant difference between corrugator supercilii and zygomaticus major, p = .316. 
For angry faces, no significant differences emerged between the muscles (all p-values > 
.849; Figure 1). Notably, no gender effects were found for this age group. For further 
information see Appendix C. 
Discussion 
Our aim was to understand the ontogeny of infants’ facial response to others’ 
emotions and how this relates to the current theoretical models regarding the role of 
perception-action matching mechanisms and affect processes. We therefore presented 4- 
and 7-months-old infants with dynamic facial expressions of happiness, fear, and anger, 
while we used EMG to measure the activation of the muscles specific for expressing 
these emotions (i.e., zygomaticus major, frontalis, and corrugator supercilli, 
respectively). The results show that infants’ SFRs to dynamic emotional facial 
expressions undergo significant developmental changes towards the age of 7-months. 
The 4-months-old infants in our study did not manifest selective activation of the 
recorded facial muscles in response to dynamic facial cues of emotions. In fact, as Figure 
1 shows, very little facial responsiveness was present for this age group. These findings 
are in line with previous EMG studies which show that 5-months-old infants do not 
match their SFRs with dynamic facial expressions of cry and laughter without additional 
emotion-relevant auditory cues (Isomura & Nakano, 2016), as well as a series of 
behavioral studies which reported a lack of selective emotional facial responsiveness for 
2-3-months-old infants and newborns (Kaitz, Meschulach-sarfaty, Auerbach, & 
Eidelman, 1988; Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Limited statistical power may have played a 
role in limiting the interpretation of some of the statistical comparisons conducted 
because of the modest sample size in this age group (n = 27). However, a post-hoc power 
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analysis revealed that a total sample of 18 infants would be needed to detect a Muscle x 
Emotion interaction effect of h2p = .112 with 90% power using a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with alpha set to .05 level. Thus, based on power calculations, we had sufficient 
power to detect an effect of the magnitude observed.   
Our study shows for the first time that dynamic emotional facial expressions 
elicit selective SFRs in 7-month-old infants. Importantly, this pattern of response was 
not generalizable across all emotional expressions. The comparisons of muscle 
activation between and within each emotion show that observing dynamic facial 
expressions of happiness leads to increased activation of the muscle specific for 
expressing this emotion (i.e., zygomaticus major) and decreased activation of the muscle 
involved in expressing fear (i.e., frontalis) and anger (i.e., corrugator supercilli). A 
similar pattern of selective SFRs was also recorded for fearful faces, with an increased 
activation of the frontalis and decreased activation of the muscle specific for expressing 
happiness (i.e., zygomaticus major). In contrast, the perception of angry faces tended to 
lead to a more non-differentiated pattern of facial responsiveness. While the muscle 
specific for expressing anger, corrugator supercilli, did record an increased activation in 
response to angry faces compared to the happy ones, this was not associated with a 
decrease in the activation of the muscle specific for smiling (i.e., the zygomaticus major) 
nor the muscle specific for fear (i.e., the frontalis). Similar partial selectivity of the 
behaviorally coded facial responsiveness has been previously reported in studies with 2- 
to 3-months-old and 6-months-old infants, in which responses to more than two 
emotional expressions during ecological mother-infant interactions were contrasted 
(Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Izard et al., 1995; Walker-Andrews, 1997).  
Amongst the most prominent theoretical proposals for the neurocognitive 
mechanisms underlying the SFRs to others’ emotions are those attributing a primary role 
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to perception-action matching mechanisms (Carr et al., 2003; Hatfield et al., 1994; 
Pfeifer et al., 2008). The fact that 7-months-old infants do not respond to all emotional 
expressions included in this study with matching SFRs in a selective manner suggests 
that these are less likely to be simple re-enactments of the observed expressions based 
on perception-action matching mechanisms. Our findings are not likely to be due to an 
inability to perceptually discriminate or display the expressions tested. In particular, at 
this age infants have the ability to perceptually discriminate angry faces from various 
other emotional facial expressions (Grossmann, 2010; Hoehl, 2014), as well as the 
ability to display the facial movements specific for anger, happiness and fearfulness 
(Camras & Shutter, 2010; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Messinger, 2002; Messinger & 
Fogel, 2007; Walker-Andrews, 1997). Moreover, it is less likely that these results are 
due to differences in exposure to angry facial expressions. From around the age of 2-
months, infants are exposed to parents’ facial expressions of anger. Although these are 
not as frequent as facial expressions of happiness (Malatesta, Grigoryev, Lamb, Albin, 
& Culver, 1986), they are probably as frequent as those of fear (Leppänen & Nelson, 
2009), for which infants show congruent SFRs. 
Behavioral and neuroimaging studies have shown that the more elaborate 
representations of emotional expressions and their communicative value develop in 
infants after the age of 5-months, in an emotion dependent fashion (Grossmann, 2010; 
Hoehl, 2014). For example, 6-7-months-old but not younger infants show specific 
sensitivity to fearful faces as cues for threat and manifest increased attention towards 
objects that were looked at by fearful faces (Hoehl, 2014; Hoehl & Striano, 2010). This 
ability consolidates in the next months (Hoehl, Reid, Mooney, & Striano, 2008) and 
becomes more obvious in how infants interact with their environment around the age of 
12-months (Campos, Thein, & Owen, 2003; Striano & Rochat, 2000; Striano & Vaish, 
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2006). Although emotional expressions of anger are also relevant cues for threat, infants 
do not seem sensitive to their specific informative value until closer to their first birthday 
(Grossmann, Striano, & Friederici, 2007; Missana, Grigutsch, & Grossmann, 2014). The 
insufficiently developed ability of 7-month-old infants to evaluate the specific 
informative value of angry facial expressions may partially explain their lack of selective 
SFRs for this expression. The immature ability of the 4-months-olds to process a variety 
of facial expressions may also be partially responsible for the absence of selective SFRs 
across all expressions included in this study. Taken together, the age differences and 
pattern of selective muscle activation appear to be consistent with proposals that see 
SFRs not as pure motor mimicry, but also see the influence of communicative processes 
involving the evaluation of the emotional cues (Dezecache et al., 2016; Grèzes  & 
Dezecache, 2014; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Soussignan et al., 2013; Walker-Andrews, 
1997). 	
This interpretation does not necessarily mean that instances of emotionally 
convergent SFRs may only be recorded in infants closer to the age of 7-months, but 
rather that they may be limited to those situations where infants are able to extract salient 
information from the perceived emotional cues. Previous behavioral studies which used 
more ecological adult-infant interaction paradigms showed that infants as young as 2-3-
months manifest facial responses which tend to converge emotionally with the observed 
ones. However, these responses are specific to situations involving interactions between 
infants and their mothers, with whom they have had extensive experience in social 
exchanges (Bigelow & Rochat, 2006; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Izard et al., 1995; 
Oostenbroek et al., 2016; Walker-Andrews, 1997). In this case, infants’ facial responses 
may reflect the appraisal of the perceived emotional cues with respect to the mother’s 
immediate future actions that in the past elicited specific emotional responses. For 
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example, caregivers’ smiling faces are typically associated with pleasant social 
engagement, such as play and caring actions known to induce positive affect in the 
infant. In contrast, the display of negative emotional expressions is more likely to be 
followed by a lack of social interaction which can be distressing for the infant 
(Grossmann, 2010; Haviland & Lelwica, 1987; Walker-Andrews, 1997). This 
explanation would also account for those situations where the perception and the 
evaluation of others’ emotions are facilitated by the presence of multiple cues (Magnée 
et al., 2007; Rychlowska, Zinner, Musca, & Niedenthal, 2012; Schrammel, Pannasch, 
Graupner, Mojzisch, & Velichkovsky, 2009; Seibt, Mühlberger, Likowski, & Weyers, 
2015; Soussignan et al., 2013) or the quality of the emotional cues (e.g., static versus 
dynamic expressions; Rymarczyk, Biele, Grabowska, & Majczynski, 2011; Sato & 
Yoshikawa, 2007; Seibt et al., 2015; Weyers, Muhlberger, Hefele, & Pauli, 2006). The 
fact that 5-month-old infants respond with emotion convergent SFRs to audio-visual 
expressions of laughter and crying but not to the unimodal presentations (i.e., face-only, 
voice-only) of these emotional displays (Isomura & Nakano, 2016) may reflect such 
facilitating effect (Burnham, 1993; Flom & Bahrick, 2007; Vaillant-Molina, Bahrick, & 
Flom, 2013). 
Although the current findings together with those previously reported (Haviland 
& Lelwica, 1987; Isomura & Nakano, 2016; Oostenbroek et al., 2016) are informative 
about the emergence of the emotion congruent SFRs in infancy and suggestive with 
regards to the complexity of the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms, further research 
is needed in order to draw firmer conclusions in this respect. For example, although the 
current study shows that facial EMG paradigms can be successfully used with infants of 
different ages, it does not allow establishing whether the observed facial responses are 
related to changes in autonomic arousal. Emotional expressions displayed by both adults 
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and peers were found to elicit autonomic arousal indicative of emotional responsiveness 
in infants. In particular, changes in skin conductance and pupil diameter have been 
reported in response to expressions of happiness, fear, anger, and general distress in 
infants starting with the age of 4-months (Geangu, Hauf, Bhardwaj, & Bentz, 2011; 
Gredebäck, Eriksson, Schmitow, Laeng, & Stenberg, 2012; Jessen, Altvater-Mackensen, 
& Grossmann, 2016; Nava, Romano, Grassi, & Turati, 2016). Changes in autonomic 
arousal also seem to be significantly related to infants’ facial responses in emotion 
elicitation situations (Emde & Campos, 1978; Lewis & Ramsay, 2005; Lewis,  Ramsay, 
& Sullivan, 2006; Mattson et al., 2013). Concurrent facial EMG and measures of 
psychophysiological arousal would be particularly valuable for understanding how 
affect related processes contribute to the emergence of the emotionally convergent SFRs 
during infancy and childhood. Such knowledge is also directly relevant for studying the 
ontogeny of affect sharing and empathy (Decety, 2015; Decety & Michalska, 2010). 
Extracting, processing, and responding to the emotional information presented 
by human faces relies on complex neural networks involving both sub-cortical and 
cortical structures, including those that are part of the emotion-related brain circuits (e.g., 
the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex (Adolphs, 2002; Pessoa, 2008; Vuilleumier 
et al., 2003) and those functionally linked with motor preparation for action and 
estimating others’ immediate intent for action (Balconi & Bortolotti, 2013; Baumgartner 
et al., 2007; Coelho, Lipp, Marinovic, Wallis, & Riek, 2010; Coombes, Tandonnet,  
Cauraugh, & Summers, 2009; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2014; Hamilton, 2016; Oliveri et 
al., 2003; Schutter et al., 2008). Although the emotion-related brain structures are 
already functional at birth, and the connections with the other related cortical and 
subcortical areas established, these brain structures continue to mature and their pattern 
of connectivity refines over the course of postnatal development (Leppänen & Nelson, 
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2009). It is thus possible that the SFRs of the 7-months-old infants to happy and fearful 
facial expressions reflect, at least partially, these developmental changes in the 
underlying neural network (Leppänen & Nelson, 2009, 2012). Natural variations in the 
familiarity with different social contexts, as well as in the maturation of the relevant 
brain networks which are specific to the first year of life can thus provide unique 
opportunities for characterizing processes that would otherwise be impossible to capture 
in the fully mature adults (De Haan, Humphreys, & Johnson, 2002; Filippi et al., 2016). 
Different experimental approaches could be adopted for further investigations 
into the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying emotion congruent SFRs in infancy. For 
example, concurrent recordings of facial EMG and EEG based measures of cortical 
activation would be particularly informative in understanding how neural development 
contributes to the emergence of emotionally convergent SFRs in infancy (Dezecache et 
al., 2016; Filippi et al., 2016; Hamilton, 2016), with the potential of clarifying the extent 
to which shared motor representations comprising components of the perceived action 
and associated somatosensory consequences are involved in generating emotion 
congruent SFRs in infants, alongside emotion evaluation and reactivity processes. 
Specifying the dynamic of the facial muscle activation may also be relevant in this 
respect, potentially reflecting the chronology of different processes. In the present study 
we have shown that the selective facial muscle activation specific for emotion congruent 
SFRs is overall recorded between 1000 and 3000ms after stimulus onset. This timing is 
similar to that reported in previous studies with young children (Geangu et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, more subtle latency differences between emotions, and between muscles 
within emotion categories, may be present (Achaibou, Pourtois, Schwartz, & 
Vuilleumier, 2007). The stimuli used in the current study were not matched for the 
precise timing of facial actions, therefore not allowing a more refined time sensitive 
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analysis. Artificially developed stimuli, such as morphed faces, or static facial 
expressions would be particularly suitable in this respect.  
Being able to detect and respond to others’ emotions is essential to our social 
lives. For the past decades, a large number of studies have shown that adults tend to 
respond with rapid facial responses which converge emotionally with the emotions they 
perceive in others (Seibt et al., 2015). Although much more limited, evidence also 
emerged in recent years to show that similar patterns of facial responsiveness can be 
reported during childhood (Beall et al., 2008; Deschamps, Coppes, Kenemans, Schutter, 
2015; de Wied, van Boxtel, Zaalberg, Goudena, & Matthys, 2006; Oberman, 
Winkielman, & Ramachandran, 2009). Despite being a well-documented phenomenon 
in adulthood, debates regarding its early ontogeny and the underlying neurocognitive 
mechanisms remain open (Dezecache et al., 2016; Isomura & Nakano, 2016; Magnée et 
al., 2007; Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Our study shows that spontaneous facial responses 
which converge emotionally with the facial expressions observed in others can be 
recorded in 7- but not in 4-months-old infants. The pattern of infant emotional SFRs 
suggests that they may rely on complex neurocognitive mechanisms (Dezecache et al., 
2016), which undergo important developments at least until the second half of the first 
year of life. The factors contributing to the development of infants’ emotional SFRs 
remain to be established, yet continued work on this topic will be critical for better 
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Abstract 
Recent studies using non-verbal versions of traditional false belief tasks suggest that 
infants around the age of 15-18 months can already attend to others’ beliefs in order to make 
sense of their behavior. However, there is still restricted understanding of the neurocognitive 
processes underlying infants’ performance in these tasks and their relation to those reported in 
older children and adults. Our study aimed to explore the neural correlates underlying infant’s 
false belief (FB) processing during a passive paradigm by analysing event-related potentials 
(ERPs). Using an adapted version of the task described by Geangu et al., (2013), 15-months-old 
infants were presented with sequences of images depicting a character acting congruently (FB 
Congruent) or incongruently (FB Incongruent) to her false belief about an object’s location, while 
EEG was continuously recorded. ERPs analysis revealed differences between conditions at 
frontal leads, as indexed by modulations in the N400 component. A more negative N400 
waveform was recorded for belief incongruent as compared to belief congruent trials. The 
sensitivity of the N400 to action sequences that were incongruent with a narrative context 
evocative of people’s beliefs about an object location suggests that 15-monht-old infants are able 







Interacting with other people is central to our lives. Recognizing and understanding that 
other people’s behavior is driven by their mental states, like intentions, desires, emotions and 
beliefs, helps us to predict their behaviors and to collaboratively perform complex actions (Kuhn-
Popp, Sodian, Sommer, Dohnel, & Meinhardt, 2013; Sodian, 2011; Wellman, 2011). An essential 
milestone in the development of these abilities is to understand that people build representations 
of reality, which are more or less accurate, similar or dissimilar to our own (Flavell, 1988; Luo, 
2011; Rakoczy, 2012; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). Classically, it was thought that this ability 
first emerges around the age of 4 years, when children can make judgements about people’s false 
beliefs (FB) about reality and predict their behavior accordingly (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 
1985; Flavell, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman et al., 1988; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This evidence comes primarily from behavioral studies with pre-
schoolers using standard false-belief tasks, where children are explicitly asked to reason about 
an agent’s perception or beliefs about different aspects of reality (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988).  However, more recent studies 
using spontaneous-response passive tasks suggest that computations about others’ beliefs may 
be already present in infancy (Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; 
Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 
2008; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Träuble, Marinović, & 
Pauen, 2010). Also, neuroscientific investigations point to a protracted development of belief 
understanding which extends well beyond the age of 4-years, reaching more mature levels of 
performance only towards the end of adolescence (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Blakemore, 2008, 
2012; Chandler & Lalonde, 1996; Gweon, Dodell-Feder, Bedny, & Saxe, 2012; Johnson, 2001; 
Kobayashi, Glover, & Temple, 2007; Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009). The 
present study sought to extend the knowledge about belief processing development by 
investigating the infant’s neural responses during a passive non-verbal FB task by using event-
related potentials (ERPs).  
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In their now well know study, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) proposed for the first time 
that 15-month-old infants may present at least some incipient abilities for belief computations. 
Closely following the sequence of events in the classic false belief task (Wellman et al., 2001; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983), in this study, infants saw a character placing an object in one of two 
containers. In the following sequences, the object emerges from the container where it was 
initially placed and moves into the second one. The character is either absent or present during 
the location change event, making their beliefs about reality either true (TB) or false (FB). During 
the test trials, infants see the character reaching in one of the two containers. The fact that infants 
in the TB condition looked longer when the character reached for the object in the initial location, 
while infants in the FB condition looked longer during the search in the final location, was 
interpreted as suggesting that infants make some computations about others’ beliefs. Since this 
initial report, several other studies using similar paradigms have suggested that infants are not 
only sensitive to beliefs about objects’ locations, but also about objects’ identity, content, 
number, and perceptual properties (He & Baillargeon, 2007; Scott & Bailargeon, 2009; Scott, 
Song, Baillargeon, & Leslie, 2007; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song et al., 2008). Also, it has 
been proposed that infants integrate information about the means through which others form 
these representations (i.e., either through seeing or touching, Träuble et al., 2010) and that 
representing others’ beliefs is similar to and interacts with infants’ own representations of reality 
(Kovacs et al., 2010). Such processes seemingly influence infants’ behavior in relation to other 
people or to the physical environment. For example, 17-month-olds reach for an object 
disregarding adults’ ostensive cues, if the previous events suggest this person has false beliefs 
about the object’s location (Southgate, Johnson, El Kariou, & Csibra, 2010).   
To date, multiple behavioral studies suggest that from around the age of 18-months, infants 
also seem to be able to anticipate others’ behavior based on the succession of events suggestive 
of their false beliefs (Southgate et al., 2007; Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012; 
Zmyj, Prinz, & Daum, 2015), which is more cognitively demanding than post-hoc evaluations of 
the congruency between actions and beliefs (Daum, Attig, Gunawan, Prinz, & Gredebäck, 2012; 
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Gredebäck, Melinder, & Daum, 2010; Verschoor, Spapé, Biro, & Hommel, 2013). Eighteen-
months-olds’ ability to anticipate a character’s behavior based on his/her false beliefs was found 
to significantly predict their performance in a classic verbal false-belief reasoning at the age of 
48-months (Thoermer et al., 2012). These findings provide further support for the relevance of 
the passive non-verbal false belief tasks in the study of the early ontogeny of the ability to infer 
mental states to others. Nevertheless, we still have only limited understanding of the 
neurocognitive processes underlying infants’ performance in the passive non-verbal tasks and 
how they relate to those reported in older children and adults. Further knowledge of such 
neurocognitive processes would also bear relevance for the open theoretical debates regarding 
the relation between implicit and explicit inferences about others’ mental states. While some 
authors still question whether implicit tasks reflect mentalizing processes (Heyes, 2014), others 
propose the presence of two distinct systems (He & Baillargeon, 2007): an implicit one which 
emerges early in life and operates automatically, making the processing faster and more efficient; 
and an explicit system that develops later and operates in a more top-down manner, leading to a 
slower but more deliberate processing. Finally, others have postulated the presence of a single 
system, which depending on the contextual demands, operates either automatically or in a more 
controlled way (Carruthers, 2016). 
Measurements of the electrical brain activity recorded at the level of the scalp (e.g., 
electroencephalography – EEG, and ERPs) have proven useful in investigating the perceptual 
and cognitive processes involved in the social functioning of both developing and adult 
populations (de Haan, 2007; Luck, 2005). The crucial advantage of ERPs is the high temporal 
resolution, providing precise information about the chronometry of given neural responses and 
the associated perceptual and cognitive processes. Together with the fact that they can be used 
across the entire lifespan, the use of ERPs provides opportunities to tracking cognitive 
development from birth until adulthood (de Haan, 2007; Reid & Geangu, 2008).  
ERPs have been successfully used in investigating both implicit and explicit mental state 
processing in adults with several components showing sensitivity to inferences about others’ 
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mental states (Ferguson, Cane, Douchkov, & Wright, 2015; Geangu, Gibson, Kaduk, & Reid, 
2013; Kovacs, Kühn, Gergely, Csibra, & Brass, 2014; Liu, Meltzoff, & Wellman, 2009; Liu, 
Sabbagh, Gehring, & Wellman, 2004, 2009; Meinhardt, Kuhn-Popp, Sommer, & Sodian, 2012; 
Meinhardt, Sodian, Thoermer, Dohnel, & Sommer, 2011; Sabbagh, Moulson, & Harkness, 2004; 
Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000; Sommer et al., 2007). A negative ERP component recorded at frontal 
scalp regions, usually between 200 and 500 ms after stimulus onset (N400) was found to be 
modulated by whether adults judge others’ mental states versus physical features (Sabbagh et al., 
2004) and whether adults judge action outcomes based on the agents’ beliefs or based on reality 
and photographs of reality (Ferguson et al., 2015; Sabbagh & Taylor, 2000). Within roughly the 
same time window, a positive component (LPC, 300-600 ms) recorded particularly at parietal 
regions of the scalp was found to show increased amplitude for belief versus reality reasoning 
and for FB compared to TB reasoning (Meinhardt et al., 2011; Sabbagh et al., 2000). These two 
components seem to have different sources of activation, with the frontal N400 being mainly 
generated by the orbitofrontal cortex and medial temporal lobes, while the LPC being related to 
the activity of the parietal cortex (Sabbagh et al., 2004) and temporal-parietal junction (TPJ; 
Kovacs et al., 2014; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2007). Differentiations in the brain 
waves slowly developing after 600 ms from stimulus onset at both parietal and frontal locations 
have also been reported to differentiate between false and true representations of reality (Geangu 
et al., 2013; Meinhardt et al., 2011) between mental and non-mental representations of reality 
(Liu et al., 2004; Liu, Meltzoff et al., 2009; Sabbagh et al., 2000) and between pretense and false 
belief reasoning (Meinhardt et al., 2012). These late slow waves (LSWs) are considered to index 
the decoupling between representations of and the real state of affairs, which is important for 
understanding FB (Geangu et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2004; Liu, Meltzoff et al., 2009; Liu, Sabbagh, 
et al., 2009; Meinhardt et al., 2011; Meinhardt et al., 2012; Sabbagh et al., 2000; Rösler & Heil, 
1991). 
The investigations on FB processing in children older than 4-years reveal similar ERP 
responses to the adult ones, although with some marked differences. Children ERP responses 
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tend to be delayed, have greater duration and smaller amplitude, and may even be inverted in 
polarity and present different scalp distributions (Liu, Sabbagh et al., 2009; Meinhardt et al., 
2011). These ERP differences are echoed by the results in functional magnetic brain imaging. 
When reasoning about others beliefs, children engage areas of the prefrontal cortex and the 
posterior cingulate, which are relevant for monitoring and regulating behavior (Amodio & Frith, 
2006; Kobayashi et al., 2007; Sommer et al., 2010)  to a larger extent than adults. Also, the TPJ 
shows an increasing selective activation with age in response to mental state information, 
correlating with children’s performance on ToM tasks outside the scanner (Gweon et al., 2012; 
Saxe et al., 2009; Sommer et al., 2010). Taken together, these studies suggest that the 
neurocognitive processes involved in mentalizing may show some differences during childhood, 
and that they continue to develop long after children pass the classic behavioral FB tasks 
(Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010; Gweon et al., 2012; Sommer et al., 2010). It is thus 
reasonable to enquire whether ERPs can shed some light into the neurocognitive processes 
underlying infants’ responses to non-verbal FB tasks. 
To this aim we used a passive non-verbal content transfer FB task closely derived from 
previous behavioral studies (e.g., Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005, as described above) and previously 
used with adult population (Geangu et al., 2013). Specifically, in order to differentiate between 
ERP responses driven by reality processing and those driven by false belief processing, we 
employed a match-mismatch paradigm with two FB conditions: the FB congruent condition (FBc 
- the character’s behavior in the last scene is congruent with her belief about reality but 
incongruent with the current location of the object she reaches for) and the FB incongruent 
condition (FBi - the character’s reach behavior in the last scene is congruent with the current 
location of the object even though she was unaware of the change in location). We were interested 
in finding out the extent to which the infants’ brain responses are sensitive to such incongruences 
between the agent’s actions and the visual narrative context suggestive of her false beliefs by 
analysing the effects on the N400 component. Outside the belief-processing domain, this 
component has been related to processing of semantic information (see Kutas & Federmeier, 
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2000, 2011, for reviews), both linguistic (Camblin, Ledoux, Boudewyn, Gordon, & Swaab, 2007; 
Holcomb, 1993; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984; van Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999) and 
related to human actions (Bach, Gunter, Knoblich, Prinz, & Friederici, 2009; Gunter & Bach, 
2004; Pace, Carver, & Friend, 2013; Proverbio & Riva, 2009; Reid, Hoehl, & Striano, 2009; 
Shibata, Gyoba, & Suzuki, 2009). Higher amplitudes of the N400 are reported in response to 
linguistic and action stimuli which are semantically incongruent within a specific context 
compared to the congruent ones (Bach et al., 2009; Camblin et al., 2007; Gunter & Bach, 2004; 
Holcomb, 1993; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984; Pace et al., 2013; Proverbio & Riva, 2009; Reid 
et al., 2009; Shibata et., 2009; van Berkum et al., 1999). When visual stimuli are presented, such 
as those depicting human behavior, N400 is usually reported over anterior scalp locations 
(Friedrich & Friederici, 2004; Ganis, Kutas, & Sereno, 1996; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; 
Proverbio, Crotti, Manfredi, Adorni, & Zani, 2012; Sheehan, Namy, & Mills, 2007; Sitnikova, 
Holcomb, Kiyonaga, & Kuperberg, 2008; West & Holcomb, 2002). In infants and toddlers, N400 
was recorded both in response to linguistic and human action stimuli (Friedrich & Friederici, 
2004; Ganis et al., 1996; Pace et al., 2013; Reid et al., 2009; Sheehan et al., 2007). We thus 
anticipate that if 15-month-old infants in our study process the character’s actions as being related 
to her knowledge about object location rather their own knowledge about reality, then an 
increased N400 will be recorded during the last scene of the FBi compared to the FBc condition. 
Alternatively, if infants are more likely to process the character’s actions in relation to the current 
reality, we expect a more negative anterior N400 to be elicited by the FBc rather than the FBi 
condition. Given that the stimuli included in our study are visual, in light of previous studies with 
both infants and adults (Friedrich & Friederici, 2004; Ganis et al., 1996; McPherson & Holcomb, 
1999; Pace et al., 2013; Proverbio et al., 2012; Reid et al., 2009; Sheehan et al., 2007; Sitnikova 







Sixteen 15-month-old infants (8 girls, M = 470.81 days, SD = 6.872 days) were included 
in the final analysis. All participants were recruited from a small urban area in North West 
England. Additional 10 infants were tested, but excluded from the final analysis due 
inattentiveness and excessive movement resulting in less than 9 trials per condition which were 
both artifact free and observed. This attrition rate is similar to previous belief processing ERP 
studies with developing populations (Bowman, Liu, Meltzoff, & Wellman, 2012) and ERP 
investigations in other domains involving this age group (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012). Informed 
consent was obtained from all parents prior to the beginning of the procedure. Ethical approval 
was granted by the University Ethics Committee. 
Stimuli 
Using an adapted version of the visual stimuli from Geangu et al. (2013), infants were 
presented with images depicting sequences of events in which a female agent acts congruently 
or incongruently to her false belief (FB) about an object location (Figure 3).  Across a total of 12 
images, the character first reaches towards an object, then places it in one of the two boxes located 
to the left and right in front of her. In the next step, a black board is raised, occluding the 
character’s view of the scene. While the character’s view of the scene is occluded, the object 
leaves the box and, after reaching the middle of the table, moves to the other box, creating a FB 
condition. The last images show the occluding board being removed and the character either 
reaching inside the box where she has initially placed the object (FBc – false belief congruent) 
or reaching inside the box where the object currently is (FBi – false belief incongruent). In order 
to make the task interesting for the infants, the character manipulates the location of three objects 
(i.e., a banana, an orange, and a green pepper), which were presented alternatively across trials. 
The colour (i.e., red or blue) and the position (i.e., left or right) of the boxes remained constant 
across trials. The box in which the agent first placed the object was counterbalanced across trials. 
The presentation of the entire sequence of images lasted 5s. The first 10 images were presented 
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for 350 ms each, while duration of the final image was 1000 ms. Before the last image, a 500 ms 
fixation cross was presented to allow correction for baseline during the EEG analysis.  
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the sequence of images seen by the infants during the task: (A) 
false belief congruent - FBc; and (B) false belief incongruent - FBi.  
 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet and dim lit room. Infants were seated on 
their mother’s lap, approximately 70 cm away from a 17-inch monitor. Parents were instructed 
to hold their infants as still as possible to reduce artefacts in the data due to motion, not to speak 
to them, and not to point towards the screen during the entire stimuli presentation. The FB 
congruent and incongruent trials were presented in a randomized order with the constraint that 
the same condition did not occur three times consecutively. A trial consisted of the 12 images 
sequence lasting 5 seconds, followed by a fixation cross. The offset of the fixation cross was 
controlled by the experimenter, allowing for either the continuation of the stimulus presentation 
or for the display of a dynamic non-social attention grabber with the purpose of maintaining 
attention in case the infant became fussy or uninterested. The testing session ended when the 
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infant’s attention could no longer be attracted to the screen (FBc: M = 24 trials, Min = 18, Max 
= 32; FBi: M = 27 trials, Min = 21, Max = 34). The entire procedure was video recorded in order 
to establish whether the infants had watched all images within a trial and to facilitate artifact 
detection during the data analysis.  
EEG Recording and Analysis 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded continuously using a 128-electrode 
HydroCel Geodesic Sensor Net (Electrical Geodesic Inc., Eugene, OR) and amplified using an 
EGI NetAmps 300 amplifier. The signal was referenced online to the vertex electrode (Cz), a 
bandpass filter of .1 to 100Hz was applied, and the data were sampled at 500 Hz. Impedances 
were checked prior to the beginning of recording and considered acceptable if lower than 50KΩ. 
EEG data were further processed offline using NetStation v4.6.4 (Eugene, OR). The signal was 
band-pass filtered (0.3-30 Hz), and the ERP trials were segmented between 100 ms before and 
1000 ms after the presentation of the last frame where the character reaches into the box where 
she initially had placed the object. Data were corrected to the average voltage during baseline 
and re-referenced to the algebraic mean of all channels. To eliminate artifacts, segmented data 
were automatically rejected whenever the signal exceeded ± 200 µV at any electrode. Data were 
further checked through visual inspection for eye-movements, eye-blinks and other body 
movement artifacts not detected by the automated algorithm. Trials were excluded if more than 
eighteen bad channels were detected. Of the remaining trials, individual bad channels were 
replaced using spherical spline interpolation. Individual subject averages were computed 
separately for each channel across all trials within each condition and then re-referenced to the 
average reference. Only those trials in which infants had looked at the full sequence of images 
(12 pictures) were included in the final analysis. This inclusion criteria was selected in order to 
avoid  attentional confoundings during the interpretation of the results. Notably, this restrictive 
criteria is in line with previous children ERP studies on theory of mind using similar stimuli 
(Bowman et al., 2012; Kuhn-Popp et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2009). In order to ensure that the 
infants’ neural reponses registered in this study were not driven by their mothers’ reactions to 
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the visual stimul, all trials included in the final analysis were further coded for child-directed 
interactions defined as all that instances where the mother 1) talked to the infant, 2) pointed to 
the screen, or 3) briefly established eye contact with the infant. As a result of this coding, an 
additional 12 trials (FB: 5 trials; TB: 7 trials) were removed due to parental interference. Across 
participants, the mean number of trials contributing to the average ERP was 13 per each condition 
(FBc: M = 12.5, SD = 2.805; FBi: M = 13.5, SD = 3.932). Individual ERP waveforms were 
created through averaging the segmented EEG data for each condition.  
 For the statistical analysis, in order to correct for chance capitalisation (i.e., correcting for 
the number of tests of significance being performed), we divided our average ERP/EEG data in 
intervals of 50 ms and tested for significance using a repeated measures ANOVA. Statistical 
analyses were performed on the mean amplitude for three clusters of electrodes: frontal (3, 4, 5, 
10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 118, 124), central (7, 30, 31, 36, 37, 42, 80, 87, 93, 104, 105, 106), and 
parietal (52, 59, 60, 66, 67, 71,76, 77, 84, 85, 91, 92). Data was analysed with separated 2 
(Condition: FBc, FBi) x 3 (Region: frontal, central, parietal) repeated measures ANOVAs on 
each 50 ms time windows. Based on this analysis, we only report results for those time windows 
composed by a minimum of three consecutive intervals of 50 ms with a significant Condition x 
Region interaction (see also Muller et al., 2016). On the basis of this information, and in 
consonance with prior work (Balconi & Caldiroli, 2011; Kuhn-Popp et al., 2013; McPherson & 
Holcomb, 1999; Meinhardt et al., 2011; Pace et al., 2013; Sheehan et al., 2007; Sitnikova et al., 
2008; West & Holcomb, 2002), statistical analyses were performed in the aforementioned 
clusters of electrodes (at frontal, central, and parietal regions) within the time window 450-600 
ms (N400). 
Results 
A repeated measures ANOVA with condition (FBc, FBi) and region (frontal, central, 
parietal) as within subject factors was conducted on the mean amplitude of the N400. Same 
repeated measures ANOVA was also calculated on the peak amplitude of the N400, where there 
was a clear peak. All ERP statistical tests were interpreted at .050 level of significance (two-
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tailed). No gender differences were found for the selected time window per condition neither on 
mean amplitude nor peak amplitude measures. Yet, the inclusion of gender lead to significant 
gender disparities on the N400 peak amplitude at frontal regions (p = .042), with females 
displaying a more negative peak than males (Females: M = -16.462 µV, SE = 2.056; Males: M = 
-10.533 µV, SE = 2.056). For further information see Appendix D. Additional statistical analyses 
conducted on the N400 component are provided in Appendix I and J. Figure 1 shows the grand-
average of ERPs recorded at frontal, central and posterior sited in both conditions.  
N400 (450-600 ms)    
The analysis of the mean amplitude for this time window revealed a significant main effect 
of region, F(2,30) = 46.483, p = .000, η2 = .756. Overall, waveforms within this epoch were more 
negative-going at frontal (M = -8.802 µV ; SE = 1.359) and central (M = -7.351 µV ; SE = .980) 
locations than parietal (M = 11.638 µV ; SE = 1.802). Importantly, an interaction of Condition x 
Region was observed, F(2,30) = 6.198, p = .006, η2 = .292. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
showed that differences between conditions were significant in frontal areas (p = .001), with FBi 
trials eliciting a more negative N400 (M = -10.528 µV; SE = 1.318) compared to the FBc trials 
(M = -7.077 µV; SE = 1.525). There were no significant differences between conditions at either 
central (p > .610) or parietal regions (p > .092). The analysis of the peak amplitude for this time 
window resulted in similar effects. A more negative peak amplitude was recorded at frontal (M 
= -13.498 µV; SE = 1.600) and central areas (M = -11.279 µV; SE = 1.084) compared to the 
parietal areas (M = 6.068 µV; SE = 1.682), F(2,30) = 41.533; p = .000; η2 = .735. This main 
effect was further qualified by a significant interaction with condition, (F(2,30) = 5.325; p = 
.010; η2 = .262). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that FB incongruent trials elicited a 
more negative peak (M = -14.938 µV; SE = 1.525) than the FB congruent trials (M = -12.058 µV; 
SE = 1.807) at frontal locations (p = .010), but not at central (p = .405) or parietal regions of 





Figure 1. Grand average ERPs for the FBc and FBi conditions over frontal (A), central (C) 
and parietal locations (D). For the frontal areas, the electrodes included in the analysis were 3, 4, 
5, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 118, 124 (B). For the central areas, the electrodes included in the 
analysis were 7, 30, 31, 36, 37, 42, 80, 87, 93, 104, 105, 106 while for the parietal areas the 
included channels were 52, 59, 60, 66, 67, 71, 76, 77, 84, 85, 91, 92 (B).  
 
Discussion 
Using a non-verbal ERP paradigm adapted from previous behavioral studies (Onishi & 
Bailargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Träuble et al., 2010), 
15-month-old infants were presented with visual narratives depicting a female adult acting 
congruently or incongruently with her false belief about the location of an object. Our results 
show that the N400 component recorded at frontal locations significantly differentiates between 
conditions. Watching someone searching for an object where it is currently located in the context 
of having the knowledge of it being somewhere else, elicited a more negative N400 compared to 
observing someone searching for an object where they previously placed it. This differentiation 
persists for most of the remaining duration of the stimulation, suggesting that 15-month-old 
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Traditionally, the N400 has been shown to reflect the semantic integration in the linguistic 
context, where anomalous sentence endings elicit an increased negativity compared to the 
semantically congruent ones (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980a, 1980b). These increased negativities for 
semantically incongruent stimuli are thought to index the activation state of the input in semantic 
memory, which tends to be higher for the stimuli that violate the predictions formulated based 
on the preceding contextual information (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). More recently, evidence 
has also accrued to show that larger N400s are evoked in both adults and infants by incongruous 
and/or unexpected images compared to the congruous ones in narratives presenting people and 
their behavior (e.g., Amoruso et al., 2013; Cohn & Kutas, 2015; Reid et al., 2008; Reid et al., 
2009; Pace et al., 2013; Sitnikova, Kuperberg, & Holcomb, 2003). When these narratives are 
presented in images, the N400 tends to be more frontally distributed and to have shorter latencies 
(particularly for dynamic stimuli) compared to when the narratives are presented textually 
(Amoruso et al., 2013; Coch, Maron, Wolf, & Holcomb, 2002; Pace et al., 2013; Sitnikova et al. 
2008). The N400 recorded in this type of paradigms tends to be preceded by an earlier negative 
component – N300 (Amoruso et al., 2013; Federmeier & Kutas, 2001; Hamm, Johnson, & Kirk, 
2002; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; West & Holcomb, 2002). ERP responses with morphology 
characteristic for the N400 have also been recorded in studies that investigate belief processing. 
For example, such responses are triggered while adults passively read or watch narratives 
describing characters who behave congruently or incongruently to their false beliefs about reality 
(Ferguson et al., 2015; Geangu et al., 2013) as well as when they actively engage in tasks that 
visually (e.g., Liu, Sabbagh et al., 2009) or audio-visually depict characters who behave 
incongruently with their representations of reality (e.g., Meinhardt et al., 2012). The increased 
negativity of the N400 for the events which are incongruent with the characters’ representations 
of reality in these types of paradigms seems to be dependent on the individual’s social 
competence (Ferguson et al., 2015) and perhaps the different type of processes involved in 
understanding others’ actions as being related to their beliefs (Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & 
Rakoczy, 2016; Michael & Christensen, 2016). Interestingly, N400 with increased negativity has 
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also been recorded when adults make explicit inferences about other’s mental states based on eye 
expressivity compared to when they judge the sex of the person in the image (Sabbagh et al., 
2004).  
In line with these previous findings, 15-months-ols infants in our study showed a larger 
anterior N400 response for trials in which the agent’s behavior is incongruent with her knowledge 
about object location (but congruent with the current reality and the participant’s knowledge) 
compared to trials in which the observed behavior is congruent with the agent’s knowledge (but 
incongruent with the current reality and the participants’ knowledge). The N400 was preceded 
by an earlier negativity similar to the N300 previously reported in a variety of studies using this 
type of paradigm with pictorial stimuli illustrating human actions (Amoruso et al., 2013; 
Federmeier & Kutas, 2001; Hamm et al., 2002; McPherson & Holcomb, 1999; West & Holcomb, 
2002). From a young age, infants are able to follow pictorial narratives depicting human agents 
in action. Certainly, by the age of 9-months infants seem to be able to encode and access the 
information provided through such narratives which is reflected in N400 variability to violations 
in goal directed action sequences (Reid et al., 2009). Our study shows that by the age of 15-
months, infants are able to track the relation between human agent’s actions and the present 
objects across a succession of events, and that they are able to detect inconsistencies between the 
final action and the semantic context indicative of the character’s perspective of reality. The 
differentiation between false belief congruent and false belief incongruent trials at the level of 
the N400 suggests that the previously reported behavioral findings (Onishi & Bailargeon, 2005; 
Scott & Bailargeon, 2009; Song & Bailargeon, 2008; Southgate et al., 2007; Surian et al., 2007; 
Träuble et al., 2010) are less likely to be reliant on pure perceptual processes, but rather on some 
form of belief representation that involves semantic memory (Michael & Christensen, 2016). The 
processes required by 15-month-old infants to establish the congruency between the character’s 
final action and her view of the reality seem to be more effortful and to require more time than 
for adults, as reflected by the N400 larger amplitude and slightly delayed latency (Ferguson et 
al., 2015). Similar developmental differences have been reported for linguistic processing 
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(Friedrich & Friederici, 2004) and goal directed action understanding (Reid et al., 2009). The 
current findings add to the existent literature showing that infants’ anticipations of others’ actions 
in relation to their false beliefs about reality significantly predicts their performance in explicit 
false-belief tasks at the age of 4-years (Thoermer et al., 2012), by providing more specific 
information about the neurocognitive processes underlying these early abilities. Importantly, the 
study presented here supports the use of ERPs in investigating the link between the early 
indicators of belief processing and the later development of the ability to infer mental states to 
others. Due to their unique high temporal resolutions, ERPs provide valuable information about 
the chronology of the underlying neurocognitive processes which can complement the evidence 
regarding the related neural networks resulted from the use of methods with high spatial 
resolution, such as functional near-infrared spectroscopy (Lloyd-Fox, 2017). 
One could argue that the N400 differences reported here are due to the perceptual 
differences between frame 3 and 12 in the FBi condition presenting different hand movements, 
without any need for understanding the preceding action events. If perceptual differences 
between the two conditions would drive the observed responses, one would expect to find 
differences between conditions at the level of the earlier ERP components, shown to reflect brain 
activity governed by perceptual processing (see Thierry, 2005, for a review). Nevertheless, the 
waveform morphology and the differentiation between conditions recorded in this study do not 
support such interpretation. Furthermore, a number of studies have shown that infants younger 
than 15-months are able to establish clear relations between a specific agent and his/her action 
goal (Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & Bloom, 2003), which persists across 
perceptual variations in the context, such as the location of the goal (Robson, Lee, Kuhlmeier, & 
Rutherford, 2014) or the paths and direction of the action involved (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Csibra, 
2011; Luo, 2011) as long as the equifinality principles are respected. Also, by the end of the first 
year infants are able to detect goal changes (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Sodian & Thoermer, 2004) and 
track a person’s attention towards an object in order to infer next actions (e.g., Onishi & 
Bailargeon, 2005; Southgate et al., 2007). Therefore, there is clear evidence that by the age of 
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15-months infants have the ability to formulate expectations about other people’s actions, which 
can support further inferences about their mental states.  
Different engagement of attentional processes could also potentially drive the observed 
responses. In particular, previous studies have argued that the frontal N400 can also reflect the 
influence of attentional components like the Nc when the stimuli depict actions with different 
degree of saliency for infants (e.g., feeding vs. non-feeding; Reid et al., 2009). The strength of 
our study is that the stimuli in both conditions are equally salient, thus unlikely to elicit 
differences in attention allocation due to this property. Modulations in attention have been 
reported when infants process human hand grasps oriented congruently or incongruently with 
respect to the previous location of an object. Nevertheless, the ERP component reflecting such 
differences is a posterior P400 (Bakker et al., 2014), which in our study does not differentiate 
between conditions. This could be due to the fact that the direction of the grasp is present and 
processed earlier in the sequence of events included in our stimuli, prior to the one we analysed. 
The gradual completion of an action is the norm in ecological situations, potentially engaging 
attention to a different extent while observing its earlier stages rather than the later ones. Thus, 
the presentation of more ecologic information about the gradual completion of an action can 
represent an advantage in studying infant complex processing of others’ behaviors in relation to 
their representations of reality, and should not be omitted. 
Different theoretical accounts have been proposed for how humans mindread others and 
how this ability develops. While some fall closer to the extremes of the deflationary (Perner & 
Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman, 2014) and the nativist (Kovacs et al., 2010; Baillargeon et al., 2010; 
Leslie, 2005) views, others try to provide a reconciliatory approach, which takes into account the 
rich and predominantly behavioral empirical evidence (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low et al., 
2016; Michael et al., 2016).  With respect to these theoretical accounts, the present findings with 
15-monts-old infants seem to support the presence of some basic form of mentalistic processing 
(as opposed to a mere physical processing). The sensitivity of the 15-month-old N400 to action 
sequences which are congruent or incongruent with a narrative context suggestive of people’s 
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beliefs about the reality indicates that deeper meaning processing is already present at this age. 
Although infants probably do not represent beliefs in the same way that older children and adults 
do, our results seem to support the view that their processing of others’ belief-based actions 
involves access to more generalized semantic memory which probably supports the later 
emergence of more sophisticated forms of belief representations (Michael et al., 2016). Beyond 
providing substantive data, we also provide a platform for future research of the early 
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Summary of Findings 
The current thesis examined early precursors of empathy development in 
infancy. Because of the complexity of this psychological construct and the limitations 
involved in its evaluation within developing populations we used a multi-method 
approach. The four studies within this thesis have explored the two main components 
of empathy, affective and cognitive, by investigating the neural mechanisms underlying 
infants’ perception of peers’ non-verbal vocalizations and the role of temperament as a 
modulator of these responses (Paper 1), the neural indices of motivational tendencies 
underpinning infants’ affective and behavioral responses to their peers’ negative and 
positive emotions (Paper 2), the developmental trajectory and mechanisms underlying 
infants’ spontaneous facial reactions (SFRs) to others’ emotional facial expressions 
(Paper 3), and the neurocognitive processes underlying early forms of belief processing 
that are thought to support the later emergence of more mature forms of mentalizing 
and empathy responses (Paper 4).  
In Paper 1, 8-month-old infants were exposed to the sounds of another peer 
crying, laughing and coughing while their EEG activity was recorded online. Further, 
parent filled in a questionnaire about their infants’ temperamental traits. Results showed 
that the processing of emotional non-verbal vocalizations produced by peers (i.e. 
laughter and crying) elicited differential event-related potential (ERP) activity at frontal 
locations, as indexed by differences in the N100, P200 and late positive component 
(LPC). Specifically, N100 amplitudes were more negative for peers’ crying sounds 
relative to positive and neutral peers’ non-verbal vocalizations of emotions, whereas 
P200 amplitudes did not show any differentiation between conditions. Peers’ crying 
elicited higher LPC amplitudes compared to laughing or coughing sounds. Importantly, 
these neural responses were modulated by temperamental differences. Infants with 
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better abilities to regulate their own arousal and low in negative emotionality showed 
more differentiated ERP responses between emotional and neutral vocalizations as well 
as between threatening (crying) and non-threatening vocalizations (laughing and 
coughing). Taken together, this study adds novel information to an increasing body of 
knowledge suggesting important links between temperament and emotion information 
processing development, which might help to predict later individual predispositions to 
experience greater or lesser empathy.  
In Paper 2 we presented 8-month-old infants with the audio-video recordings of 
a peer laughing and a peer crying. The stimuli were displayed twice on separate 
sessions. Frontal asymmetry patterns were recorded by means of 
electroencephalography (EEG) during the first session while infants’ other-oriented and 
emotional behaviors were recorded during the second visit to the lab. This study 
demonstrated that observing a peer crying was accompanied by greater relative right 
frontal activity while the observation of a peer laughing elicited greater relative activity 
in the left frontal region compared to the right region, yet the difference was not 
significant for this condition. During the second session, we found that infants 
resonated with their peers’ emotions. That is, they tended to display more positive affect 
(i.e. greater facial expressions of happiness) in response to a peer laughing as compared 
to a peer crying, and more negative affect (i.e. negative vocalizations, facial expressions 
of distress) in response to a peer crying as opposed to a peer laughing. Although we 
observed approach-oriented responses to peers’ distress and happiness in 8-month-old 
infants, overall they tended to display more withdrawal than approach behaviors for 
both peer affective conditions. Notably, we also found a significant link between early 
measures of frontal asymmetry activation and later infants’ empathic-related responses. 
Increased electrical activity in the left frontal region was associated with the occurrence 
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of more approach-oriented behaviors towards a peer crying and laughing. These 
findings are crucial since for first time they reveal a link between particular 
neurophysiological asymmetry patterns reflecting motivational tendencies and infants’ 
approach-oriented behaviors to their peers in early development. 
For Paper 3 we presented 4- and 7-month-old infants with dynamic facial 
expressions of happiness, fear, and anger, while we used electromyography (EMG) to 
measure the activation of the facial muscles specific for expressing these emotions (i.e. 
zygomaticus major (smiling), corrugator supercilii (frowning), and frontalis (forehead 
raising). Seven-month-old infants exhibited selective muscle activation patterns but not 
across all facial emotional expressions. In particular, the observation of happy and 
fearful faces in 7-month-old infants lead to increased activation of the muscles specific 
for expressing these emotions, with increased zygomaticus major activation for happy 
faces and increased frontalis activation for fearful faces. In contrast, the perception of 
angry faces lead to a more non-differentiated pattern of facial responsiveness. Although 
the muscle specific for expressing anger, corrugator supercilli, did record an increased 
activation in response to angry faces, this was not associated with a decrease in the 
activation of the muscle specific for smiling (i.e., the zygomaticus major) nor the 
muscle specific for fear (i.e., the frontalis). Unlike the older age group, 4-months old 
infants did not manifest selective activation of the recorded facial muscles in response 
to the facial cues of emotion. These findings are of crucial relevance since they suggest 
that motor mimicry alone is not sufficient to explain infants’ spontaneous facial 
reactions (SFRs) to others’ dynamic facial expressions of emotions, and that other 
mechanisms are likely to play an important role. Furthermore, the absence of 
emotionally matched facial expression in 4-month-old infants as compared to the oldest 
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age group, suggests that the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying SFRs undergo 
important changes during the second half of the first year of life.  
Finally, for Paper 4, 15-month-old infants were presented with a non-verbal 
false belief task consisting of visual narratives depicting a female agent acting 
congruently or incongruently with her false belief about the location of an object. 
During the whole session, infants’ EEG activity was recorded online. Our analyses 
revealed that ERP responses at frontal locations significantly differentiated between 
conditions, with the false belief incongruent condition (belief incongruent – reality 
congruent) evoking the largest N400. In line with previous behavioral studies, this 
finding suggests that at the age of 15 months infants are able to track other people’s 
actions, and detect inconsistencies between human agents’ final actions and their 
mental states. In the context of empathy development, these results are relevant since 
they set the basis for future research to explore the link between neural correlates 
underlying implicit forms of mentalizing and other-oriented responses (i.e. affective 
concern and approach-related behaviors) during toddlerhood and early childhood. 
Overall, this thesis demonstrated that during the second half of the first year the 
infant’s brain is already sensitive to their crying and laughing peers, which fits with the 
behavioral evidence provided by cry contagion studies (e.g., Martin & Clark, 1982; 
Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971) and previous infant ERP studies on face and 
speech emotional processing (e.g., Cheng, Lee, Chen, Wang, & Decety, 2014; de Haan, 
Belsky, Reid, Volein & Johnson, 2004; Grossman, Striano, & Friederici, 2005; Nelson 
& de Haan, 1996). The novel aspect of these findings is the discovery that infants’ brain 
responses to their peers’ non-verbal emotional vocalizations were modulated by 
individual differences in their tendency to express negative affect (IBQ-R Negative 
Emotionality factor) and their ability to regulate one’s own arousal (IBQ-R Fall 
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Reactivity scale). This relation is relevant given that negative emotionality and self-
regulation have been previously linked to empathy-related responses during childhood 
(e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Murphy, Shepard, Eisenberg, Fabes, 
& Guthrie, 1999). Remarkably, the perception of a peer crying and laughing not only 
elicited differentiated ERP responses, but also led to different EEG frontal asymmetry 
patterns, with the observation of a peer crying being associated with withdrawal 
tendencies (i.e. greater relative right frontal activation). Interestingly, these neural 
indices of motivational tendencies were related to infants’ later affective and behavioral 
responses to their peers, revealing a positive relation between left frontal activation and 
infants’ attempts to approach a peer crying and laughing. In other words, infants who 
exhibited higher relative left frontal activity during the observation of a peer crying 
displayed more attempts to approach the peer in distress during the second session. 
Likewise, infants who displayed higher relative left frontal activity during the 
observation of a peer laughing exhibited more attempts to engage vocally with the 
cheerful peer during the second visit. 
Notably, the current work also demonstrates for the first time that infants were 
able to respond with matching emotional responses to peers’ positive affect. This 
highlights that emotional resonance in infancy is not specific to negative emotions. 
Additionally, this thesis shows that infants’ facial responsiveness to others’ facial 
expressions of emotions do not solely rely on pure motor mimicry and that they may 
be the result of more complex neurocognitive mechanisms linked to a broad set of 
affective, cognitive and physiological processes. Additionally, the presence of age 
differences in SFRs suggests that the mechanisms underlying these responses undergo 
significant developmental changes between 4 and 7 months of age. Finally, this thesis 
also provides the basis for further research on the relationship between theory of mind 
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and empathy development by indicating that infants by the second year of life area able 
to run some neural computations of others’ beliefs, computations that are thought to 
underline the later emergence of affective concern and approach-related behaviors 
towards others’ in distress.  
Theoretical Implications 
Individual Differences in Infants’ Neural Responses to their Peers’ Non-verbal 
Vocalizations  
Infants’ ability to detect, discriminate and recognize others’ emotional 
expressions through vocalizations, facial expressions or body postures is fundamental 
for the later development of children’s interpersonal and social skills (e.g., Grossmann, 
2010; Walker-Andrews, 1997), and may be crucial for the development of empathy 
(Decety, 2015; Decety & Howard, 2013; Geangu, 2015; Hoffmann, 2001). Although 
non-verbal vocalizations are produced by pre-verbal infants from an early age and are 
thought to communicate pure emotional states, infants’ ability to process, respond, and 
use non-verbal vocalizations of emotions remains understudied (Dunbar et al., 2012; 
Geangu, 2015; Pell et al., 2015; Provine, 1996). The current thesis provides novel and 
valuable insights into the early development of emotion processing, with important 
implications for the study of empathy. Notably, the ERP components (N100, P200, 
LPC) sensitive to emotional vocalizations of peers in this study suggests that vocal 
emotional processing in infancy follows a multistep process, in a similar way to the one 
proposed for adults (see Schirmer & Kotz, 2006 for a review). Specifically, in adults 
the processing of vocal emotional information has been associated with three main 
processes, which are differentially represented in the brain (Schirmer & Kotz, 2006). 
These processes has been described as follows: (1) analysis of the acoustic cues of 
vocalizations, (2) extraction of the emotional signals conveyed within the set of 
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acoustic cues, and (3) deployment of higher order cognitive processes to decode 
emotional significant vocalizations. Importantly, this multistep account proposes that 
contextual or individual factors might facilitate or enhance processing at any of the 
three stages, which is partially corroborated by our study. In this respect, we showed 
that individual differences in the temperamental dimension of negative emotionality 
modulated the mean amplitude of the P200 and LPC responses to peers’ emotional non-
verbal vocalizations. Nonetheless, further research is needed in order to clarify the 
developmental trajectory of these ERP components and how they relate to the ones 
described in adults.  
Importantly, our ERP results underscored a preferential processing of crying 
sounds at early (as indexed by an enhanced N100) and later stages (as indexed by an 
enhanced LPC). This selective enhancement for crying sounds in auditory processing 
is in line with a substantial body of evidence suggesting the emergence of a negativity 
bias in the processing of emotional information at the age of 7 months, with enhanced 
allocation of attention and sensorial processing for negative emotions rather than 
positive (see Vaish, Grossman, & Woodward, 2008 for a review). ERP studies on 
infants’ perception of emotional faces and voices have provided some indirect evidence 
in this respect. For instance, the perception of angry and fearful prosodies embedded in 
speech has been associated with larger ERP amplitudes than happy or neutral prosodies, 
suggesting increased attention for negative emotional expressions (Cheng et al., 2014; 
Grossman et al., 2005). In the visual domain, infants tend to display stronger ERP 
responses when watching a fearful face than neutral or happy faces, suggesting the 
recruitment for more attentional resources for negative-valenced information (e.g., 
Nelson & de Haan, 1996; de Haan et al., 2004; Leppänen, Moulson, Vogel-Farley, & 
Nelson, 2007; Peltola, Leppänen, Mäki, & Hietanen, 2009). Notably, these ERP 
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findings are in agreement with behavioral evidence showing that infants use negative 
cues more successfully than positive cues to efficiently guide their own behavior in new 
or ambiguous situations (e.g., Hertenstein & Campos, 2001; Hornik, Risenhoover, & 
Gunnar, 1987; Mumme & Fernald, 2003; Mumme, Fernald, & Herrera, 1996).  
One potential explanation is that infants are born with a predisposition to 
primarily attend and process aversive events given its potential threat to survival 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; 
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Taylor, 1991). Indeed, threat-related emotions are 
hypothesized to carry greater informational value, develop more rapidly and require a 
faster reaction than positive ones, which in turn translates into the recruitment of more 
resources (e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 1999; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990; Vuilleumier, 
2005; Williams, 2006). Based on this evolutionary premise, throughout generations, 
those organisms who were better attuned to negative events had a better chance to 
survive threats and therefore to pass their genes onto next generations. Thus, negative 
events would operate as a sign for behavioural change while positive emotions would 
allow us for consistency and stability (Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 
2001; Taylor, 1991). Notably, behavioural adjustment to the environment is seen by 
some  as the best mechanism to increase the likelihood for survival (Cacioppo et al., 
1999; Baumeister et al., 2001).  
Although these models are informative, they are unable to account for the whole 
phenomenon (Rozin & Royzman, 2001). At this respect, some studies have already 
reported that infants do not show a negativity bias in the first few months after birth 
(Aldrige, 1994; Fernald, 1993; Singh, Morgan, & Best, 2002), which calls into question 
the credibility of an innate predisposition to negative events. Furthermore, even if the 
bias was an artefact of evolution, one would expect early experiences to play an 
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essential role in its ontogenetic emergence (Johnson, 2005; Vaish, Grossman, & 
Woodward, 2008). Mechanistic theories such as the range-frequency theory have 
incorporated the nature of this early experiences to explain the emergence of the 
negativity bias (Helson, 1964; Parducci, 1995). According to these theories, it is the 
novelty of negative events what leads to a negativity bias rather the negative valence 
per se. Support for this account comes from multiple behavioural studies showing that 
from early on infants are more frequently expose to positive interactions than negative 
(Malatesta & Haviland, 1982; Malatesta, Grigoryev, Lamb, Albin, & Culver, 1986). 
This early predominance of positive events may positively skew infants so that later on, 
negative events stand out and demand more attentional resources (Fiske, 1980; Peeters 
& Czapinski, 1990). This hypothesis does not necessarily conflict with evolutionary 
accounts. Rather, they can be seen as complementary, where ultimately the negativity 
bias serves the adaptive purpose of helping us to avoid harmful situations. 
Finally and more importantly, our results showed for first time that later auditory 
processing stages were modulated by individual differences, in particular by variations 
in the tendency to express negative affect (IBQ-R Negative Emotionality factor) and 
the ability to regulate one’s own arousal (IBQ-R Fall Reactivity scale). This is 
particularly important given the high relevance of negative emotionality and emotion 
regulation in the production of empathic responses (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992). 
Specifically, Eisenberg & Fabes (1992) model on empathy suggests that the interaction 
of the temperamental factors emotional reactivity (affective and motoric arousal) and 
self-regulation modulates the expression of empathy. This model assumes that people 
who are able to regulate their own emotions would be prone to experience less personal 
distress when exposed to another person’s suffering, regardless of their dispositional 
emotionality. In contrast, people who tend to experience emotions more intensely 
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(display higher arousal) would be more likely to show personal distress if they lack the 
ability to regulate themselves. All these assumptions have received some empirical 
support in research with children (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; 
Murphy et al., 1999; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994; Ungerer et al., 1990). In 
relation with this model, our results suggest that those infants who were better at self-
regulation and low in negative emotionality were the ones who exhibited a more 
accurate processing of emotional cues, which in turn might promote the expression of 
more other-oriented responses to others’ emotions. Taken together, our findings add 
novel information to an increasing body of knowledge suggesting important links 
between infant temperament and emotion information processing development, with 
potential implications for understanding the ontogeny of empathy.  
Neural Indices of Infants’ Motivational Tendencies to Approach their Peers  
In the domain of empathy, it has been argued that infants’ early responsiveness 
to others’ emotions, in conjunction with certain levels of emotion understanding and 
perspective taking, may further motivate other-oriented responses like prosocial 
behaviors (e.g., Batson, 1991, Decety & Lamm, 2006; Eisenberg, Losoya, & Guthrie, 
1997; Hoffman, 1975, 1982; Knafo & Israel, 2012; Singer, 2006). Nevertheless, until 
now these links had only been established at a theoretical level. This thesis provides 
significant data in relation to the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying infants’ 
motivational tendencies to approach or avoid peers experiencing distress or happiness, 
with potential implications for understanding the ontogeny of prosocial behaviors.  
In line with contemporary models of frontal EEG asymmetry (Davidson & Fox, 
1982, 1989), Paper 2 found that the observation of peers’ positive and negative 
emotions elicited distinctive patterns of brain activation and affective responding. In 
particular, the observation of a peer crying was associated with greater relative right 
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frontal activation in 8-month-old infants. This result fits with a series of previous 
studies linking right frontal cortical activity to the tendency to display negative 
emotions and withdrawal behaviors (e.g., Buss et al., 2003; Diaz & Bell, 2012; Fox & 
Davidson, 1987, 1988). Although observing a peer laughing evoked relative greater 
activation of the left hemisphere than the right hemisphere, this difference was not 
significant. A possible explanation for this finding is that the more generalized pattern 
of brain activity observed for a peer laughing reflects higher cognitive demands. This 
hypothesis is consistent with recent studies suggesting that generalized increases in 
alpha frontal EEG power are associated with higher levels of performance on memory 
and attentional task (Bell, 2001, 2002; Bell & Fox, 1997; Santesso, Schmidt, & Trainor, 
2007; Stroganova, Orekhova, & Posikera, 1999). It is thus possible that by the age of 8 
months the laughter of a peer is not yet especially meaningful, thus leading infants to 
recruit extra cognitive resources to extract the emotional information conveyed. In this 
respect, it is important to bear in mind that this thesis (Paper 1) has also shown that only 
the sound of a peer crying engages in later sustained cognitive processing compared to 
both infants laughter and infant coughing vocalizations. It is thus possible that 
compared to crying, the development of laughter follows a different course and relies 
on more sophisticated social cognition abilities that develop later. Supporting this view, 
several fMRI studies with adults suggest that the processing of emotional laughter 
places higher demands on frontal brain areas implicated in theory of mind and emotion 
evaluation (Szameitat et al., 2010; Tschacher, Schidt, & Sander, 2010; Wildgruber et 
al., 2013). 
Additionally, the current work extends the existing developmental literature by 
showing that emotional resonance in infancy is not only limited to negative emotions 
(e.g., Dondi, Simion, & Caltran, 1999; Sagi & Hoffman, 1976; Simner, 1971). Our 
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behavioral data suggests that by the age of 8 months infants respond with distinctive 
matching affective behaviors to a crying and laughing peer, which goes in consonance 
with previous findings indicating differences in physiological measures of arousal 
among 6- to 12-months-old infants in response to other infants’ happiness and distress 
(Geangu, Hauf, Bhardwaj, & Bentz, 2011; Upshaw, Kaiser, & Sommerville, 2015).  
To finalize, it is important to outline that the current work provided support for 
an incipient body of research suggesting important links between left frontal activity 
and approach-related responses towards others’ in distress, with potential implications 
for understanding the ontogeny of prosocial behaviors. In agreement with previous 
research (Hay, Nash, & Pedersen, 1981; Liddle, Bradley & MacGrath, 2015; Roth-
Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-Waxler, 2011), our study showed that infants are able to 
display very simple forms of approach towards others in distress, and that these 
behaviors are mediated by specific frontal asymmetry patterns indexing motivation to 
approach. In particular, we found a positive relation between left frontal asymmetry 
and infants’ approach-related behaviors to their peers crying and laughing. These 
findings fit with previous EEG work with younger children showing a link between left 
frontal activation and empathy-related reactions (Jones, Field, & Davalos, 2000; Jones, 
Field, Davalos & Hart, 2004; Paulus, Kuhn-Popp, Licata, Sodian, & Meinhardt, 2013) 
as well as previous infant EEG studies linking left frontal activation to higher levels of 
sociability with peers (Calkins, Fox, & Marshall, 1996; Fox, Henderson, Rubin, 
Calkins, & Schmidt,, 2001; Henderson, Fox, & Rubin, 2001). Thus, this study adds to 
the literature on social neuroscience and developmental psychology by providing 
evidence that frontal asymmetries are important markers for motivational processes and 
social behaviors (e.g., Fox, 1991, 1994; Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2010) and 
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by supporting current frontal EEG asymmetry models of motivational tendencies 
(Davidson & Fox, 1982, 1989).  
The role of Motor Mimicry in Empathy   
Traditionally, motor mimicry and matching mechanisms have been proposed as 
primary mechanisms underlying affect sharing in preverbal infants (e.g. Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Hoffman, 2001; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003; Preston & de 
Waal, 2002). This idea goes in line with the theoretical account of the automatic 
transmission of emotions, according to which humans tend to automatically mimic 
other’s facial, vocal or postural expressions of emotions and that such motor mimicry 
evokes the same emotions in the observer through perception-action matching (e.g. de 
Waal, 2009; Hatfield et al., 1994; Lipps, 1907). The idea that motor mimicry and 
matching mechanisms are causally related in the generation of emotional contagion 
responses mostly comes from a series of studies exploring spontaneous facial responses 
(SFRs) by using facial electromyography (EMG). Nonetheless, there is a large 
controversy about whether SFRs commonly seen after the exposure to facial 
expressions are triggered by perception-action matching mechanisms, bypassing 
emotional systems or, conversely, whether they are they result of an affective response 
(e.g. Beall, Moody, McIntosh, Hepburn, & Reed, 2008; Hess, Philippot, & Blairy, 
1998; Moody, McIntosh, Mann, & Weisser, 2007).  
The current thesis contributes to this old debate by challenging the perception-
action matching proposal. Taken together, the age differences and pattern of selective 
muscle activation found in Paper 3 suggest that motor mimicry alone is not sufficient 
for explaining spontaneous facial reaction since according to the perception-action 
assumption facial actions should have led to matching expression for every emotion. 
Rather they appear to be consistent with proposals that see SFRs not as pure motor 
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mimicry, but the result of complex neurocognitive mechanisms allowing both 
evaluative processes and shared motor representations (e.g., Dezecache et al., 2016; 
Grèzes & Dezecache, 2013). Specifically, the results suggest that infants’ SFRs to 
dynamic emotional facial expressions undergo significant developmental changes 
towards the age of 7 months and that motor mimicry is not always present (as in the 
case of anger). Therefore, it is plausible to argue that infants’ reactions to others’ facial 
emotional displays may be influenced by early and quick evaluations of the emotional 
signal (Dezecache et al., 2016; Grèzes & Dezecache, 2013; Soussignan et al., 2013). In 
support of this view, there is evidence suggesting that the processing of emotional cues 
from faces not only recruits neural networks linked to shared motor representations but 
also emotion-related brain networks such as the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex 
in adults (Adolphs, 2002; Carr, Iacobini, Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Pessoa, 
2008; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003) and infants (Minagawa-Kawai et 
al., 2009). Overall, it is possible to suggest that infants’ ability to share emotions with 
others during the first year of life may not rely on motor mimicry alone, but the 
combination of multiple complex neurocognitive mechanisms with direct relevance for 
the emergence of more mature empathy-related responses.  
The Role of Theory of Mind in Empathy  
The capacity for two people to resonate with each other emotionally, prior to any 
cognitive understanding, is the basis for developing shared emotional representations, 
but is not enough to account for more mature forms of empathic understanding. Such a 
comprehension requires the ability to understand the emotions and feelings of others in 
relation to oneself, which is commonly known as cognitive empathy. In turn, this 
cognitive aspect of empathy is thought to rely on the gradual emergence of theory of 
mind (ToM) processes implemented by a decoupling computational mechanism that 
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allow the individual to generate second-order representations of the feelings of another 
person, while regulating the own emotional arousal response to avoid personal distress 
(e.g., Decety, 2010; Decety & Meyer, 2008; Decety & Michalska, 2010; Decety & 
Svetlova, 2012). Therefore, in order to understand the developmental course of 
empathy, it is important to elucidate when and how ToM develops. Once having a 
starting point, we can further investigate when and how ToM begins to shape early 
forms of empathy into more complex ones.  
 For many years it has been thought that the ability to represent other people’s 
false beliefs (FBs) first emerges around the age of 4 years (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985; Flavell, 1988; Perner, 1991; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wellman 
& Bartsch, 1988). This evidence comes primarily from behavioral studies with pre-
schoolers using standard FB tasks, where children were explicitly asked to reason about 
an agent’s perception or belief about different aspects of reality (e.g. Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985; Wellman & Bartsch, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, an increasing 
number of studies using non-verbal tasks based on looking-time measures suggest that 
computations about others’ beliefs may be already present around the age of 15-18 
months (e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Song, Onishi, 
Baillargeon & Fisher, 2008; Träuble, Marinović, & Pauen, 2010). Interestingly, it is 
around the same age when infants also begin to display more mature forms of empathy 
like affect concern, attention to the distress of the other, cognitive exploration of the 
event and approach-oriented behaviors towards the other in distress (e.g., Knafo, Zahn-
Waxler, Van Hulle, Robinson, & Rhee, 2008; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner, 
& Chapman, 1992). Although the emergence of implicit forms of ToM and more 
mature empathy-related behaviors occur around the same period, no studies have 
empirically examined the link between these two constructs in infants. The lack of 
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studies on the topic might be due to the methodological difficulties associated with the 
evaluation of implicit (non-verbal) forms of ToM in infants and the old notion that this 
ability is not present until the age of 4 years. Critically, the investigation of the neural 
mechanisms underlying ToM in infancy is central to elucidating the developmental 
course of empathy since it has the potential to inform about the nature of the relation. 
Furthermore, by using brain measures it is possible to overcome the interpretational 
issues associated with looking time results, and specifically provide more certainty 
about the nature of the processes measured (Aschersleben, Hofer, & Jovanic, 2008; 
Gredebäck & Daum, 2015; Jackson & Sirois, 2009; Reynolds & Guy, 2012; Sirois & 
Jackson, 2007). 
 The current thesis contributes to the developmental literature by providing 
empirical evidence suggesting the presence of some basic form of mentalistic 
processing as opposed to mere physical processing at the age of 15 months. Notably, 
these findings support previous looking time measure studies suggesting that infants in 
the first half of the second year of life correctly anticipate the actions of agents holding 
a false belief, and, consequently, have an implicit understanding of others’ false beliefs 
(e.g., Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Song et al., 2008; Song 
& Baillargeon, 2008; Träuble et al., 2010). Although our results support the view that 
computations about others’ belief-based actions may be already present in infancy, the 
nature of the cognitive abilities measured in this task and how they relate to those 
measured in verbal (explicit) false belief tasks remains unclear. Research is therefore 
needed to investigate the relation between these two types of false belief tasks in 
development.   
In the domain of empathy, this finding is crucial given the relevance of mentalizing 
skills in the modulation of empathic responses through top-down processes. 
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Interestingly, the positive link between ToM and empathy development has been 
already reported by few fMRI studies in younger children (Decety, Michalska, & 
Akitsuki, 2008) and adolescents (Decety, Michalska, Akitsuki, & Lahey, 2009). These 
studies show that mentalizing about the pain of others when it has been intentionally 
caused recruits brain regions linked to the ToM network network as compared to 
situations in which the pain was caused accidentally. Despite these positive findings, 
there is still some controversies regarding the link between FB understanding (ToM) 
and empathy since not all developmental studies have succeeded in finding a link 
between these constructs (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Hugues, White, Sharpen, & 
Dunn, 2000) or have failed to report age effects on the development of cognitive 
empathy (Garaigordobil, 2009). The current thesis sets the basis for further studies to 
explore the link between infants’ empathic responses and their neural correlates 
underlying others’ belief processing at early stages. For instance, this study may 
encourage future research to investigate whether the neural correlates of preverbal 
infants in non-verbal FB tasks are related to infants’ ability to appropriately match 
others’ emotions or infants’ ability to respond with approach behavior to others’ in 
distress during the second year of life.   
Limitations and Future Studies 
This thesis is not without limitations. Regarding the study presented in Paper 1 
aimed at exploring individual differences in infants’ neural correlates to their peers’ 
laughter and crying, it is important to highlight two main limitations. The first limitation 
is linked to our stimuli. In particular, 25% of the adult raters judged the neutral sounds 
as something other than neutral. This may mean that any contrast involving the neutral 
stimuli was not as robust as one would hope. Interestingly, similar data has been 
obtained with visual stimuli, indicating that neutral faces may be interpreted as 
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potentially negative or threatening given their ambiguity and lack of clear approach 
signals (Lee, Kang, Park, Kim, & An, 2008; Wieser & Brosch, 2012). This constrain 
seems to be an inherent problem given that we tend to attribute emotional and mental 
states to neutral and facial vocal expressions. Therefore, it would be important for 
future research to elucidate the emotional significance of neutral stimuli in infancy. 
Additionally, it is possible that the use of only vocal information (without the 
convergent presentation of facial cues) may have muted infants’ ERP responses, 
especially those to laughter sounds, whose successful processing may depend on the 
presence of other emotional social cues (e.g., face and body posture) during the first 
year of life (Provine, 2004; Scott, Lavan, Chen, & McGettigan, 2014). Finally, it is 
important to bear in mind that the measures used to evaluate infants’ temperament 
relied on parental reports, which is an indirect measure of individual differences and is 
prone to rater bias or distortion. It would thus be important to further investigate 
individual differences by using more direct measures of temperament such as structured 
observations (e.g., Laboratory Temperament Assessment Battery – LabTab). Certainly, 
longitudinal or cross-sectional studies would provide further information about how the 
ERP components observed in this study mature across time and how they link with the 
adult ones.  
 There are also few limitations in the study presented in Paper 2 that require 
discussion. First, although the peer emotion tasks used in both sessions were similar, 
they differed in duration and the conditions under which they were applied, which could 
explain some of the differences observed. In addition, it is possible that infants’ 
responses were dampened by the exposure to unfamiliar peers rather than familiar ones. 
In this respect, there is suggestive evidence that child-child interactions are modulated 
by familiarity, with infants being more likely to interact with familiar peers as opposed 
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to unfamiliar peers (Demetriou & Hay, 2004; Howes & Farver, 1987; Stefani & 
Camaioni, 1983; Young & Lewis, 1979). Likewise, the presence of the caregiver in the 
room during the second session may have caused children to respond less. Their own 
mothers’ unresponsiveness toward the stimuli may have prompted them to be less 
interested themselves in the peers. It is also possible that infants responded less because 
they were waiting for their own mothers to intervene. In the future, it would be 
important to study the links between frontal EEG asymmetry and infants’ approach-
related responses towards their peers in more natural settings. It would also be relevant 
to study the neural indices of motivational tendencies of infants’ approach-related 
responses towards their caregivers.  
Regarding Paper 3, there are some constrains regarding the stimuli. Most 
notably, the emotional cues were only conveyed visually, which it may have been an 
issue for 4-month-old infants. In this respect, there is suggestive evidence that infants 
are able to discriminate emotional expressions conveyed visually around the age of 7 
months but not earlier (Bahrick, Lickliter, & Flom, 2004; Flom & Bahrick, 2007). Thus, 
the use of audio-visual stimuli could have been more effective in order to capture 
spontaneous facial reactions (SFRs) in 4-month-old infants as previously illustrated by 
Isomura and Nakano (2016). Future studies would need to clarify the details of the 
emergence and development of infants’ emotional SFRs by directly investigating the 
links between motor mimicry and emotion recognition abilities. In addition, we only 
included emotional facial expressions produced by strange female actresses, which 
might have weakened the infants’ responses. Previous studies suggest that infants 
exhibit more emotional resonance to their own mothers’ vocal and facial displays of 
emotions than towards an unfamiliar female (Kahana-Kalman & Walker-Andrews, 
2001; Montague & Walker-Andrews, 2002). Therefore, we do not know whether the 
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observed effects are induced by characteristics such as sex or degree of familiarity. 
Finally and most importantly, because this study did not use stimuli that were carefully 
matched in terms of the timing of the facial movements and peak intensity for the 
different emotional expressions, we cannot draw conclusions about the dynamic 
changes of the EMG signal across time. Further research should explore this question 
by creating artificial faces through morphing. The analysis of the dynamic changes 
across time would provide additional information about different underlying 
mechanisms and their interaction. In future studies, it would be important to use 
concurrent recordings of facial EMG and measures of psychophysiological arousal or 
electrical brain activity to better understand how affect related processes and neural 
correlates contribute to the emergence of the emotionally convergent SFRs during 
infancy. 
 Finally, there are some limitations linked to the interpretation of the results 
described in Paper 4. Although this study shows that by the age of 15 months infants 
are able to distinguish between conditions (as indexed by differences in the N400 
component), and these differences may be suggestive of the presence of some basic 
form of mentalistic processing, there are some controversies regarding the 
interpretation of these results. One could argue that amplitude differences in the N400 
between false belief congruent (FBc) and false belief incongruent (FBi) conditions were 
due to infants’ expectations on the retrieval of an object. That is, in the FBi condition, 
there is an object that could be retrieved, so the ‘incongruency’ indexed with a greater 
N400 for this condition could be because infants expected the actor to pull her hand of 
the box once she grasp the object, creating confusion of why she does not pull her hand 
out. On the contrary, in the FBc condition, there is no object to retrieve, so the fact that 
the actor does not pull her hand out of the box is congruent with the idea that she may 
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be still exploring around for her object in the box, trying to find it. One way to address 
this issue would be by modifying the existing stimuli such that for both conditions in 
the target stimulus the actress pulls her hand out of the box. Certainly, longitudinal 
designs correlating infants’ brain responses with later behavioral measures of 
performance in false belief tasks would be important to clarify the interpretation of 
results.  
Conclusions 
This thesis provides a substantial body of empirical evidence in relation to the 
affective and cognitive processes underlying the development of empathy during 
infancy. Despite the relevance of empathy for the development of healthy social 
interactions (Blair, 2001, 2005), this topic has remained largely unexplored throughout 
infancy. Undoubtedly, empathy is a complex phenomenon whose examination is not 
exempt of difficulties, mostly within preverbal infants. Nonetheless, recent advances in 
neuroimaging and psychophysiological techniques have provided a new venue to 
explore the processes underlying empathy without the need to rely on introspective 
data. The main objective of the current thesis was to contribute to the existing limited 
literature on empathy by adopting an multi-method approach to shed new light into the 
neural processes that underpin infants’ responses to others’ emotional states as well as 
the neural processes underlying infants’ responses to others’ false beliefs. 
The evidence presented in this thesis expands upon previous studies from 
developmental psychology and social cognitive neuroscience while raising new 
questions to be investigated by future studies. Importantly, this thesis demonstrates the 
advantages that developmental neuroscience can offer to the study of social cognition. 
Despite being a young discipline, there is no doubt that future infant research will 
greatly benefit from the combination of neuroimaging (e.g. EEG, fMRI, diffusion 
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tensor imaging, optical imaging), hormonal and genetic methodologies. Finally, the 
findings reported in the current work might help to improve early diagnosis of children 
with atypical social development and contribute to the development of more efficient 
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Principal statistics for the 3 (Emotion) x 2 (Hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on N100 mean amplitudes including gender as a between-subjects factor (N 
= 30) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Emotion F(2,56) = 6.639; p = .003,  h2p = .192 
Emotion*Gender F(2,56) = 2.529; p = .089,  h2p   = .083 
Hemisphere F(1,28) = 1.402; p = .246,  h2p = .048  
Hemisphere*Gender F(1,28) = .236;   p = .631,  h2p = .008  
Emotion*Hemisphere F(2,56) = .595;   p = .555,  h2p   = .021 
Emotion*Hemisphere*Gender F(2,56) = 2.157; p = .125,  h2p = .072 






Principal statistics for the 3 (Emotion) x 2 (Hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on P200 mean amplitudes including gender as a between-subjects factor (N 
= 30) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Emotion F(2,56) = 4.993; p = .010,  h2p = .151 
Emotion*Gender F(2,56) = 2.257; p = .114,  h2p   = .075 
Hemisphere F(1,28) = .488;   p = .490,  h2p   = .017  
Hemisphere*Gender F(1,28) = .039;   p = .845,  h2p = .001  
Emotion*Hemisphere F(2,56) = .566;   p = .571,  h2p   = .020 
Emotion*Hemisphere*Gender F(2,56) = .688;   p = .507,  h2p   = .072 









Table 3.  
Principal statistics for the 3 (Emotion) x 2 (Hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on LPC mean amplitudes including gender as a between-subjects factor (N 
= 30) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Emotion F(2,56) = 3.731; p = .030,  h2p = .118 
Emotion*Gender F(2,56) = .459;   p = .634,  h2p = .016 
Hemisphere F(1,28) = .057;   p = .813,  h2p = .002  
Hemisphere*Gender F(1,28) = 2.335; p = .138,  h2p = .077 
Emotion*Hemisphere F(2,56) = .950;   p = .393,  h2p = .033 
Emotion*Hemisphere*Gender F(2,56) = 1.355; p = .266,  h2p = .046 











Gender Difference Analyses for Paper 2 
 
 
Table 1.  
Principal statistics for the 2 (Condition) x 2 (Hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVA 
performed on the log-transformed alpha power values including gender as a between-
subjects factor (N =32) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Condition F(1,30) = .711;   p = .406,  h2p = .023 
Condition*Gender F(1,30) = .031;   p = .862,  h2p = .001 
Hemisphere F(1,30) = .995;   p = .327,  h2p = .032  
Hemisphere*Gender F(1,30) = 1.028; p = .319,  h2p = .033 
Condition*Hemisphere F(1,30) = 6.029; p = .020,  h2p = .167 
Condition*Hemisphere*Gender F(1,30) = .889;   p = .353,  h2p = .029 




Table 2.  
Principal statistics for the 2 (Condition) x 2 (Emotion facial expressions) repeated 
measures ANOVA performed on the percentages of emotional facial expressions 
including gender as a between-subjects factor (N = 22) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Condition F(1,20) = .104;     p = .750,  h2p = .005 
Condition*Gender F(1,20) = .552;     p = .466,  h2p   = .027 
Emotion F(1,20) = 3.152;   p = .091,  h2p   = .136  
Emotion*Gender F(1,20) = .660;     p = .426,  h2p   = .032 
Condition*Emotion F(1,20) = 16.450; p = .001,  h2p   = .451 
Condition*Emotion*Gender F(1,20) = .493;     p = .491,  h2p = .024 










Table 3.  
Principal statistics for the 2 (Condition) x 3 (Emotion vocal expressions) repeated 
measures ANOVA for emotional vocalizations percentages including gender as a 
between-subjects factor (N = 22) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Condition F(1,20) = 7.044;   p = .015,  h2p = .260 
Condition*Gender F(1,20) = .006;     p = .941,  h2p   = .000 
Emotion F(2,40) = 3.071;   p = .057,  h2p   = .133  
Emotion*Gender F(2,40) = .332;     p = .720,  h2p   = .016 
Condition*Emotion F(2,40) = 5.248;   p = .009,  h2p   = .208 
Condition*Emotion*Gender F(2,40) = 1.143;   p = .329,  h2p   = .054 





Principal statistics for paired-sample t-tests performed on looking time, withdrawal 
and approach behaviours percentages for each condition including gender as a 
between-subjects factor (N = 22) 
 
Source Paired-Sample T-Tests Parameters 
% Looking Time_Cry t(20) = 1.444;   p = .164  
% Looking Time_Laughter t(20) = 2.695;   p = .014 
% Withdraw_Cry t(20) = -1.133;  p = .271 
% Withdraw_Laughter t(20) = .221;     p = .827  
% Approach_Cry t(20) = .238;     p = .814  
% Approach_Laughter t(20) = 1.956;   p = .065 
















Principal statistics for the 3 (Muscle) x 3 (Emotion) x 2 (Time Window) repeated 
measures ANOVA conducted on the muscle mean amplitude z-scores including 
gender as a between-subjects factor for the 7-month-old group (N = 24) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Muscle F(2,44) = 2.021;   p = .145,  h2p = .084 
Muscle*Gender F(2,44) = 1.449;   p = .246,  h2p = .062 
Emotion F(2,44) = 1.937;   p = .156,  h2p = .081  
Emotion*Gender F(2,44) = .073;     p = .930,  h2p = .003 
Time Window F(1,22) = 1.889;   p = .183,  h2p = .079 
Time Window*Gender F(1,22) = .787;     p = .385,  h2p = .035 
Muscle*Emotion F(4,88) =  2.133;  p = .083,  h2p = .088 
Muscle*Emotion*Gender F(4,88) =  1.019;  p = .402,  h2p = .044 
Muscle*Time Window F(2,44) =  .116;    p = .890,  h2p = .005 
Muscle*Time Window*Gender F(2,44) =  .360;    p = .699,  h2p = .016 
Emotion*Time Window F(2,44) =  3.600;  p = .036,  h2p = .141 
Emotion*Time Window*Gender F(2,44) =  1.019;  p = .339,  h2p = .048 
Muscle*Emotion*Time Window F(4,88) = 3.081;   p = .020,  h2p = .123 
Muscle*Emotion*Time Window*Gender F(4,88) = .468;     p = .759,   h2p = .021 





















Principal statistics for the 2 (Belief) x 3 (Region) repeated measures ANOVA conducted on 
N400 mean amplitude including gender as a between-subjects factor (N =16) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Belief F(1,14) = .040;     p = .844,  h2p = .003 
Belief*Gender F(1,14) = .411;     p = .532,  h2p = .028 
Region F(2,28) = 53.021; p = .000,  h2p = .791  
Region*Gender F(2,28) = 3.110;   p = .060,  h2p = .182 
Belief*Region F(2,28) = 6.719;   p = .004,  h2p = .324 
Belief*Region*Gender F(2,28) = 2.262;   p = .123,  h2p = .139 





Principal statistics for the 2 (Belief) x 3 (Region) repeated measures ANOVA conducted on 
N400 peak amplitude including gender as a between-subjects factor (N = 16) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Belief F(1,14) = .131;     p = .723,  h2p  = .009 
Belief*Gender F(1,14) = .327;     p = .576,  h2p   = .023 
Region F(2,28) = 48.608; p = .000,  h2p   = .776  
Region*Gender F(2,28) = 3.555;   p = .042,  h2p   = .203 
Belief*Region F(2,28) = 5.779;   p = .008,  h2p   = .292 
Belief*Region*Gender F(2,28) = 2.279;   p = .121,  h2p   = .140 





Power Analyses for Paper 1 
 
The sample size of 30 was used to run post-hoc power analyses for the entire data set. 
For this study, separated 3 (Emotion: laughter, crying, coughing) x 2 (Hemisphere: left , 
right) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the mean amplitude of different ERP 
components at frontal locations (i.e. N100, P200 and LPC). Power estimates are reported for 
the main effects and interaction of all the ANOVAs. The analyses were performed using the 
program GPower1.  
Frontal N100 
 
This study had more than ample power to detect an effect of emotion, hemisphere and 
their interaction, at the observed magnitude, given that such effects truly exist in the population. 
Power analyses are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. 
Power statistics for the N100 component (N = 30) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Emotion .168 3 46  >.95 
Main effect Hemisphere .043 2 138  >.95 
Interaction .021 6 138  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
 
 
Frontal P200 (corrected) 
 
This study did not have sufficient power to determine whether there actually exists 
effects of this magnitude in the population. Power analyses are shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. 
Power statistics for the P200 (corrected) component (N = 30) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Emotion .003 3 46  .159 
Main effect Hemisphere .001 2 138  .054 
Interaction .017 6 138  .154 





This study had more than ample power to detect the effect of emotion at the observed 
level given that one actually exists. Same for the interaction. However, it did not have sufficient 
power to be confident that there truly is no effect in the population for hemisphere (5% power). 
Power analyses are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
Power statistics for the LPC component (N = 30) 
  
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Emotion .125 3 46  >.95 
Main effect Hemisphere .000 2 138  .050 
Interaction .036 6 138  >.95 
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Power Analyses for Paper 2 
 
Frontal Asymmetry measures 
 
The sample size of 32 was used to run a post-hoc power analysis for the EEG dataset. 
Specifically, one 2 (Condition: peer laughing film, peer crying film) x 2 (Hemisphere: left, 
right) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the log-transformed alpha power values. 
Power estimates for the main effects and interaction of this ANOVA are shown in Table 1. The 
analyses were performed using the program GPower1.  
Table 1. 
Power statistics for log-transformed alpha power values  (N = 32) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Condition .024 2 179  >.95 
Main effect Hemisphere .035 2 358  >.95 
Interaction .157 6 358  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
 
This study had more than ample power to detect effects of condition, hemisphere and 
interaction of this magnitude given that one truly exists in the population. 
Behavioural measures 
For infants’ emotional facial expressivity, the sample size of 22 was used to run a post-
hoc power analysis. One 2 (Condition: peer laughing film, peer crying film) x 2 (Emotion 
expression: positive, negative) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the percentage 
of emotional facial expressions coded. Power estimates for each main effect and interaction of 
the ANOVA are illustrated in Table 2.  
Table 2. 
Power statistics for facial expressions of affect (N = 22) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Condition .010 2 12  .289 
Main effect Emotion .156 2 24  >.95 
Interaction .438 4 24  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
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This study did not have sufficient power to determine whether there actually exists an 
effect of condition of this magnitude in the population (28.9% chance). Yet, it had ample power 
to detect the observed effect of emotion and interaction effect, assuming that these effects truly 
exist.  
For infants’ emotional vocalisations, the sample size of 22 was used to run a post-hoc 
power analysis. One 2 (Condition: peer laughing film, peer crying film) x 3 (Emotion 
expression: positive, negative, neutral) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 
percentage of emotional vocal expressions coded. Power estimates for the main effects and 
interaction of the ANOVA are illustrated in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. 
Power statistics for vocal expressions of affect (N = 22) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Condition .269 2 12  >.95 
Main effect Emotion .128 3 24  >.95 
Interaction .184 6 24  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
 
  This study had more than ample power to detect an effect of emotion, vocalisation and 
their interaction at the observed magnitude, given that such effects truly exist in the population. 
Further post-hoc power analyses were conducted across a series of paired-sample t-
tests run for withdrawal, approach and looking time measures with condition as independent 
variable. These results are reported in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. 
Power statistics for approach/withdrawal behaviours and looking time measures (N = 22) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Approach .095 2 12 .071 
Withdrawal .115 2 12 .082 
Looking time .422 2 12 .473 
Note. Effect size refers to Cohen’s d 
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Overall, this study did not have enough power to detect an effect of emotion for 
approach/withdrawal behaviours, assuming that such effects truly exist in the population. 
Nonetheless, it had low to medium power (47.3% power) to detect an effect of emotion for 
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Power Analyses for Paper 3 
 
The sample size of 24 7-month-old infants and 27 4-month-old infants were used 
respectively to run post-hoc power analyses for the key main effects and contrasts. For this 
study, separated 3 (Emotion: happiness, anger, fear) x 3 (Muscle: zygomaticus, corrugator, 
frontalis) x 2 (Time Window: 0-1 sec, 1-3 sec) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted 
on the z scores of muscle activity mean amplitude for each age group. Power estimates are 
reported for the main effects and key interactions of all ANOVAs. The analyses were 
performed using the program GPower1.  
EMG Results for 7-month-old infants  
 
This study had ample power to detect all of the observed effects in 7-month-old infants, 
given that these effects truly exist at the reported level (see Table 1 for more details). 
 
Table 1. 
Power statistics for the EMG results on 7-month-old infants (N = 24) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Emotion .088 3 20  >.95 
Main effect Muscle .099 3 60  >.95 
Main effect Time Window .095 2 60  >.95 
Emotion*Muscle .085 9 60  >.95 
Emotion*Muscle*Time Window .130 18 60  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
 
EMG Results for 4-month-old infants  
 
This study had sufficient power to detect all of the observed effects, given that these 
effects truly exist in the population. Yet, it is important to highlight that there was only a 46.6%  
chance of detecting the observed effect size of emotion for this age group.  Power estimates 





Power statistics for the EMG results on the 4-month-old infants (N = 27) 
 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Emotion .016 3 20  .466 
Main effect Muscle .031 3 60  >.95 
Main effect Time Window .108 2 60  >.95 
Emotion*Muscle .112 9 60  >.95 
Emotion*Muscle*Time Window .063 18 60  >.95 
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Power Analyses for Paper 4 
 
 The sample size of 16 was used to run post-hoc power analyses for the entire data set. 
For this study, separated 2 (Belief: FB congruent, FB incongruent) x 3 (Region: frontal, central, 
parietal) repeated measures ANOVA were conducted on the mean and peak amplitude of the 
N400 component. Power estimates are reported for each main effect and interaction of the 
corresponding ANOVAs. The analyses were performed using the program GPower1. 
 For the N400 mean amplitude, this study had the highest level of power to detect all 
(but one) of the observed effects, given that these effects truly exist at the level observed. 
Specifically, this study had lower power (8% chance) to detect an effect of condition at the 
observed size. For further details, see Table 1. 
Table 1. 
Power statistics for the N400 mean amplitude (N = 16) 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Belief .003 2 20  .080 
Main effect Region .756 3 60  >.95 
Interaction .292 6 60  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
 
  Similarly, for the N400 peak amplitude, this study had the highest level of power to 
detect all (but one) of the observed effects, given that these effects truly exist at the level we 
reported. Specifically, this study had lower power (1.65% chance) to detect an effect of 
condition at the observed size. Power estimates are presented in Table 2.  
Table 2. 
Power statistics for the N400 peak amplitude (N = 16) 
Source Effect size  # Groups # Measurements Power 
Main effect Belief .009 2 20  .165 
Main effect Region .735 3 60  >.95 
Interaction .262 6 60  >.95 
Note. Effect size refers to h2p 
 
 
1 Erdfelder, E., Faul, F., & Buchner, A. (1996). GPOWER: A general power analysis 
program. Behavior research methods, instruments, & computers, 28(1), 1-11.
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Appendix I 
Peak-to-Peak Analysis for Paper 4 
Given the temporal proximity between the N400 (450 – 600 ms) component and the 
N300 (250 – 350 ms) at frontal locations, it is possible that variations in the N300 parameters 
may have affected the N400 component differently across conditions. Thus, complementary 
peak-to-peak measurements and analyses were performed to control for N300 variations. With 
this purpose, same statistical analyses were performed on the measure of the mean amplitude 
difference between the peak of the N400 and the N300 (i.e. N400-N300). These analyses 
revealed non-significant main effects or interactions (p < .067). Therefore, when accounting 
for peak-to-peak amplitude differences, the Belief x Region interaction disappears. Table 1 
illustrates the 2 (Belief: FB congruent, FB incongruent) x 3 (Region: frontal, central, parietal) 
repeated measures ANOVA results for the corrected N400.  
 
Table 1.  
Principal statistics for the 2 (Belief) x 3 (Region) repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the 
mean amplitude difference between the peak of the N400 and the N300 (N = 16) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Belief F(1,15) = .225;   p = .642,  h2p = .015 
Region F(2,30) = 2.956; p = .067,  h2p   = .165 

















Repeated-Measures ANOVA with Hemisphere as a Factor for Paper 4 
An increasing amount of fMRI studies emphasizes the dominant role of the right 
hemisphere in mentalizing tasks1,2,3. These results go in line with lesion studies reporting 
Theory of Mind (TOM) impairments in patients with right hemispheric lesions4,5. Nonetheless, 
the literature contains opposing results with other studies depicting a higher activation of the 
left hemisphere during TOM tasks. Certainly, such disparities could be explained by 
differences in the task and stimuli used among studies. 
Following the empirical evidence pointing towards a differential involvement of the 
left and right hemisphere on TOM processing, the emergence of hemispheric differences on 
the N400 component was explored. With this purpose, independent 2 (Belief: FB congruent, 
FB incongruent) x 3 (Region: frontal, central, parietal) x 2 (Hemisphere: left, right) repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted on the N400 mean and peak amplitude (see Table 1 and 2 
for full parameters). 
Notably, the addition of hemisphere did not to provide any valuable information. 
Specifically, the analysis of the mean amplitude for this time window did not reveal neither a 
significant Belief x Hemisphere interaction (F(1,15) = .089, p = .769, h2p = .006) nor a 
significant Belief x Hemisphere x Region interaction (F(1,15) = 1.109, p = .343, h2p = .069). 
Similar results were found for the peak amplitude, where the analysis failed to find  a significant 
Belief x Hemipshere interaction (F(1,15) = .211, p = .652, h2p = .014) as well as a significant 
Belief x Hemisphere x Region interaction (F(1,15) = .552, p = .581, h2p = .036).  
Notably, post-hoc power analyses indicated that this study had ample power (>.095 
power) to detect both interaction effects at the observed size, assuming that such effects exist 
in the population. Thus, based on power calculations, we had sufficient power to detect a Belief 
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x Hemisphere and a Belief x Hemisphere x Region interaction effects of the magnitude 
observed, if such effects really exist.  
Altogehter, this study has failed to report hemispheric differences on the morphology 
of the N400 component as a function of belief (i.e. FBc, FBi).  
 
Table 1. 
Principal statistics for the 2 (Belief) x 3 (Region) x 2 (Hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on the N400 mean amplitude (N = 16) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Belief F(1,15) = .042;     p = .841,  h2p  = .003 
Region F(2,30) = 46.483; p = .000,  h2p   = .756 
Hemisphere F(1,15) = 4.069;   p = .062,  h2p   = .213  
Belief*Region F(2,30) = 6.198;   p = .006,  h2p   = .292 
Belief*Hemipshere F(1,15) = .089;     p = .769,  h2p   = .006 
Region*Hemisphere F(2,30) = 1.771;   p = .187,  h2p   = .106 




Principal statistics for the 2 (Belief) x 3 (Region) x 2 (Hemisphere) repeated measures ANOVA 
conducted on the N400 peak amplitude (N = 16) 
 
Source ANOVA Parameter Estimates 
Belief F(1,15) = .137;     p = .716,  h2p  = .009 
Region F(2,30) = 41.533; p = .000,  h2p   = .735 
Hemisphere F(1,15) = 3.832;   p = .069,  h2p   = .203  
Belief*Region F(2,30) = 5.325;   p = .010,  h2p   = .262 
Belief*Hemipshere F(1,15) = .211;     p = .652,  h2p   = .014 
Region*Hemisphere F(2,30) = 1.973;   p = .157,  h2p   = .116 
Belief*Region*Hemisphere F(2,30) = .552;     p = .581,  h2p   = .036 
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